Recognizing and Addressing Risk Ambiguity in Sea Level Rise Adaptation Planning: a Case Study of Miami-Dade County, Florida by Rozance, Mary Ann
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
Winter 1-9-2019
Recognizing and Addressing Risk Ambiguity in Sea Level Rise
Adaptation Planning: a Case Study of Miami-Dade County,
Florida
Mary Ann Rozance
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Environmental Policy Commons, and the Urban Studies Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized
administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rozance, Mary Ann, "Recognizing and Addressing Risk Ambiguity in Sea Level Rise Adaptation Planning: a Case Study of Miami-
Dade County, Florida" (2019). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 4673.
10.15760/etd.6557
 
 
 
Recognizing and Addressing Risk Ambiguity in Sea level Rise Adaptation Planning:  
A Case Study of Miami-Dade County, Florida 
 
by  
Mary Ann Rozance 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
degree requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy  
in  
Urban Studies 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
Vivek Shandas, Chair 
Connie Ozawa 
Thaddeus Miller 
Amy Lubitow 
 
 
 
 
 
Portland State University 
2019 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2018 Mary Ann Rozance
 
 
i 
 
Abstract 
As coastal cities around the world identify and implement adaptations to sea level 
rise, they are faced with competing interests around what should be done and how to 
prioritize actions. Often, environmental problems—like confronting the challenge of sea 
level rise—are posed as requiring expert driven, technical solutions to identify and 
mitigate risks across the landscape. This framing, however, ignores the way in which 
diverse knowledge can help inform long-term planning horizons that address complex 
ways that sea level rise affects communities. The failure to integrate diverse knowledge 
into sea level rise adaptation can result in barriers to implementation and outcomes that 
can reproduce inequities.  
In environmental planning, knowledge integration challenges can stem from 
ambiguity around the construction of environmental risk knowledge, as well as 
institutional arrangements that inhibit diverse involvement. Ambiguity refers to a context 
in which there are different and sometimes conflicting views on how to understand the 
problem or system to be managed, for example, conflicts around what risks to measure 
and how to measure them. This manifests in the ways that different groups construct and 
use knowledge about risks. Often ignored in planning contexts and research on sea level 
rise adaptation, ambiguity—particularly around social risks—are critical to address, since 
they can determine whether diverse knowledge about risks are integrated or ignored in 
planning.  
This dissertation uses a case study of Miami-Dade County, Florida and is guided 
by the question: how do different groups understand risk within sea level rise, and what 
planning and governance factors influence the way diverse dimensions of risk are 
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integrated into adaptation strategies? Findings from this case study suggest that 
baselines, projections, and the focus of risk rooted in an economic discourse based on 
short-term planning horizons and technical constructions of risk have more authority as 
compared with counter arguments around ecological and social risks. Recommendations 
include the need for transparent adaptation decisions and the inclusion of diverse 
stakeholders in the production of regional climate science, sea level rise assessments, and 
adaptation planning. A more integrated approach can better address diverse risks and 
facilitate long-term planning.    
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Chapter 1: Dissertation Introduction 
 On March 29, 2018 climate activist Maggie Fernandez addressed the City of 
Miami Sea Level Rise Committee in Coconut Grove at City Hall. Asking the committee 
and the city to discuss the possibility of joining the Miami Climate Alliance’s effort in 
holding energy companies accountable for the cost of climate change impacts, the 
situation erupted into an argument over whether greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation 
efforts are under the purview of the committee (Harris 2018). Architect and Sea Level 
Rise Committee member, Reinaldo Borges, the most vocally opposed to Fernandez, 
argued to maintain the focus of the committee’s efforts on adaptation solutions and not 
tap into the politics of responsibility. Fernandez argued back and pointed to the lack of 
diverse representation on the committee and the need to build a more inclusive planning 
arena in which more peoples’ concerns could be addressed. The outfall of this outburst, 
which included personal attacks, ended in Mayor Suarez calling for Borges’ resignation 
and potential reorganization of the Sea level Rise Committee into a resiliency committee 
to broaden its scope.   
 Like most outbursts in public settings, this one has multiple layers. There is the 
feeling of a lack of representation on a formal committee, boundaries that exclude topics 
that some view as relevant, as well as uneven power structures between a climate activist 
and a prominent architect. Debates surrounding the risks, or the anticipated dangers 
associated with sea level rise, are at the core of these issues. Contestations emerging from 
different views of what is considered relevant for sea level rise adaptation planning can 
be explored by examining how different groups (e.g. the development community and 
environmental organizations) construct and frame risk in the planning process. A climate 
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activist, such as Fernandez for example, may be focused on a broad set of impacts from 
climate change and concerned with reducing emissions to mitigate all these impacts. 
While an architect may also be concerned with those things, they may be relatively more 
concerned with the impacts sea level rise will have on development and future growth 
within Miami. Neither Fernandez nor Borges are right or wrong in their views and 
priorities, yet some priorities carry more authority and political motivation than others, 
and may be embedded in assessments, policies, and planning documents. Within the 
planning context surrounding the existential threat of sea level rise in Miami, Florida, 
such dynamics emerge out of and simultaneously produce and construct the way in which 
risks are understood and addressed in the planning process. Finding ways to balance 
shifting priorities in this planning context around risk is a complex challenge.  
 This dissertation examines the way institutions, and individuals acting within 
those institutions, construct knowledge about risks and the social and governance 
processes surrounding the ways in which those different risk constructions are or are not 
embedded in planning activities. Broadly defined, the construction of risk encompasses 
the social process of selecting dangers for attention (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). 
Though risks are often considered to be something that can be measured and formally 
assessed as a function of probability and consequence of a potential outcome, there is no 
one “correct” way to identify risks (Lupton 1999). The process of defining and assessing 
risks takes place in social settings by which people make decisions about what 
probabilities to assign and how to assign them, and what consequences to measure and 
how to measure them, among other factors that determine risk (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1983; Lupton 1999). Often, guidelines and baselines surrounding these decisions are 
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formalized in laws and policies. Uncertainty is a key component of risk because a world 
with perfect information about the future would suggest straightforward decision-making 
where outcomes of all decisions would be known, without the need to examine 
probabilities, unintended consequences, or risks (Gross 2010). The desire to reduce 
uncertainty is often paramount when managing risks, and how uncertainties are assessed 
and addressed are shaped by and shape our processes for how we deal with risks (Gross 
2010). Since there is no one way to define risk, we must understand different planning 
contexts and the systems that determine and reinforce dominant narratives around risk.  
The problem of risk construction and knowledge integration is not new to the 
topic of sea level rise because societies have long examined and managed different risks 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Wildavsky 1988; Winner 1989). For example, cities 
examine and attempt to reduce risks from crime, economic activities, and human and 
environmental health. Assessing risks and identifying strategies to mitigate those risks is 
ubiquitous to many urban environmental planning challenges (Gottlieb 1993; Fischer 
2000). This is largely because we live in a society in which the risks resulting from 
industrialization often outstrip the benefits, and the dark sides of progress increasingly 
come to dominate social and political debates (Beck 1992). While cities have always 
grappled with risk management, modernization has transformed this relationship and new 
risks continue to emerge out of activities that are simultaneously viewed as technological, 
industrial, and urban achievements (Beck 1992; Latour 2012). Many modern risks are 
both more pervasive and harder to detect, requiring science and expertise to understand 
and interpret (Winner 1989; Beck 1992). Given the highly technical and invisible nature 
of risks, knowledge politics contested through expertise and counter expertise emerge 
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from managing modern risks (Beck 1992; Fischer 2000).  This serves to elevate the 
expertise and status of knowledge professions to a prime political position in the 
discourse of risk— often experts control the discourse around risk, leaving little or no 
room for the layperson (Wynne 1996). The central fault of the risk society is the growing 
tension between those with and those without formalized risk knowledge (Beck 1992). 
Understanding risk, science, and politics is complex, as is the way in which these 
knowledges become embedded in decision-making. While citizens depend on the 
knowledge produced by expert institutions, they can be simultaneously concerned that 
these institutions construct that knowledge to obscure or mystify them (Wynne 1996; 
Fischer 2000). Sometimes, knowledge about risks can be controlled and determined by 
certain policies, pre-existing goals, and decisions, which may benefit some while harming 
others (Tenenbaum and Wildavsky 1984).  
From a theoretical standpoint, conventional work around risks has neglected two 
basic dimensions of the social processes that surround them. First, the social context in 
which risks are embedded is often ignored (Wynne 1992). Secondly, assumptions about 
the character of risk are often removed from the experiences of those at the actual site of 
the risk (Wynne 1992). For example, while institutions may conduct formal risk 
assessments, they may not be culturally relevant or reflect the risks that people 
experience in their daily lives (Wynne 2003). The danger of failing to recognize the 
social processes that construct and embed risk knowledge is that some knowledge—
particularly lay knowledge—can be left out, and risk management solutions can overlook 
critical knowledge to the problem at hand.  
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Increasingly, we have multiple institutions, both formal and informal, governing 
knowledge production and implementation around risks (Leach et al. 2007). Each of 
these institutions has their own way of understanding risks. Institutions that govern 
decisions about risks shape risk knowledge in accordance with their own missions, 
priorities, ways of knowing, and boundaries (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Hilgartner 
1992). Those institutions and individuals closest to decision-making, often adopt risk 
knowledge that most closely aligns with their cultural practices and preferences, which 
can differ from other institutions more removed from decision-making (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1983). When not recognized and addressed, divergent and conflicting ways of 
constructing risk—known as risk ambiguity—can lead to barriers to implementation, 
communication, and knowledge integration (van den Hoek 2014). These processes can 
also reproduce social inequities (Adger et al. 2005; Adger and Jordan 2009; Wisner et al. 
2014).  
The way that risk knowledge is produced and governed in modern risk societies 
can hide who serves to benefit and who might be burdened by planning outcomes (Beck 
1992; Wisner et al. 2014). Ultimately, risks are shaped by priorities, and within urban 
systems, priorities connected to both formalized and informalized systems of power and 
authority can shape planning outcomes in their favor (Fischer 2000; Leach et al. 2007). 
This can be either intentional or unintentional. The unintentional creation of risk 
knowledge that fails to address diverse dimensions of risk can be the result of 
institutional blindness to different problem framings and ways of measuring or knowing 
risks (Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 2018). Risks can also intentionally be ignored or 
misrepresented (Fischer 2000). This can occur when private interests dominate the policy 
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design and evaluation around how risks are measured and managed (Fischer 2000). For 
example, United States policies on toxicants place most of the burden of proof on the 
public to demonstrate they are a risk, rather than on the companies producing toxicants to 
demonstrate safety (Fischer 2000).  
This complicates planning for risk and suggests that modern societies managing 
risks are now trapped: risks are increasing but those responsible for their management are 
often blind to the complexity of those risks, and producers of risks are able to either avoid 
regulatory measures or possibly benefit from the ways that risks are constructed. The 
public must live with the obvious threats of uncontrolled technical industrial development 
and they often have little ability to account for the existence of threats or accurately 
identify the culpable individuals. However, such power dynamics and outcomes around 
winners and losers within a risk society are not guaranteed. Individual actors within 
different institutions and the community can change the system and ways in which risks 
are understood and managed. This has happened throughout history as communities have 
rallied against toxins in their neighborhoods, work environments, and food products 
(Gottlieb 1993; Fischer 2000). The environmental justice movement emerged out of the 
recognition that environmental harms are disproportionately experienced by communities 
of color and low-income communities (Gottlieb 1993).  
So, while trends in modern risk societies present a gloomy image of those in 
power obfuscating risk in their favor, individuals can act within the system and 
institutions do change. The first step to changing top-down risk management practices is 
to create systems with a more complex understanding of the public’s relationship to 
expertise and broader understandings of how multiple risks are understood and serve to 
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be integrated into decision-making contexts (Fischer 2000). Expert’s reductionist 
framings of both biophysical risks and evaluations of citizens responses to risks often fall 
short of achieving the necessary foundation for knowledge integration practices (Slovic 
1992). We see an increasing recognition that ordinary people have valuable risk 
knowledge (Wynne 2003) and that city planning efforts seek out this knowledge for 
decision-making (Innes and Booher 2010). A restructuring of professional expertise 
towards a more reflexive approach to science (Wynne 2003), and a more democratic and 
integrative approach to measuring and addressing risks (Beck 1992; Fischer 2000; Innes 
and Booher 2010), can open-up knowledge practices around risk and create a more 
integrative approach to assessing and addressing environmental risk (Miller and Muñoz-
Erickson 2018).  
This dissertation applies this planning challenge around assessing and addressing 
risks in the context of sea level rise adaptation planning. Impacts from climate change, 
including sea level rise, presents new emerging risks that are being understood and 
planned for by institutions governing the urban environment. Research on climate change 
risks, particularly the science to policy interface, demonstrate existing power structures 
around climate change mitigation and adaptation policies (Hulme 2009; Hulme 2010; 
Hulme 2013). Global climate knowledge and the institutions representing that knowledge 
come into conflict with local knowledge, sovereignty, and local power and authority 
(Jasanoff and Long-Martello 2004; Hulme 2009; Denton 2017). Researchers have also 
examined the uneven distribution of climate risks (Wisner et al. 2014) and community 
pushback and/or acceptance to different climate change policies and adaptation strategies 
(Humle 2009). While uneven distributions of risks are explored, the role of knowledge 
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practices that result in those distributions is frequently unexamined, particularly in North 
America.    
The risk of sea level rise is predominantly considered in future contexts and 
understood by climate models that both serve to reconstruct the past and project into the 
future. At the same time, decisions surrounding what to do about sea level rise impacts 
are affecting people now, and the way in which risk knowledge is constructed and 
integrated into the planning process can show us who may serve to benefit and who may 
be burdened by these planning choices. Ultimately it comes down to whose knowledge 
matters in terms of how risks are measured, and how is that knowledge used. The 
governance and production of risk knowledge is not static, people can work outside of the 
norms determined by their institutions and institutions can change in response to 
community and political pressure.  
Sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County, Florida is used as a 
key-case study for how knowledge about risks posed from sea level rise are both 
constructed and integrated into planning processes. In Miami-Dade County, planners and 
scientists have been examining sea level rise risks for decades and have begun to 
implement solutions to address inundation from changes to the sea level. The purpose of 
this dissertation research is to better understand how risks from sea level rise are 
constructed within a local planning context and the challenges and opportunities current 
governance processes present in integrating diverse knowledge about those risks. This 
will allow us to more closely examine risk challenges and how they are being reproduced 
and challenged in a real-world example. This dissertation is organized as follows:      
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Chapter 2, titled, “Using risk ambiguity to examine sea level rise adaptation 
planning,” applies the concept of risk ambiguity to the topic of sea level rise adaptation 
planning by emphasizing the way that risk knowledges are constructed in the planning 
process. Knowledge constructions around risk reflect institutional priorities, 
epistemologies, and boundaries in adaptation governance. This chapter provides a 
theoretical framework and research questions that guide the dissertation. 
Chapter 3, “Literature and theoretical review” presents a literature review 
extending the theoretical frame around knowledge co-production, the social construction 
of risk, and knowledge integration theories around governance and planning. The purpose 
of this chapter is to connect these theoretical frameworks to the issue of sea level rise 
adaptation planning to provide more context for research gaps examined in this 
dissertation.  
Chapter 4 “Research design and methods,” offers an overview of the research 
design and methods. A single case study research design is used to understand the 
multiple, complex factors that shape how risks from sea level rise are constructed and 
integrated in planning systems. The case study was informed by document analysis and 
interviews. Interviews were transcribed and coded. Thematic analysis was used to 
identify emerging themes and discourses. Literature and theoretical reviews are also used 
to contextualize findings that emerge out of the case study.  
Chapter 5, titled, “Constructing risk knowledge in sea level rise adaptation 
planning in Miami-Dade County, Florida” examines the process of how institutions select 
or ignore dangers for attention. I apply Gross's (2010) theory on the two types of 
ignorance—the uncertainties that get measured and further evaluated, and the 
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uncertainties that are ignored—to understand how some risk knowledge is used in the 
planning process and uncertainties further examined while other risk knowledge is 
ignored. This chapter includes three findings of how sea level rise risks are constructed. 
First, that determining the physical hazards of sea level rise (i.e. rates, projections, and 
physical geographies) is a negotiated and contested process. Second that risk knowledge 
that supports an economically viable future is favored over knowledge that either 
threatens that future or is seen as insignificant to that future. Third, the production of 
knowledge about biophysical hazards shaped by certain economic and political framings 
are reinforced and reconstructed in the planning process as hazards are translated to their 
interaction with social, technological, ecological, and economic vulnerabilities. This 
research contributes to cultural theories of risk by identifying points of ambiguity among 
stakeholder groups in sea level rise adaptation planning. Findings from this research can 
be used to understand political processes around how constructions of risk are emerging 
in the context of climate adaptations in urban environments.  
Chapter 6 titled, “Pathway for change or business as usual? Discourses in sea 
level rise adaptation governance in Miami-Dade County, Florida” examines institutional 
arrangements around adaptation governance through emerging narrative networks and 
storylines around problem framing and solutions to sea level rise adaptation planning. 
This chapter provides the interpretive planning context of sea level rise adaptation 
governance in Miami-Dade County, including an overview of roles and responsibilities of 
institutions involved or affected by sea level rise adaptation planning and the associated 
adaptation pathways. Four discourses around sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-
Dade County emerge within the community. The first is a focus on the economic core of 
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development and tourism, aligned primarily with the business community. The second 
discourse emphasizes infrastructure and is closely aligned with local governments and the 
desire to sustain a regional tax base to fund adaptation actions. Thirdly, a discourse 
around ecological impacts from sea level rise emerged among environmental non-
governmental organizations, some government employees, and private interest groups, 
primarily underpinned by scientific rationality. Finally, considerations for the people 
using infrastructure and that people also matter emerged out of cultural rationality with 
community organizations and others purporting initiatives that recognize distributive 
justice and the unevenness of socio-economic vulnerabilities. This research contributes to 
planning theory by opening-up governance processes around adaptations to climate 
change shape and are shaped by the ways different groups define and interpret risks to 
sea level rise. The planning and governance contexts are used to examine how these 
discourses interact with each other.  
Chapter 7, “Miami-Dade County, Florida case study conclusions, theoretical and 
planning contributions, and recommendations” concludes the Miami-Dade County case 
study. This chapter draws on lessons learned from risk construction and governance in 
the Miami-Dade County case study to articulate principles for creating inclusive 
adaptation science and planning activities. Findings from chapters 5 and 6 suggest that 
baselines, projections, and the focus of risk rooted in economic principles have more 
authority as compared with counter arguments around ecological, social and cultural 
risks. Recommendations include the need for transparent adaptation decisions and the 
inclusion of diverse stakeholders in the production of regional climate science, sea level 
rise assessments, and adaptation planning. This work informs climate change adaptation 
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science and planning practice by identifying barriers and opportunities for diverse 
knowledge integration in the planning process. These findings illuminate points within 
the planning system that can better facilitate the creation of shared meaning, trust, and 
relationships among different stakeholder groups. 
Chapter 8 is a co-authored chapter titled, “Re-scaling the black box of decision-
making: Global to local knowledge practices of sea level rise risk in coastal adaptation 
planning.” As part of my National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education 
Research Traineeship (IGERT), I am required to co-author a dissertation chapter with 
other IGERT Fellows. We developed a framework that can be used to examine scalar 
issues of knowledge practices in identifying and planning for risks from sea level rise. As 
sea level rise risk knowledge is translated from global to site-specific scales, we identify 
five key moments in which politics of scale around risk knowledge emerge in adaptation 
work: 1) the construction of the global climate; 2) the regional downscaling of climate 
impacts; 3) the local definition of risks; 4) the transformation of on-the-ground social-
ecological-technical systems and infrastructures; and, 5) the evaluation of intervention 
efficacy. We apply this framework to findings from two case studies in the coastal areas 
of Florida, United States, and the Pacific Islands to exemplify scalar issues at work in 
adaptation governance.   
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Chapter 2: Using Risk Ambiguity to Examine Sea Level Rise Adaptation Planning 
2.1 Introduction 
Impacts from climate change put pressure on cities’ social, ecological, and 
technological systems (IPCC 2012; IPCC 2014). In response, cities around the world are 
transforming urban infrastructure to adapt to future climatic regimes and assuage 
potential threats posed to urban life. Across the country, coastal cities are developing and 
implementing a range of strategies to protect populations from the impacts of sea level 
rise. For example, the City of Miami Beach is currently raising street levels (Flechas 
2015) and across the San Francisco Bay Area, groups are focused on restoring tidal 
wetlands in anticipation of climate impacts (King 2016). Planners in Seattle have begun 
working with community groups to better understand the ways in which sea level rise 
will affect urban residents (Stowe 2016). 
Within these and other climate adaptation contexts, planners are confronted with 
the challenge of integrating diverse knowledge systems into adaptation strategies (Adger 
et al. 2009; van den Hoek 2014). Knowledge integration is particularly important to the 
ways in which risks surrounding sea level rise are understood relative to different 
stakeholder groups (van den Hoek 2014). Often, solutions to environmental problems—
like confronting the challenge of sea level rise—are unproblematized and posed as 
requiring expert driven, technical solutions (Winner 1989; Jasanoff 2006). This framing, 
however, ignores the way in which the knowledge behind these solutions is produced and 
situated in political, economic, and cultural contexts (Jasanoff 2004; Shapin and Schaffer 
1985; Miller 2008), and overlooks other knowledge systems relevant to the problem at 
hand (van den Hoek 2014; Brugnach and Ingram 2012). The failure to integrate diverse 
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knowledge systems and constructions of risk into sea level rise adaptation strategies can 
result in barriers to implementation (Adger et al. 2005; Adger et al. 2009; Sabatier 2005) 
and outcomes that can reproduce social inequities (Adger et al. 2005; Adger and Jordan 
2009; Wisner 2014).  
In environmental planning, knowledge integration challenges can stem from 
several sources, including ambiguity and contestations around how environmental risks 
and solutions are framed (Brugnach and Ingram 2012; Fischer 2000) and institutional 
arrangements that may inhibit diverse involvement (Leach et al. 2007; Jasanoff and Long 
Martello 2004; Bogason and Musso 2006). This dissertation examines knowledge 
integration barriers in sea level rise adaptation planning and is guided by the question: 
how do different groups understand risk within sea level rise, and what planning and 
governance factors influence the way diverse dimensions of risk are integrated into 
adaptation strategies?  
The climate change literature generally defines adaptation as the “adjustment in 
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (McCarthy et al. 
2001, p. 982). Sea level rise adaptation planning is predicated on predicting real world 
impacts and designing and implementing an adaptation strategy. In the wake of uncertain 
future conditions, cities depend on models, simulations, and expert opinions to make 
decisions about what adaptation measures to take and how to design and implement 
strategies. Knowledge claims about risks posed by climate change impacts are used to 
understand and promote climate adaptation (Hilgartner 1992), and the way risks are 
understood is ultimately linked to the design, planning, and implementation of proposed 
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solutions (Sarawitz et al. 2000). These different knowledge claims are prioritized, ranked 
and privileged in the planning process (Gross 2010).  
In environmental planning, risk is often conceived of as a function of the physical 
components of the hazard (i.e. rate of sea level rise), the vulnerability of the social and 
ecological system (e.g. topography, socio-demographic data), and the system’s adaptive 
capacity—or ability to respond to shock (e.g. evaluated in terms of institutions and 
governance, information and resources, etc.) Planners conduct risk assessments which 
stem from a tradition of technical, scientific, and objectively rational approaches (Fischer 
2000; Wisner 2014). The focus is on minimizing risks and it is often assumed that more 
information about the potential impacts of climate change on social, economic, and 
biophysical systems will result in better decision-making, and that the lack of information 
about risks is the main limitation in adaptation action (Adger et al. 2009; van der Hoek et 
al. 2014). This line of reasoning is understandable, given that predicting uncertain futures 
and impacts is at the core of many debates around how and when to take political action 
(Adger et al. 2009). However, scholars have identified multiple dimensions of uncertainty 
and while the focus tends to be on “not knowing enough” in terms of incomplete 
knowledge and unpredictability, ambiguity or “knowing differently” is equally important 
(see Figure 2.1) (Weick 1995; van den Hoek et al. 2012; Brugnach and Ingram 2012).  
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Figure 2.1 Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity: Modified and expanded from van den Hoek 2014, depiction of 
how ambiguity, or “knowing differently” differs from incomplete knowledge and unpredictability, or “not 
knowing enough.” 
Ambiguity refers to a context in which there are different and sometimes 
conflicting views on how to understand the problem or system to be managed (Dewulf et 
al., 2005; Brugnach et al., 2008; Renn et al., 2011). Groups may have differing ideas of 
what to put as the focus, how to interpret information about the system, or how to bound 
a system (Brugnach et al. 2008; van den Hoek 2014). Often ignored in planning contexts 
and research on sea level rise adaptation, ambiguity—particularly around social risks—
can be far more important for decision-making than the knowledge gaps of natural 
systems, since ambiguities can hamper project development and lead to conflicts over the 
facts (van den Hoek 2012). Within sea level rise adaptation, issues of ambiguity can take 
multiple forms: discretionary decisions resulting from the focus or problem framing, 
epistemological conventions or how knowledge is understood, and system boundaries 
that can restrict what knowledge is used.   
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Figure 2.2 Within social-ecological systems, different contexts of risk emerge relative to the institution 
defining and making claims to those risks. 
First, ambiguity can arise in what different groups place as the substantive focus 
of the risk definition (van den Hoek 2014). Institutions and groups create their own 
conceptions of risk stemming from different ontological perspectives from which 
institutions align themselves (Hilgartner 1992; Short and Clark 1992; Wisner et al. 2014). 
In understanding risk, cultural theory argues that risks are “defined, perceived, and 
managed according to principles that inhere in particular forms of social organization” 
(Rayner 1992). Figure 2.2 represents some of the ways risk may come to be thought of in 
terms of impacts from sea level rise using a post card from Miami Beach to illustrate 
various dimensions of risk. Adger et al. (2009) identify that within climate change 
adaptation planning, much of the focus for framing risk among the planning community 
surrounds ecological, economic, and technological dimensions of risk. There are other 
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risks, however, related to sea level rise. There may be political risks involved in either 
addressing or failing to address sea level rise in a particular way (Giddens 2009; Adger et 
al. 2009). Environmental changes, such as those resulting from sea level rise, may impact 
community and individual identities (Clayton 2003) as well as elements of human well-
being such as public health and livability (Fischer 2000). The way in which institutions 
come to define and interpret risk is shaped by their position in social, cultural, political 
and economic systems (Hilgartner 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). This institutional 
positionality can influence the focus of a groups definition of risk. Figure 2.3 
demonstrates how different dimensions of risk may come to be important as the focus for 
different groups. The relationship between positionality and risk definitions are apparent 
in that people will often select those dimensions of risk that help to reinforce the social 
solidarity of their institutions (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983).  
  
Figure 2.3 Institutional positionality around risk focus: Groups have different priorities that cause them to 
focus on different dimensions of risk. The first group on the left, representing engineers, may be more 
focused on technological risks to infrastructure. A community organization represented on the right may be 
primiarily focused on risks that threated well-being and identity.  
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The second way ambiguity can manifest in sea level rise adaptation planning are 
in the ways groups interpret information about risk. Epistemological differences among 
institutions can create conflict around what knowledge is considered valid. As the 
conflict between the architect and the climate activist in the beginning of Chapter 1 
demonstrated, the planning process can become political as different groups interact, 
determining the focus of sea level rise adaptation strategies (Sarewitz et al. 2000) It is not 
only important to consider the way knowledge claims around risk are constructed, but 
also how they are contested and used among different institutions in the planning context. 
These disagreements may emerge in public settings, such as the outburst at the City of 
Miami Sea Level Rise Committee meeting previously described. Sources of disagreement 
can stem from differences in methodological practices and different ways of measuring 
an unknowable future (Ozawa 1996). Constructions of risk are embedded in climate 
models (Edwards 2001), public policies (Fischer 2000), heuristics (Stirling 2009), 
organizational and individual behaviors (Short and Clark 1992), and lay knowledge 
(Wynne 1992). The process by which knowledge about risk is constructed in part lends it 
credibility in many planning arenas. For example, scientific representations of risk, such 
as those used by climate scientists, hydrologists, and geomorphologists may be 
considered more credible sources of information through a knowledge production system 
integrating testable and defensible biophysical laws (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Gieryn 
2006). Rational and technical approaches to constructing knowledge around risk differ 
from other knowledge constructions. Community activists may use knowledge of place-
based experiences, linking outcomes from previous climatic events within their 
communities to a changing climate as well as social, economic and political histories 
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(Fischer 2000). As such, community groups may think of risk from climate change in 
terms of the complex arrangements surrounding their daily lives and worry about 
housing, future employment, health, and asserting their rights (see Stowe 2016). 
Ultimately, diverse ways of knowing risk are related to priorities of different groups. 
These priorities can be defined by and reinforced through institutional policies, laws, and 
social norms and help determine what types of information matters to whom. Disparate 
ways of knowing and ideas around what constitutes valid forms of knowledge within sea 
level rise adaptation planning may create conflicts among groups and impede the 
integration of diverse knowledge systems in proposed solutions. At the same time, 
conflicts can push against ideas of what is considered at risk from sea level rise. 
Depending on how conflicts are handled, they can benefit the planning process and push 
things towards more integration. The outcome of the conflict between the architect and 
the climate activist, for example, called for the Sea Level Rise Committee to broaden its 
scope and begin addressing risks and solutions.  
The third way issues of ambiguity emerge in sea level rise adaptation planning are 
in decisions surrounding how to bound the system (van den Hoek 2014). This could 
manifest in terms of scalar differences and in the way groups may emphasize different 
constraints on scope and project planning. Governing institutions have their own 
jurisdictional boundaries which may be related to borders (e.g. municipal, county, and 
state governments) or components of the social, ecological and technical system (e.g. 
United States Fish and Wildlife have jurisdiction over habitat, while the EPA may have 
jurisdiction over contaminants). Groups may bound the system differently in terms of 
both spatial and temporal scales, these differences may not only emerge in different 
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constructions of risk, but also impact the planning process and knowledge integration. 
The perceived need to act quickly with sea level rise may result in actions that stem from 
narrow constructions of risk as opposed to taking the time to produce a more integrated 
approach, as time constraints can be barriers to collaborative and integrated processes. In 
addition to differences in scale boundaries of a system, groups may have different 
interpretations of political, environmental, and fiduciary constraints regarding the scope 
of possibilities. Some groups may bound the system based on limitations from historical 
trajectories and historical lock-in, while other groups may consider ideas outside of these 
boundaries. There may also be specific types of analysis and probabilities that groups use 
to bound the system (Kunreuther et al. 2013). In many widely-used systems for risk 
management policy analysists often focus on a narrow set of sources of uncertainty, and a 
narrow scoping of probabilities can influence how they bound the system (Kunreuther et 
al. 2013).  
In addition to knowledge practices that create risk constructions, it is important to 
pay attention to the way in which diverse knowledge about risk are integrated into 
decision-making. Climate adaptation governance surrounding the decision-making 
context may help or hinder the integration of diverse constructions of risk into adaptation 
strategies. While some governance arrangements allow for creative linkages among 
institutional actors to help solve environmental problems, scholars have also identified 
several challenges. For example, decentralized environmental decision-making can lack 
transparency and blur the public participation processes, making it difficult for 
integrating local knowledge in decision-making (Leach et al. 2007; Jasanoff and Long 
Martello 2004; Bogason and Musso 2006). Further, rules and regulations may serve to 
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reinforce certain ontologies, epistemologies, and system boundaries inhibiting knowledge 
integration (Jasanoff and Long Martello 2004).  
In addition to examining governance, it is important to consider the planning 
process because it can help determine the degree to which views, values and interests of 
diverse communities are represented in the formulation of a problem and the 
development of its solution (Brugnach and Ingram 2012). While institutions may always 
differ in terms of where they place the substantive focus of risk, what information they 
use, and how they bound the system, conflict and uncertainty around ambiguity can be 
resolved through relationship building, trust, and creating shared meanings (see Figure 
2.4) (Lengwiler 2008; van Asselt and Renn 2011). The planning process—and how the 
public and different stakeholders are included in particular— can help determine how 
diverse knowledge systems are integrated into planning outcomes and reduce barriers to 
implementation. 
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Figure 2.4 Issues of ambiguity emerge from and can be reinforced by the governance, planning, and 
knowledge network process. Issues of ambiguity can also be addressed through these processes with 
adaptation strategies that address diverse dimensions of risk in the outcome and produce a more holistic 
view.   
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Finally, knowledge networks of different institutions (both formal and informal) 
may determine what types of knowledge—including lay knowledge—flow through the 
system and influence decision-making (Muñoz-Erickson 2014). Connectivity and 
information sharing can indicate a system in which there may be trust among 
organizations potentially leading to the creation of shared meanings around risks to sea 
level rise (Pietri et al. 2015). How connected different groups are may result in how their 
constructions of risk are integrated into adaptation strategies. 
To summarize, within sea level rise adaptation planning there are several factors 
that may shape the way ambiguity is addressed. Addressing ambiguity can lead to the 
integration of diverse constructions of risk into climate adaptation strategies. The 
ontological focus of risk definitions and epistemological differences in how risk is 
understood are wrapped up in political dimensions of the decision-making arena. As 
such, knowledge politics surrounding different definitions of risk and adaptation 
strategies may in and of itself limit the integration of diverse knowledge systems. 
Different groups may bound the system in different ways and these boundaries may shape 
the way they construct risk around phenomena (van den Hoek 2014). Aspects of the 
planning process, governance mechanisms, and knowledge networks can negatively 
impact relationships, create distrust, restrict the creation of shared meanings, and 
ultimately, limit diverse knowledge integration. Conversely, these dynamics can also 
serve as an opportunity to foster relationships, build trust, create shared meanings, and 
result in diverse knowledge integration.  
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2.2 Research Questions 
This dissertation identifies how risk is being constructed among different groups 
within the sea level rise adaptation planning community in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 
and how those constructions of risk are embedded in design, planning, and 
implementation of adaptation strategies.  
How do different groups understand risk related to sea level rise, and what planning and 
governance factors influence the way diverse dimensions of risk are integrated into 
adaptation strategies? 
Risk Construction 
1. What do different institutions (both formal and informal) place as the substantive 
focus of risk and how do they generate knowledge claims and interpret 
information about risk surrounding the planning, implementation, and design of 
climate adaptation strategies? How are these knowledge claims contested? What 
shared meanings emerge out of these contestations? 
2. How do different groups bound the system when considering risk of sea level rise 
and possible solutions? How do these boundaries shape how diverse dimensions 
of risk are both understood by different groups and integrated into adaptation 
strategies?   
Knowledge Integration  
3. What characteristics of climate adaptation governance help or hinder the 
integration of diverse dimensions of risk into climate change adaptation planning, 
implementation, and design? 
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4. How does the planning process shape the way diverse dimensions of risk are 
integrated into adaptation strategies?   
5. What are the knowledge networks surrounding how institutions (both formal and 
informal) currently sharing knowledge in the knowledge production, planning, 
and or implementation phase? How do different types of knowledge— including 
lay knowledge— flow through the system? 
Sea level rise adaptation is emerging in coastal cities across the United States and 
are transforming the built environment in Miami-Dade County, Florida, yet little is 
known about the political process, decisions, and knowledge systems going into their 
design, and the actors involved in planning. This dissertation contributes to the 
understanding of how sea level rise adaptation planning is being carried using a key case 
study of adaptation planning Miami-Dade County, Florida focusing on the political 
process and ambiguity around risk. By considering the way in which risks are constructed 
in sea level rise adaptation planning, this dissertation offers insight into how we can 
improve climate change adaptation science and planning and draws attention to the need 
to integrate the public at all stages of the planning process.  
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Chapter 3: Literature and Theoretical Review  
3.1 Overview of Sea Level Rise Adaptation Science and Planning 
 Sea level rise is the change of the height of the ocean relative to the coastline. It is 
caused by increases to the volume of the global ocean which come from warming of the 
ocean (thermal expansion), loss of ice by glaciers and ice sheets, and reduction of liquid 
storage on land (Church et al. 2013; Hine et al. 2016; Pilkey et al. 2016). Localized 
atmospheric conditions, tectonic land shifts and other hydrogeologic conditions of 
coastlines determine how sea level rise will impact specific regions (Hine et al. 2016; 
Sweet et al. 2017). And while sea levels change daily, global and regional mean sea 
levels have shifted drastically in the earth’s history (Church et al. 2013; Hine et al. 2016; 
Pilkey et al. 2016). For example, 14,000 years ago geologists estimate that sea levels in 
Florida were 125 meters lower than they are today (Jarrett et al. 2005; Hine et al. 2016). 
In recent history, there is evidence that suggests global mean sea level rates are 
increasing (Sweet et al. 2017), with rates increasing by about 21-24 cm since 1880, with 
around 8cm occurring since 1993 (Church and White 2011; Hay et al. 2015; Nerem et al. 
2010; Sweet et al 2017). Since 1900, the global mean sea level rise rate has been faster 
than during any comparable period over the last 2800 years (Kopp et al. 2016). Even if 
society were to drastically decrease greenhouse gas emissions, many scientists agree that 
sea level will most likely continue to rise for centuries based on persistent trends 
(Golledge et al. 2015; DeConto and Pollard 2016).  
While benchmarks such as mean sea level and historical trends enable societies to 
monitor and assess potential threats posed by shifting conditions, mean sea level is not 
something that exists, it is a social construct (Hine et al. 2016). “Sea level” is never level, 
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it slopes in different places and varies among ocean basins at any one time (Hine et al. 
2016). Like measuring the global climate, the measurement of mean sea level is a 
modeled phenomenon comprised of multiple sources of data (Edwards 2001; Hine et al. 
2016). Scientists come to “know” mean sea level and sea level rise through different 
ways. Because sea level rise only exists in relation to past conditions, understanding 
today’s sea level requires reconstructing the past over long geological time periods. To do 
this, scientists use both direct and indirect indicators. Scientists rely on direct 
measurements of geological features that they know formed very close to sea level, such 
as elevated notches, shallow-water coral reefs, marshes, and preserved paleoshorelines 
(Hine et al. 2016). They use indirect proxy measures including chemical signals in rocks, 
sediments, and fossils (Hine et al. 2016).  
To understand shifts in sea level, including past, current, and future projections, 
climate scientists look to the three main sources of increased oceanic volume: thermal 
expansion of water, loss of ice by glaciers and ice sheets, and loss of liquid storage on 
land, as well as various localized current and atmospheric conditions to assess historic 
changes and project future conditions (Church et al. 2013). For example, the 2013 IPCC 
Report on sea level rise, scientists have high confidence in the use of the earth’s energy 
budget to model heat transfers to the ocean with physics to calculate thermal expansion of 
water (Church et al. 2013). They have varying degrees of confidence around different 
glaciers and ice melt and around potential feedbacks of accelerating land ice melt 
(Church et al. 2013). There are tradeoffs among different types of sea level rise models 
and decisions made during model construction which complicate sea level rise adaptation 
planning.  
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Decisions regarding what resolution to use for collecting data and modeling, data 
differences from computing resources, the level of modeling complexity, and what 
duration (time-scale) to model are all made by those producing sea level rise knowledge 
with limited public oversight and involvement. These decisions are built on disciplinary 
conventions and “schools of thought” (Kuhn 1970; Edwards 2001). Different epistemic 
values, or values about knowledge, factor into these decisions around tradeoffs as well as 
other modeling choices that influence outcomes (Alder and Hadorn 2014). Sometimes the 
epistemic value choices that scientists make can be ethically relevant (Tuana 2013 and 
2015; Alder and Hadorn 2014). For example, research around Antarctic and Greenland 
ice melt models suggest potential earth systems feedbacks that could drastically raise sea 
level and result in significant impacts to societies around the world (Hansen 2007). While 
these feedbacks are dynamic, they are represented as static in existing models because of 
the uncertainty around how those feedbacks will affect the system. Such a discretionary 
epistemic choice for modeling prudency has ethical implications around how best or 
worst-case sea level rise scenarios should be developed and presented by the scientific 
community and integrated in the policy arena (Hansen 2007). Because of the large scope 
of potential impacts the findings from climate change and sea level rise science poses to 
governments around the world, this knowledge can be suppressed, debated and 
politicized (Hulme 2009).  
Issues of values and politics are relevant to the production of global climate 
knowledge. This political process becomes even more complex as knowledge moves 
from global to regional to local scales and how these projections are interpreted and used. 
The way that sea level rise projections are provided as ranges and with different carbon 
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scenarios can create challenges for regional and local decision makers. For example, the 
most recent IPPC report on global mean sea level rise projects that the years 2081-2100 
compared to baseline years of 1986-2005 will be 0.4 [0.26-0.55] m for RCP2.6 and 0.63 
[0.45-0.82] m for RCP8.5 (Church et al. 2013). Information provided in this way leaves it 
to local decision makers to determine which rate to adopt and how to integrate that into 
planning. This process can be political as different actors will have different beliefs as to 
which projection to adopt. For example, local decision makers often interpret sea level 
rise as a slow process and can be dealt with in the future, but scientists suggest that it 
occurs in uneven and dramatic shifts (Hine et al. 2016). Further, scientists regularly point 
out that and even small changes to the sea level can have dramatic impacts on storm 
surge, high tides, and wave actions (Theuerkauf et al. 2014). Global sea level rise 
knowledge can intersect with local experiences, localized geographies and tide data that 
makes it difficult to apply at local scales.  
The challenge of planning for sea level rise is like the challenge for planning for 
other climate change stressors in that local governments need down scaled climate data 
that are created in the context of regional and local conditions. The need for downscaled, 
and localized sea level rise projections have resulted in governments creating localized 
projections. For example, two United States Federal government agencies, NOAA and 
the USACE, have integrated local and regional data sets and processes to produce 
regional scale projections.  Regional projections include the use of historical data from 
local tide gages, regional atmospheric processes, tectonic uplifting, and other processes 
(Sweet et al. 2017). Coastal regions must make decisions about what to do within this 
context around the state of knowledge about sea level rise. These decisions are 
 
31 
 
commensurate with the way in which governing institutions understand the risks 
associated with unknown changing climatic and oceanic conditions. This understanding 
of risk is constructed by and reinforces planning decisions around how to deal with sea 
level rise impacts.    
3.2 Knowledge Co-Production and Constructions of Risk  
To better understand how risks are measured, understood and used in sea level 
rise adaptation planning, this dissertation uses the theory of co-production of knowledge 
from Science and Technology Studies and constructivist theories of risk to understand the 
way knowledge about risks from sea level rise are constructed by institutions and used in 
adaptation planning. The technical complexity of environmental challenges and reliance 
on scientific expertise to solve environmental problems creates barriers to public 
involvement and the integration of non-technical, lay knowledge in planning decisions 
(Fischer 2000). This knowledge integration barrier is problematic in how risk is 
understood in climate change adaptation planning (van den Hoek 2014). Using a co-
production lens offers “ways of thinking about power, highlighting the often invisible 
role of knowledge, expertise, technical practices, and material objects in shaping, 
sustaining, subverting, and transforming relations of authority” (Jasanoff 2004, p. 4). 
Because all organizations are “knowing” organizations (Choo 2007) and the way 
institutions know things shapes the material world (Jasanoff 2004), understanding how 
different institutions—both formal and informal—construct ideas about risk and how this 
knowledge shapes plans, designs, and implementation of climate change adaptation 
strategies is fundamental to unpacking barriers to diverse knowledge integration. 
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We live in a time in which science and technology increasingly shapes our 
political system and daily life (Jasanoff 2004). More and more, science is called upon to 
predict occurrences that cannot easily be inferred from experiences and judgements alone 
(Sarewitz et al. 2000). Science and technology studies opens up the knowledge co-
production process— how the ways in which we understand the world and are 
inseparable from the ways we choose to live in it (Jasanoff 2004). When viewed through 
a co-production lens, all knowledge—including scientific knowledge—is produced 
through systems of social and material relationships and in turn that knowledge shapes 
the social and material world (Miller and Edwards 2001; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; 
Jasanoff 2004). Sheila Jasanoff defines this relationship, “Knowledge and its material 
embodiments are at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life; 
society cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge can exist without 
appropriate social support” (Jasanoff 2004, p. 2-3).  
Knowledge refers to claims made by actors—either individuals or institutions—
that either serve to tell us something factual about the world (with varying degrees of 
certainty and consensus) or are taken by actors to tell us something factual about the 
world (Miller et al. 2010). It is an idea or belief that someone takes to be true, or at least 
relatively truer than other kinds of statements (Miller et al. 2010). As Miller (2008, p. 
1898) defines it, “Knowledge is comprised not of simple statements of truth or fact but 
rather of complex judgments regarding how to identify multiple forms of evidence, assess 
their credibility and meaning, and integrate them together, based on appropriate 
evidentiary standards and weighting.” These judgments are often shaped by tacit skills 
and values (Collins 1974), problem framings (Miller 2000), and styles of reasoning 
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(Hacking 2002). The forms of evidence are then accepted or rejected based on different 
disciplines and schools of thought (Kuhn 1970). 
Knowledge claims are wrapped up in a decision-making context through a 
knowledge-action-system (Muñoz-Erickson 2014). A knowledge system is a suite of 
interconnected individual, social, and/or institutional practices by which knowledge 
claims get formulated, validated, circulated, and used in making decisions (Miller et al. 
2010). While science plays an important role in knowledge systems, there are many other 
actors, institutions, and networks which also play significant roles (Cornell et al. 2013; 
Irwin 1995; Irwin and Wynne 1996; Leach et al. 2005). Scholars have studied the ways 
knowledge systems relate to environmental decision-making and governance institutions. 
Knowledge systems determine what institutions know and what they do not know, based 
on what kinds of questions get asked, the methods used to gather information, and the 
standards by which to evaluate evidence.  
For more than thirty years, social and cultural theorists have examined the way 
risk is understood in a knowledge co-production process (Schwing and Albers 1980), this 
work is summarized on Figure 3.1. Initially in this field, Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky (1982) demonstrated that risk perceptions—once thought to be entirely 
created at the individual level—are socially and culturally mediated. In their work, they 
examined how community consensus relates some natural disasters to moral defects and 
how particular kinds of dangers come to be selected for attention. Risks that matter, 
therefore, are those seen as a threat to community order, and the social production of 
risks is a means of maintaining cultural boundaries.  
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Figure 3.1 Social science theories of risk. Adopted from Lupton 1999, Fox 1999, and Krimsky and Golding 
1992. In her assessment of the three-main contribution of social and cultural theories of risk, Lupton (1999) 
suggests that Giddens and Beck’s understandings while constructivist, are sometimes realist. Douglas 
offers a relativist view and Foucault has the most constructivist view. 
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Following the work of anthropologists Douglas and Wildavsky, sociologist Ulrich 
Beck published his work on ‘risk society’ which examines the process by which modern 
society has come to be encompassed by risk because of technological innovation. His 
work on modern instrumental rationality suggests that modern society seeks solutions to 
every problem through technology. But with this development of technology, there is also 
accumulation of risks in undesirable abundance because of technology. For example, the 
development of nuclear energy creates risks around accidents and how to deal with by-
products of the energy process. Risks, Beck argues, “only exist in terms of the (scientific 
or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. They can be changed, magnified, dramatized or 
minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social 
definition and construction” (p. 23 in Beck 1992). Because of the uneven distribution of 
risks, Beck argues that the control of risk definitions and knowledge about risks becomes 
paramount in terms of how power is linked to knowledge in a risk society (Beck 1992).  
Around the same time Beck was publishing his work, French philosopher Michel 
Foucault introduced his theory on governmentality and how the state and other 
governmental approaches work to govern (i.e. manage and regulate) populations via risk 
reduction discourses and strategies (Foucault et al. 1991). This work is the most 
constructivist of all three of these contributions to social and cultural theories of risk (see 
Figure 3.1). While Beck accepts the reality of hazards though views risks as socially 
constructed, Foucault is squarely constructivist, with both risks and hazards being 
mediated through social processes (Fox 1999). As Deborah Lupton writes about those 
who have followed Foucault’s constructivist path, they are “not interested in investigating 
the nature of risk itself, but rather the forms of knowledge, the dominant discourses and 
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expert techniques and institutions that serve to render risk calculable and knowable, 
bringing it into being” (Lupton 1999, p. 6).  
While the work of Douglas and Wildavsky, Beck, and Foucault did not 
necessarily build off each other, these social and cultural theories are in clear contrast to 
techno-scientific approaches to risk by considering broader social, cultural, and historic 
contexts in which risk derives its meaning (Lupton 1999). Non-cultural theories of risk, 
such as those in economics and psychology, often begin with a statement of probability 
and consequences of an event or activity, followed by an assumption of an appropriate 
human response (Lupton 1999). Risk is largely treated as a taken for granted objective 
reality (Lupton 1999). In these realist theories of risk, the “focus is on identification of 
risks, mapping their causal factors, building predictive models of risk relations and 
people’s responses to various types of risk and proposing ways of limiting the effects of 
risks” (Lupton 1999, 7).  For example, in psychometric studies of risk people are often 
viewed as responding individually to risks per various ‘heuristics’, or frames of 
perception and understanding that structure judgement (Lupton 1999). In this line of 
research, lay people’s judgments are often considered biased or ill-informed compared to 
expert, scientific assessments and very little attention is paid to the broader social, 
cultural, and historical contexts in which these heuristics are developed (Lupton 1999).  
Cultural theories of risk differ in that they assume an active rather than a passive 
perceiver of risk (Rayner 1992). This could be an individual or institution driven by their 
own cultural imperatives to select risks for management attention, or to suppress them 
from view (Douglas and Wildavsky1982). Institutional structure becomes the ultimate 
cause of risk perception, and risk management becomes the stimulus for risk rather than 
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the outcome of risk (Rayner 1992). The focus, is therefore on “the forms of knowledge, 
dominant discourse, and expert techniques and institutions that serve to render risk 
calculable and knowable, bringing it into being” (Lupton 1999, p. 7).  
Cultural studies of risk have spanned a variety of topics. Researchers have 
examined the organizational aspects of risk (Perrow 1984), analyzed risk distribution 
among classes and populations (Beck 1992), analyzed media coverage of risk 
(Lichtenberg and MacLean 1991), and followed the way knowledge about risk becomes 
legitimized (Jasanoff 1987). Institutions have their own ways of constructing knowledge 
about risks and part of the challenge in integrating diverse knowledge systems into 
climate adaptation planning rests in underlying assumptions of these disparate and 
sometimes conflicting knowledge systems. As Brugnach and Ingram (2012, p. 61) 
suggest, “Ambiguity is often the result of unrecognized contextual, methodological, and 
substantive differences among knowledge systems… Even when different knowledge 
systems share facts, there can be differences in the meaning and implications of the 
shared information.” In cultural theory, risk communication, becomes more about the 
creation of shared meaning and trust to overcome the challenges of ambiguity (Rayner 
1992). 
Risk is a concept that when used to describe a population or situation can obscure 
who is bearing the costs and who is benefiting (Beck 1992). It is often a “black-boxed” 
term, where, although fundamental to how decisions are made regarding managing risks, 
the way risk is constructed in the planning process is often hidden from public attention 
(Lupton 1999). Planning processes often allude to straightforward measurements of risk 
and risk assessments. For example, the risk of harm from sea level rise can be 
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geographically, biophysically, and socio-economically defined, and as such, solutions can 
be strait forward. In this realist perspectives, the risk of sea level rise, maps directly onto 
the hazard of increased flooding from sea level rise (Fox 1999). Yet, another argument 
would be that both risks and hazards are constructed through political and institutional 
processes. From a constructivist perspective, “hazards may be understood as the 
reifications of moral judgements about the ‘riskiness’ of choices, evoked discursively to 
support estimations of risk and those assessed to be ‘at risk’” (Fox 1999, p. 15).  This 
could mean that solutions to sea level rise, grounded solely in realist perspectives of risk, 
may be blind to other ways of thinking about risk, and unpacking how risk is come to be 
understood can draw out the way these understandings are intentionally or 
unintentionally overlooking other perspectives.  
3.3 Knowledge Integration 
In addition to the need to understand risk knowledge construction practices, 
different governance, planning and network processes shape whether diverse 
understandings are integrated into decision-making contexts. Planners are confronted 
with the challenge of integrating diverse understandings of risk into sea level rise 
adaptation planning. There are several reasons why incorporating multiple knowledge 
systems—including non-western scientific knowledge— into integrated assessments of 
environmental and governance issues can be beneficial (Warren, Slikkenveer, and 
Brokensha, 1995; MA 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2003). The integration of local knowledge in 
decision-making can help overcome some of the limitations of science (Fabricius 2006) 
and increase the quality and amount of information available (Agarwal 1995). It can also 
contribute to understanding the relevance of a problem and how it is framed to an 
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affected party, and it helps to empower groups that hold knowledge (Agarwal 1995).  
Despite a variety of integrative approaches in the planning literature that consider 
multi-policy domains and stakeholder participation or adaptive management becoming 
increasingly common, changes in the substance of real-world decisions have remained 
elusive (Medema et al. 2008). Often, planning processes and policy choices fail to reflect 
the diversity of meaning and interpretations that the inclusion of multiple actors brings 
(Feldman and Ingram 2009). Several factors within contemporary knowledge production 
processes are inherently contradictory to knowledge integration (Brugnach and Ingram 
2012). For example, the way that problems are framed may privilege credentialed experts 
that use formal scientific procedures (Brugnch and Ingram 2012). The subsequent 
technical solutions—like many climate adaptation strategies—are often considered 
objective, rational, scientific, and engineered solutions (Winner 1989; Jasanoff 2006). 
There are three mechanisms that can affect the way in which diverse knowledge is 
integrated into adaptation strategies: governance, planning processes that incorporate 
public involvement, and knowledge networks.  
Governance 
First, governance, or broadly political processes and institutions, shape the future 
trajectory of social, ecological, and technological systems (Leach et al. 2007). In both 
intentional and unintentional ways, governance determines how scientific and 
technological processes are directed; how environmental and health issues are defined 
and addressed; and how social consequences become distributed (Leach et al. 2007).  
Governance can be thought of in different ways. Broadly, it can be considered as 
rules and institutions for the authoritative organization of collective life (Donahue 2002). 
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It is also considered as a way that different actors arrive at decisions by negotiating with 
each other and collaboratively implementing these decisions—or a multi-institutional 
networked decision-making frame (Schmitter 2001). Within sea level rise adaptation 
planning, governance processes such as funding streams, project selection criteria, and 
policies can shape the planning process and physical outcomes of adaptation strategies. It 
encompasses the system of institutions, including laws, norms, policies, organizations, 
and regulations involved in decisions surrounding the environment (Chaffin et al. 2014; 
Lemos and Agrawal 2006). The knowledge systems that shape and support governance 
processes—particularly surrounding how risk is defined, measured, and bounded—can 
serve to limit diverse knowledge integration (Miller et al. 2010).  
In climate change adaptation, governance processes place much of the focus for 
identifying and framing risk surround ecological, economic, and technological 
dimensions (Adger et al. 2009). This framing can overlook local and lay understandings 
of risk that fall outside of these domains, which may matter to the public. Scholars have 
critiqued the dominant framings of risk prevalent in planning and policy in that they are 
narrowly defined, embed biases, overlook risks not easily captured within the accounting 
format, and ignore other risk factors which may matter to groups not involved in the risk 
assessment (Short and Clarke 1992; Fischer 2000; Wisner et al. 2014). Traditional risk 
framings are regarded through formal assessments of the hazard, vulnerability, and 
adaptive capacity. However, different groups and individuals construct their own 
knowledge about risk outside of these traditional framings (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1983; Fischer 2000; Wisner et al. 2014). Yet, there is a widely-held assumption that the 
lay public does not possess the adequate amount of scientific knowledge needed for 
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democratic processes around environmental governance (Miller 2008). Local knowledge 
bridging is not merely an epistemological challenge, but it is also wrapped up in a 
struggle over power and control (Agrawal 1999; Brosius 2006). 
Governance mechanisms surrounding sea level rise adaptation planning tends to 
favor scientific knowledge, because it’s considered objective and value neutral and can 
help provide credibility and authority to support institutional decision-making (Sarewitz 
et al. 2000). However, the argument that science is a translocally valid language through 
which to mediate normative policy conflicts has met increased scrutiny (Jasanoff 1998; 
Gupta 2001; Gupta 2004). The claim to value neutrality implies that science can be set 
apart from normative conflicts (Gupta 2004). Yet science can “camouflage” peoples’ 
values, perspectives, and preferences (Sarewitz 2004). Although scientists claim to be 
value neutral, their efforts in defining concepts to draw attention to their interests and 
causes place them in the role of advocates for various agendas (Kuhn 1970; Takacs 1996; 
Miller and Edwards 2001; Reid et al. 2006).  
In addition to governance mechanisms that bolster expertise, scale decisions 
impact the knowledge being created and can have implications on the governance 
outcomes from the use of such knowledge. Choice of scale in scientific assessments of 
environmental change, for example, may hide impacts experienced locally by lumping 
them in a bigger global picture (Wilbanks 2006). Scale choices are often wrapped up in 
governance processes and can be politically motivated (Lebel 2006). The “politics of 
scale” can be reproduced in environmental assessments, emerging in issue framing, use, 
and shaping of the analysis (Cox 1998; Swyngedouw 2000; Brenner 2001; Meadowcroft 
2002; Lebel 2006). Knowledge constructions of risk cannot be disassociated with the 
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governance arrangements surrounding sea level rise adaptation planning. Governance 
arrangements can shape whether diverse knowledge systems—including lay 
knowledge—can be integrated into the planning process.  
Planning Process  
The planning process is the second mechanism that can impact how knowledge is 
integrated into decision-making. This process is shaped by different planning approaches, 
how people are represented within plans, and levels of public involvement. Planning is a 
technical and political process concerned with the establishment of goals, policies and 
procedures for a social unit (Berke et al. 2006). When it comes to municipal activities, the 
planning process usually follows these steps: analysis and characterizing the state of the 
community; setting the direction, goals and objectives; preparing a plan; implementing a 
plan; and monitoring or evaluating the plan (Berke et al. 2006).  
There are several different planning orientations articulated in planning theory, 
covering rational (e.g. McCarthy et al. 2001), consensus building/participation (e.g. 
Healey 1997), and urban design techniques (e.g. Barnett 2003). Each of these approaches 
has benefits and drawbacks for integrating diverse perspectives. Rational planning is 
premised on analytical thinking applied by social scientist and engineers and is often 
considered top-down. Consensus-based approaches incorporate more public participation, 
information sharing, and negotiation, which if done well can integrate many perspectives 
into decision-making. Planning processes utilizing urban design techniques often rely on 
a set of a priori design principles to guide planning and decision-making which may or 
may not integrate diverse perspectives. Planning orientation—whether it be rational, 
 
43 
 
consensus, design focused, or something else—can influence different stages of the 
planning process (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 Planning orientation overview. Adapted from Berke et al. 2006, this table highlights different 
stages of the planning process and how they might be shaped by three commonly used planning 
orientations: rational planning, consensus planning, and urban design. Both the stage of the planning and 
the planning orientation can impact the way different types of knowledge are used.  
Phase of Planning Rational Techniques Consensus Building 
and Participation 
Techniques 
Urban Design 
Techniques 
State of the 
Community: Identify 
issues and 
opportunities 
• use demographic info 
to identify population 
groups 
• access existing 
conditions and trends  
• establish organizing 
committee 
• create and execute 
outreach plan 
• council member as a 
neighborhood liaison  
 
• translate vision into 
hand-sketched 
images of place 
• use photographs to 
visualize current 
conditions of place 
 
Setting the direction, 
goals and objectives 
• analyze and prioritize 
problems 
• measure level of 
citizen participation 
 
• use committee and 
public involvement  
 
• run neighborhood 
charrettes 
Preparing a plan • generate and test 
alternative solutions 
• measure level of 
citizen participation 
 
• gather feedback from 
community to 
validate the plan 
• coordinate with city 
departments 
• use conflict 
resolution 
 
• prepare annotated 
maps of future land 
use in group 
brainstorming 
• use illustrations of 
verbal design policies 
in plan 
 
Implementing a plan • create action matrix to 
prioritize, set timeline, 
funding and assign 
responsibility  
 
• use action matrix as a 
negotiating tool with 
city to amend city 
plan 
 
• establish design 
review board 
 
Monitoring or 
evaluating the plan 
• create indicators 
• track changes in 
outcomes/compare 
objectives  
• dissemination of 
reports 
 
• graphic display of 
indicator trends 
 
Understanding planning processes is important because they shape the physical 
designs and outcomes of urban form. When plans become “fixed” they can determine and 
limit future trajectories. For example, in some cities past stormwater planning may have 
resulted in systems that transport stormwater to urban rivers and waterbodies, carrying 
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contaminants into waterbodies. This planning process for dealing with urban flooding 
issues may have made sense at the time it was implemented, but later creates challenges 
for preventing urban pollution from entering waterways. Further, this existing 
infrastructure is now embedded in the urban form and subsequent stormwater plans are 
limited by the design and management of the existing infrastructure.  
More recent planning strategies, such as adaptive management, have sought to 
overcome the challenge of “fixed” outcomes of plans. With adaptive management, 
planning strategies become implemented, monitored, evaluated, and adapted/altered to 
integrate findings from the monitoring and evaluation process (Holling 1978). With 
regards to stormwater management, for example, an adaptive management approach 
might include monitoring new approaches and continually updating the planning and 
implementation strategy. The flexibility, community involvement, and social learning 
components of adaptive management are increasingly called upon in planning for 
uncertainty in climate change (Lee 1999; Thompkins and Adger 2004). 
In addition to adaptive management, other planning strategies have incorporated 
social and economic factors into risk and vulnerability assessments (Solecki et al. 2011; 
Wisner et al. 2014). Expanding the definition and analysis of how people become 
“vulnerable” and “at risk” to natural disasters has compelled many cities to integrate 
social and economic factors into their analyses for risk to flooding, sea level rise, extreme 
heat events, and other environmental hazards. These strategies seek to expand definitions 
of vulnerability, from purely geographical and environmental determinants, to 
incorporate social vulnerabilities—for example, income, access to emergency services, 
etc.  
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While cities may have plans preparing for environmental hazards, such as 
adapting to sea level rise, these plans may be limited by not having direction for what to 
do following an extreme event. Post disaster recovery planning is a new area that seeks to 
overcome this planning horizon limitation. This emerging area of planning examines 
what visions people have for their communities post environmental disaster (Berke and 
Campanella 2006). It offers another way to expand the conversation around risk beyond 
preparing to manage immediate risks and towards a conversation of regional goals for a 
longer-term vision of the community.  
Efforts to create “actionable science” through co-producing science with 
managers and stakeholders is another approach some regions take with the use of 
boundary organizations connecting climate scientists to decision-makers (Vogel et al. 
2016; Kjellström et al. 2016; Beier et al. 2017). There are varied ways in which this 
occurs, with some efforts primarily focused on formal managers and decision-makers and 
some projects integrating broader groups. Co-produced science with decision-makers 
may primarily serve to reinforce existing institutional knowledge structures while 
integrating broader stakeholder groups may serve to expand institutional knowledge 
structures (Innes and Booher 2010; Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 2018). This emerging 
style of planning can impact how diverse knowledge systems are integrated in sea level 
rise adaptations. 
Procedural planning processes based on public participation techniques can 
impact the way in which different stakeholder groups are involved and ultimately shape 
planning outcomes. Public participation and involvement in planning, including 
environmental planning, emerged in the 1960s in response to conflict and challenges with 
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top-down rational planning (Healey 1997). Scholars have studied the way in which the 
public can influence the planning process and shape outcomes through different public 
engagement strategies (Healey 1997; Fischer 2000; Innes and Booher 2010). 
Opportunities for public involvement in planning processes include public meetings, 
public comment, budget hearings, community advisory panels, and other mechanisms.  
The way the public engages in planning processes can draw out social contexts, 
diverse interests, values, forms of reasoning and uneven distribution of power, which in 
some planning settings can help shape outcomes which recognize and address these 
issues (Healey 1997). However, not all forms of public participation achieve full 
recognition and integration of diverse public experiences. The type of public engagement 
practices used and how they are carried out can impact the ability of planners to integrate 
diverse knowledge systems (Healey 1997). As Arnstein (1969) argues, public 
participation can play a “token” role to justify previously determined state action. In this 
way, public participation does not necessarily equate to influence in decision-making 
(Arnstein 1969). With environmental planning, this can get caught up in a struggle 
between state and scientific expertise claiming legitimacy over what actions to take, and 
public concerns over other issues overlooked by the state (Healey 1997).  
Debates around how to define and implement public participation are wrapped up 
in normative ideas of who should have decision-making authority. For example, Arnstein 
(1969) argues that true participation achieves a high level of empowerment of the public 
and direct input into the decision process. Yet, Rowe and Frewer (2004, p. 515) argue 
that, “whether public information is elicited is an a priori characteristic of different 
mechanisms, though whether that information is used (to empower the public) depends as 
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much on sponsor motives as intrinsic mechanism characteristics and may be determined 
only some period after the event.” In this sense, any attempt on behalf of decision-makers 
to gather input from the public can be considered as public participation and as such 
evaluated on the basis of how that effort integrates diverse perspectives into those 
decisions.  
There are many issues to evaluating public participation. Mentioned earlier is that 
public participation is a value-laden concept (Rosener 1981). From a democratic 
perspective, the most effective participation may be “fair” while decision-making 
perspective might focus on the quality of the decision outcome and how it addresses 
issues raised by multiple parties in the process. There are ongoing debates around the use 
of either process-oriented criteria and outcome oriented criteria (Rowe and Frewer 2004). 
Outcomes of participation are also relative to those participating—some people involved 
may consider the process very fair while others may consider it as disproportionately 
benefiting some groups over others (Fainstein 2000). One important debate within public 
participation literature is identifying the public and how affected parties are represented 
(Innes and Booher 2004). A representative participating on a panel representing a larger 
community of affected parties may or may not be able to capture all of the diverse 
opinions of that public (Innes and Booher 2004). 
In considering aspects of public participation related to sea level rise adaptation 
planning and knowledge there are several evaluation dimensions worth considering. 
These can determine whether diverse perspectives are integrated in the decision-making 
process and outcomes. First, participants should comprise a representative sample of the 
affected population to achieve representation (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Fincher and 
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Iverson 2008). The public should also be involved as early as possible, particularly when 
value judgements become salient (Rowe and Frewer 2000; Innes and Booher 2004). 
Public participation and planning procedures should be transparent, so the population can 
see what is going on and how decisions are being made (Rowe and Frewer 2000). Public 
participation should allow for genuine influence on policy outcomes and participants 
should have access to the appropriate resources to enable them to successfully contribute 
to the process (Rowe and Frewer 2000). During public participation processes, 
participants should be made aware of the nature and scope of the participation task as 
well as the structure of the decision-making and where participation fits in to the process 
(Rowe and Frewer 2000). What happens during public participation activities is an 
important component to understanding how diverse constructions of risk may—or may 
not be—integrated into the planning process (Rowe and Frewer 2000).  
Tracking the planning process—particularly the role of the public—is important 
for understanding how sea level rise adaptation planning strategies are seeking input from 
diverse knowledge systems. Participation is not the same as influence and understanding 
the role of the public and planning procedures needs to be understood within the context 
of power dynamics, histories, and local complexities. Planning procedures that create 
opportunities for groups to construct shared meanings and build trust may result in more 
diverse knowledge integration into the adaptation strategy. 
Knowledge Networks 
The third knowledge integration mechanism surrounds the knowledge networks 
which may create formal and informal opportunities for groups to build shared meaning 
and trust. Transforming social-technological-environmental systems requires coordinated 
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efforts and changes among different actors, institutions and artifacts (Elzen et al. 2005; 
Leach et al. 2007; Meadows 1999). The rise of knowledge networks has been well 
documented both within general environmental governance and in climate change 
adaptation (Juhola and Westerhoff 2011). Knowledge networks are the actors and 
institutions that comprise a knowledge action system (using a related definition from the 
work of Muñoz-Erickson 2014). Planning and policy for various environmental 
activities—such as planning for sea level rise adaptation—can be represented by a 
constellation of different institutions working towards sometimes similar and sometimes 
conflicting goals (Leach et al. 2007). The way different types of knowledge flow through 
these networks shapes the decision-making process.  
Sometimes, knowledge networks connect diverse types of institution, leveraging 
different types of information and can more flexibly and creatively solve environmental 
problems (Borzel 1998; Pietri 2014). Some decentralized knowledge networks have been 
shown to build trust, foster communication, information and knowledge dissemination, 
and mobilize resources (Bogason and Musso 2006; Borzel 1998; Pietri 2014). Such 
outcomes are not a given and uneven power within and among different knowledge 
networks can limit the integration of diverse knowledge systems (Ernston et al. 2008). 
Knowledge politics and boundary work are one possible outcome of various knowledge 
networks that can limit knowledge sharing and integration. Scholars examine knowledge-
power systems in natural resource management, and the flow of knowledge can impact 
governance and planning (Crona and Bodin 2010; Muñoz-Erickson et al. 2010; Muñoz-
Erickson 2014). In her study of knowledge action systems in San Juan, Muñoz-Erickson 
(2014) found that institutions that dominate the knowledge about land use also make 
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most of the land use decisions, suggesting that much of what we know about land use 
dynamics is filtered by the values and beliefs of the actors controlling city resources. This 
makes it difficult for alternative knowledge systems to influence decision-making as they 
are both outside the knowledge network controlling most knowledge and decision-
making power (Muñoz-Erickson 2014).  
Organizations tend to share information and connect with other similar 
organizations, for example, government organizations tended to work mostly with other 
government organizations, and private with private (Muñoz-Erickson 2014). Similarly, 
Ernston et al. (2008) found in their analysis of urban green areas in Stockholm, that 
garden collectives holding traditional ecological knowledge were outside of and 
disconnected to the dominant knowledge networks controlling most of the information 
and decision-making authority for urban green spaces. 
Understanding knowledge networks and how it connects to decision-making is 
important because the decentralized nature may make them less democratic and 
accountable to the public (Bogason and Musso 2006). Lemos and Agrawal (2006) argue 
that in decentralized arrangements, those who are better able to integrate themselves into 
the network are better able to derive power from them. In practice the ability of the lay 
public and marginalized communities to exert power and influence is often limited 
because of this. This has implications for implementing climate adaptation strategies that 
serve both the powerful and marginalized members of the community. The inability to 
integrate diverse publics into climate adaptation invites a more nuanced and careful 
examination of how knowledge and governance networks take shape (Berkes 2007). 
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3.4 Connecting Literature and Theory to Sea Level Rise Adaptation Planning in 
Miami-Dade County, Florida 
 The social construction of risk, or the process by which institutions and people 
select dangers for attention, risk theories from sociology and other fields suggest that risk 
knowledge is controlled by those with power and decision-making authority (Beck 1992), 
and that this knowledge is shaped by their own institutional positionality—or ways in 
which they understand and prioritize information (Douglas and Wildavsky1982). At the 
same time, however, this is a negotiated and contested process as multiple institutions are 
involved in climate science, adaptation planning, and urban governance, each shaping the 
way those risks are understood and constructed (Adger et al. 2009). The way in which 
institutions, both formal and informal, are connected to the governance process and what 
forms of knowledge are used to understand risks shape planning outcomes (Lupton 
1999). While climate change research points to political and financial barriers to climate 
adaptation planning (Pilkey et al. 2016), some regions have been able to overcome these 
barriers and adopt adaptation strategies to mitigate the impacts from climate change.  
Miami-Dade County, Florida, is one area that has overcome some of these 
challenges and adopted sea level rise adaptation planning as a key strategy for managing 
risk in the urban environment. Little is known about the political and planning process 
around how risk knowledge is used and constructed under these conditions and whose 
knowledge counts in adaptation decisions. Within Miami-Dade County, this includes how 
local decision-makers and planners determined what sea level rise rates to plan for, the 
process of determining what infrastructure to prioritize, and how they integrated multiple 
ways of understanding risks in the planning process. The lack of research on these social 
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processes is in part due to the way in which the climate adaptation literature assumes that 
risks are “real” and can be understood and managed through scientific and technological 
assessments (Adger et al. 2009 ; Hulme 2009; van der Hoek et al. 2014). In general, the 
climate change literature fails to recognize how knowledge about risk is socially 
constructed and produced through social processes (Douglas and Wildavsky1982).  
There is a need to open-up these processes, especially in Miami-Dade County, 
where local governments and other institutions have been examining and planning for sea 
level rise adaptation for over a decade. Within the City of Miami Beach, for example, 
planners have been able to implement major stormwater management projects that 
involve raising the roads three feet and installing expensive pumps, even with some local 
opposition from private landowners and businesses, and lack of support from State 
government. This puts the region ahead in terms of implementing sea level rise 
adaptation strategies. Miami-Dade County is an important case to examine because it 
represents a place where local planners are working to overcome political and economic 
barriers to be able to implement sea level rise adaptation planning, and where we can 
observe risk construction and knowledge integration processes.  
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methods 
4.1 Research Design 
This research was conducted using a case study of sea level rise adaptation 
planning in Miami-Dade County, Florida to examine how risk is constructed in the 
planning process and how diverse constructions of risk are integrated through the 
governance system. A case study is “an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives 
of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or 
system in a “real life” context” (Simons 2009, p. 21). It offers a research design frame 
that incorporates different methods, rather it is “not a methodological choice but a choice 
of what is to be studied” (Stake 2005, p. 443). Compared with multiple case studies or 
other social science approaches that examine a few variables in multiple places, the single 
case study examines the complex interactions of many factors in a single place (Ragin 
1992; Thomas 2011). While there is an analytical tradeoff for generalizing across a large 
sample, the single case is better suited for understanding complexity and contributing to 
theory around how social systems operate in relation to their political, economic, and 
social contexts (Thomas 2011).  
Using Thomas’ (2011) case study classification, the Miami-Dade County case 
study on how risk is constructed in sea level rise adaptation planning and governance is a 
“key-case” because of its ability to exemplify the analytical object of inquiry for 
examining the process of how regions construct knowledge about sea level rise and 
embed those into planning practice. Risks are being negotiated across scales and 
embedded in plans, designs, and physical adaptations. In addition, Miami is considered 
one of the country’s most vulnerable regions to sea level rise and has a multi-decade 
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history of related planning activities (see Appendix A for planning timeline of relevant 
sea level rise activities). Understanding the political and contextual dimensions that result 
in the way that risks are constructed requires a case in which this is occurring. The object 
for this case study are all the institutions involved or affected by sea level rise adaptation 
planning. This is a theory-seeking case study that uses the experience of institutions 
governing adaptations to sea level rise to understand how risk knowledge is produced and 
interpreted in this planning context. 
Qualitative data is used to analyze how risk is understood by different groups 
involved or impacted by sea level rise adaptation planning. Qualitative methods are well 
suited to reveal a range of behavior and the perspectives that drive it. This fits the 
research questions which are focused on how groups construct risk and how these risk 
constructions are wrapped up in procedural elements of why they take this form and how 
these diverse constructs are integrated into planning. Qualitative methods allow 
researchers to draw out the diversity and richness of explanation, allowing for a “thick” 
description of actors, activities, and phenomena.  
The case study is developed using multiple sources of evidence. I used content 
analysis for documents of sea level rise adaptation planning, policy, and programmatic 
documents, as well as meeting minutes, public testimony, and newspaper articles. 
Emergent themes from the document review was augmented with in-depth interviews 
with multiple stakeholders. Discourse analysis was used to understand the different ways 
sea level rise risks are understood and framed. Knowledge system dynamics around the 
construction of risks were paired with institutional and planning practices and outcomes 
(such as the creation of new programs, policies, or projects). In addition to the Miami-
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Dade County case study, Chapter 8 was developed using literature and theoretical 
reviews. 
4.2 Case Study Description  
A case study is used to analyze ambiguities around risk and the governance, 
planning, and knowledge networks surrounding planning for adaptation to sea level rise. 
This case studies follows “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context” (Yin 2014, p. 16). Case study 
research is useful for analyzing “how and why questions” when the researcher has little 
or no control over behavioral events and the study focuses on a contemporary issue (Yin 
2014). Because knowledge around risks to sea level rise are constructed and articulated in 
a contemporary real-world setting, other methods such as purely conducting interviews or 
surveys, are inappropriate because they would fail to account for the diverse ways in 
which these constructions are made and interact in planning, governance, and knowledge 
networks.   
Case study research is highly relevant in situations where the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and the context may not be evident. Context surrounding the research 
question is important in case study research (Yin 2014). It is not only the contemporary 
processes that are important, but historical, political, and social context becomes a part of 
the case study research in shaping the “richness” of how decisions come to be made in 
the real world. In the proposed research, the context of both how sea level rise has grown 
to be a concern, as well as the context of other challenges regions face, is important to 
understand these research questions within the “bigger picture.”  
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The unit of analysis for this case study research includes all the institutions, both 
formal and informal, that are involved in or affected by sea level rise adaptation planning 
in Miami-Dade County. This research is bounded geographically, to include those 
activities within Miami-Dade County, Florida. This case study inquiry uses multiple 
sources of evidence, with data converging in a triangulating fashion (Yin 2014). Using 
discourse analysis, the case study development relies principally on document analysis 
and in-depth semi-structured interviews. Using multiple sources of evidence helps 
increase internal validity of these findings (Singleton and Straights 2010; Yin 2014). 
 Miami-Dade County, Florida 
Miami-Dade County is on the southernmost portion of the East Coast of the State 
of Florida, covering approximately 2,400 square miles (see Figure 4.1 for a map). The 
coastal region is surrounded by barrier islands, including the City of Miami Beach, and 
Biscayne Bay to the south. Most of the inland portion of the county is in the Everglades 
National Park, a slow-moving river that drains from Lake Okeechobee around 100 miles 
to the north, to Biscayne Bay and other parts of the coast along south Florida.  
When Florida was established as a state in 1845, it was primarily an agriculture 
economy with most of its residents living within 50 miles of the Georgia border. The 
establishment of railroads and the draining of the Everglades lead to broader expansion 
into southern Florida and present-day Miami-Dade County. Following the Great Freeze 
that struck the southeastern United States in the winter of 1894-1895 and ruined crops 
across the southeastern United States, the crops in Miami were unaffected (Dunn 1997; 
Grunwald 2006). Julia Tuttle, a prominent landowner, offered Henry Flagler half of her 
land holdings to convince him to expand the Florida East Coast Railway to Miami (Dunn 
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1997). Flagler, Tuttle, and other wealthy speculators from the north established resorts in 
Miami-Dade County that could easily be reached when the railroad arrived in 1896. The 
City of Miami was incorporated in 1896 and following its establishment, many farmers 
and farmworkers whose livelihoods were ruined by the Great Freeze settled in south 
Florida (Dunn 1997). 
In addition to the railroad, land clearing and drainage of the Everglades took place 
first for agriculture and later for urban expansion. Settlers had hopes to drain the 
Everglades during the agriculture and homestead era of the 19th century, but many 
farmers had issues with ongoing flooding (Grunwald 2006). Following the Civil War, 
privately funded efforts to drain large portions of the Everglades began in earnest with 
the construction of canals, but winter flooding continued to make this difficult. State 
driven efforts to drain the Everglades began in the early 1900s with the development of 
plans (Grunwald 2006). This coincided with the development and expansion of Miami-
Dade County. Though more canals were built to allow for development and agriculture, 
the Miami Hurricane of 1926 and the 1928 Hurricane caused enormous devastation to the 
areas early inhabitants. The 1928 Hurricane killed thousands of poor African Americans 
who were trapped by the rising waters of Lake Okeechobee, to the north of Miami-Dade 
County (Kleinberg 2003). This destruction supported already existing efforts for massive 
drainage and engineering control around the Everglades (Grunwald 2006). At this point, 
the federal government intervened and established the Okeechobee Flood Control District 
in 1929 in partnership with the State of Florida, marking a large transformation of the 
Everglades with over 60 miles of dike built along the southern edge of Lake Okeechobee 
in response to the flood devastation of the 1928 Hurricane (Grunwald 2006). These and 
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other projects had major ecological impacts to the Everglades by restricting the flow of 
water and environmentalists, including the Audubon Society, fought for its protection and 
restoration (Grunwald 2006). At the same time, however, these drainage projects allowed 
for more agriculture and more urban growth in Miami-Dade and surrounding counties 
(Grunwald 2006). Sugar production soared in Palm Beach County and continues to this 
day. In response, environmental organizations fought to see the establishment of the 
Everglades National Park in 1947 to protect some of the ecosystem (Grunwald 2006).  
The final period of major transformation of the Everglades ecosystem took place 
following hurricanes in 1947, when Congress approved the Central and Southern Florida 
Project for Flood Control and Other Purposes. This effort spanned roughly thirty years in 
which over 1,000 miles of canals, build pumping stations and levees were constructed 
(Grunwald 2006). This allowed for more growth and development in Miami-Dade 
County which further impacted the Everglades ecosystem and the region experienced its 
largest growth boom between the 1950s and 1970s (Grunwald 2006). Environmental 
movements strengthened in response to the sweeping growth and expansion of flood 
control (Grunwald 2006). Today, the region is undergoing both flood management and 
restoration efforts overseen by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the South 
Florida Water District, in partnership with the National Park and environmental 
organizations. Environmental challenges such as flood management in the Everglades, 
restoration, challenges from climate change, and pollution runoff from agriculture—
primarily the sugar industry—continue to be political issues to this day (Grunwald 2006).  
In addition to the development and environmental patterns of Miami-Dade 
County, there are important race relations that affect the present day (Bush 2016). Race 
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relations between whites and the African American community have a tenuous history 
within Miami-Dade County and the State of Florida. Between 1890-1930, Florida had the 
highest rates of lynching in the country and many African Americans were given the 
most difficult and dangerous jobs with low wages and limited opportunity (Bush 2016). 
Early in the regions settlement, African Americans and black Caribbean immigrants 
cleared the land and built the railroad into Miami, jobs that many white settlers did not 
want to perform. Because of this, they largely settled along both sides of the railroad 
(Dunn 1997). The railroad corridor runs along some of the highest elevations within 
Miami-Dade County. During the 1896 incorporation of the City of Miami, African 
Americans who were living there had no political power, recognition, or influence (Dunn 
1997). Yet, they were used as “pawns of Flager’s interest” to make sure there were 
enough registered male voters to incorporate the city (Dunn, 1997, p. 57). Of the 367 
voters who incorporated the city, 162 were black, and following the city’s incorporation, 
these voting rights were removed (Dunn 1997). Racial covenants and redlining began in 
the early 1900s and continued up until the civil rights movement. Though the names of 
the neighborhoods have changed over the years, predominantly African American 
communities includes present day Liberty City and Overtown neighborhoods. These 
neighborhoods exist at some of the highest elevations in the county because African 
Americans were not allowed to live near the beaches and other desirable waterfront 
property. In 1955, the Miami City Planning Department routed the construction of 
Interstate 95 deliberately through the middle of Overtown, which displaced thousands of 
African Americans in that community and has had lasting impacts on the urban design, 
growth and development of the community (Dunn 1997). Up until desegregation laws, 
 
60 
 
African Americans were only allowed in the City of Miami Beach, and other beach 
communities, if they were going there to work and they had to have special passes to 
enter the beach communities (Dunn 1997; Bush 2016). In addition, they were restricted 
from most city parks and the beaches until 1960 (except Virginia Key which was 
designated for African Americans) (Bush 2016). Resulting from these injustices, racial 
tensions have led to civil rights and other demonstrations over the years, including race 
riots. In many ways, Miami continues to remain a highly racially divided city (Bush 
2016) 
In addition to the hurricanes discussed above that intersect with development 
patterns in Miami-Dade County, Hurricane Andrew in 1992 transformed county building 
codes. Hurricanes Hurricane Andrew in 1992, landed as a Category 5 hurricane in south 
Miami-Dade County. Across the entire path, the hurricane destroyed more than 60,000 
homes, and resulted in $27.3 billion in damage and 65 deaths. In response to the 
hurricane’s destruction in the southern part of the county, Miami-Dade County and 
several other counties across Florida adopted stricter building codes to withstand 
Category 4 hurricane wind speeds.   
Florida is nicknamed, the “sunshine state” and known for its warm climate and 
sunny weather. Today, Miami-Dade County has 2.7 million residents and is the seventh 
largest county in terms of population in the country. With the different landscape changes 
the county land use is now roughly 70% Everglades National Park, 20% urban, and 10% 
agriculture. The top three industries are tourism, development and agriculture. Culturally, 
Miami-Dade County is very diverse. Following World War II Cuban and other 
immigrants began settling in Miami between the 1950s and 1970s. Different waves of 
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immigrants from the Caribbean and South and Central America, make Miami-Dade 
County a highly diverse region. Several of the neighborhoods and regions within the 
county are known for the settlement of different immigrants, for example the Little 
Havana and Little Haiti neighborhoods in the City of Miami. From the 2010 United 
States Census, Miami-Dade County is comprised of 65% Hispanic or Latino, 17.1% 
Black, 15.4% White, and the remainder other races.  
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Figure 4.1 Map of Miami-Dade County, Florida. County boarder outlined in red. (Google 2018).  
Geologically, Miami-Dade County is on porous limestone, which means that both 
surface water and groundwater travel quickly through the ground. Because the region is 
so flat, has a high groundwater table, and has the porous limestone the water systems 
have been heavily altered through engineered dikes, canals, and filling projects to allow 
for growth and development. Currently, the hydrologic system in Miami-Dade County is 
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intensively managed with several canals, salinity controls, and pumps. The region is also 
highly susceptible to hurricanes and tropical storms, having experienced over thirty 
hurricanes since its incorporation as a county. Even with the efforts to drain the landscape 
for flood protection, Miami-Dade County and the municipalities within it regularly 
experience flooding challenges due to low elevations and porous limestone geology. In 
the past, these issues primarily occurred because of rain events, but now, it is increasingly 
common for them to take place during high tide events as water gets pushed up through 
storm drains and the porous limestone creating “sunny day flooding.” Today, this occurs 
in different low elevation communities approximately 20 days per year (Sweet et al. 
2014).  
Climate projections suggest that Miami-Dade County will experience increased 
flooding from sea level rise as well as higher frequency and severity of extreme weather 
events. Despite this, the State of Florida has banned the terminology “climate change” 
from planning and policy. However, the State’s comprehensive planning does allow local 
governments to consider sea level rise in planning (Florida Statutes 163.3178.2.f and 
Section 163.3177(6)(g)(10)). Miami-Dade County, municipalities within the county, and 
other non-governmental institutions have undertaken a variety of activities to mitigate 
current sunny day flooding and other anticipated impacts from sea level rise (Table 4.1 
for a summary of activities by Miami-Dade County, City of Miami, and the City of 
Miami Beach). The City of Miami Beach, for example uses funding from stormwater 
bonds to install pumps and raise roads, as well as updating zoning codes and developing 
building requirements. The City of Miami recently passed the Miami Forever Bond, 
allocating funds to update stormwater management and planning. Due to a consent decree 
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from the EPA, Miami-Dade County has made changes to their wastewater treatment 
facilities to account for future sea level conditions. In addition, the county, City of 
Miami, and the City of Miami Beach are a part of Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient 
Cities initiative with sea level rise adaptation being a prominent component to that 
planning effort. There are additional examples of sea level rise adaptation efforts in this 
region, with many different institutions—both formal and informal—involved in the 
planning process.  
Within this planning context, newspapers, planning websites, and other 
documents focus a lot of the attention around protecting real estate and other valuable 
assets. Yet, ecologists and environmental groups claim that pumping stormwater runoff 
into Biscayne Bay has deleterious impacts to the ecosystem (Flechas and Staletovich 
2015). In addition, businesses complain that this new infrastructure is increasing the risk 
of flooding on their properties, forcing them to install expensive pumps to move the new 
source of water, and community members call for more thought out planning efforts 
rather than what seems to be a hastened approach (Flechas 2015, Flechas and Staletovich 
2015). Part of this reaction may be in response to a lack of transparency and public 
accountability based on the city’s decision to skip public bidding on the Sunset Harbor 
project. What originally started as a $2 million awarded to Lanzo Construction, as a 
publicly bid project in May 2013, has since been expanded twice (once in 2014 and again 
in 2015) for an additional $10.4 million with some questioning why these proposed 
project expansions were not open for either public input or a competitive bidding process 
(Flechas 2015).  
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On the national and international stage, much of the commentary around climate 
change impacts to Miami-Dade County centers around impacts to affluent residents, in 
comparison to more disadvantaged low-laying coastal communities around the world. 
This framing of Miami-Dade County’s climate change challenges overshadows 
discussions of vulnerable and marginalized communities. In February 2016 Catalyst 
Miami, a social justice organization that operates county wide, recently held their very 
first summit meeting around the issue of climate change adaptation planning. New claims 
suggest that it will not only be the low laying coastal neighborhoods that will experience 
inundation from sea level rise, but some of the inland communities will also be impacted 
due to the porous structure of the land (Weiss 2016). In response, Miami Commissioner 
Ken Russell announced at the end of May 2016 that he is introducing a resolution in early 
June that would mandate a representative from Miami’s low-income and socio-
economically vulnerable population serve on the city’s seven-person Sea level Rise 
Committee (Weiss 2016). He is quoted in the newspaper as saying, “The new member 
could be a liaison to low-income communities while at the same time influencing the 
city’s planning, policy development, and implementation” (Weiss 2016). Prior to this the 
committee was comprised of representatives from real estate development, science, 
emergency management, and business. These and other dynamics have been occurring in 
Miami-Dade County on the topic of sea level rise adaptation planning for several years. 
Examining the way in which risks from sea level rise are understood can illuminate some 
of the underlying political processes and disagreements in this case and shed light on how 
this may take place in other regions as they undergo their own adaptation planning.  
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Table 4.1 Key Actions Outlined in the Preliminary Resilience Assessment from the 100 Resilient Cities 
project (Resilient Cities Assessment 2017). 
Key Actions 
Miami-Dade County 
• Vulnerability assessment of key infrastructure and capital investments 
• Water and Sewer Dept. investing billions on improving critical infrastructure with sea level rise part 
of design 
• Work with SFWMD and USACE on Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan 
• Partner with Urban Land Institute on pilot Adaptation Action Area for Arch Creek drainage basin 
• Rand Corporation to visualize how sea level rise and future land use decisions will affect flooding 
risks 
• Working with SFWMD to understand how sea level rise will impact regional canal network 
• Actively monitoring and managing saltwater intrusion into the aquifer 
• Created sea level rise Task Force who recommended that the county prepare an Enhanced Capital 
Plan for county’s infrastructure 
City of Miami 
• Established sea level rise Advisory Committee in 2015 and an interdepartmental Resilient 
Infrastructure Committee in 2017 
• Partnering on a Resilient Redesign for Shorecrest 
• Updating stormwater master plan while implementing stormwater upgrades in highly vulnerable 
areas 
• Strengthening flood risk mitigation in the Future Land Use and Coastal Management elements of the 
City’s Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan 
• Miami Forever General Obligation Bond ($193 mill for flood risk) 
• City’s zoning code contains several standards aimed at maximizing natural infiltration of stormwater 
directly in the ground 
City of Miami Beach 
• Est. Mayor’s Blue-Ribbon Panel on Flooding and sea level rise and a Commission on Sustainability 
and Resiliency 
• $500 million to raise roads and improve stormwater drainage 
• Updated the land use and development code to incorporate climate adaptation and resilience, 
including increased freeboard, base flood elevation, roadway, ground, and seawall heights 
• Recently completed a vulnerability assessment for City infrastructure 
• Constructing green living shorelines to complement sea walls 
• Maintaining extensive sand dunes that minimize risk from storm surge and provide habitat 
• Developing design guidelines for historic preservation with sea level rise 
• Developing “unique and creative” ways to help the community learn more, including an Adaptation 
Calculator and dynamic Resilience Open Houses 
• Conducting dynamic surface/groundwater modeling 
• Recently hosted the United States Conference of Mayors and is internationally recognized for 
adaptation projects  
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4.3 Methods 
Discourse Analysis  
This case study uses discourse analysis, incorporating document analysis and 
interviews. Discourse analysis is an interpretation of how social practices construct and 
contest shared meanings that constitute social reality (Howarth 2000). A discourse is a 
shared way of apprehending the world, which are embedded in language and “enables 
those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into 
coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek 2013, p. 9). A discourse helps groups make sense 
of the world by constructing meanings and definitions while also legitimating knowledge 
(Dryzek 2013). Discourses, “rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions that 
provide the basic terms for analysis, debates agreements, and disagreements” (Dryzek 
2013, p. 9). They are bound up with political practices and power (Hajer and Versteeg 
2005), and dominant discourses shape the physical reality through policy choices and 
implementation (Dryzek 2013).  
Discourse theory begins with the assumption that all objects and actions are 
meaningful, and that their meaning is a product of historically specific systems of rules 
(Howarth 2000). Discourse analysis examines how social practices construct and contest 
the discourses that constitute social reality (Howarth 2000). This is well suited to research 
on constructions of risk in that it will help develop an understanding and interpretation of 
socially produced meanings (Howarth 2000). A discourse analysis will provide a “thick 
description” of understanding and explanation (Howarth 2000). As Howath explains: 
“Discourse theorists are concerned with how, under what conditions, and for what 
reasons, discourses are constructed, contested and change” (Howarth 2000, p. 131). 
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Discourse analysis problematizes how certain topics and ideas are “closed off” to “open” 
them up. Discourse theorists must modulate and articulate their concepts to suit the 
problems they are addressing (Howarth 2000). This is relevant to this research on sea 
level rise adaptation planning, where there are many assumptions about risk, and these 
assumptions result in planning contexts and decisions that embed certain ways of 
knowing and priorities in the process. Discourse analysis can help unpack the discursive 
articulations of risk, for example if someone describes risk as being a calculation that is 
being made, it can help unpack the relations of power and assumptions embedded in such 
a definition of risk.  Within discourse analysis, the theoretical framework must be 
sufficiently ‘open’ and flexible enough to be ‘stretched’ and restructured in the process of 
application (Howarth 2000). This conception therefore excludes essentialist and 
reductionist theories of society, which tend to predetermine the outcomes of research 
(Howath 2000). The overall aim of social and political analysis from a discursive 
perspective is to describe, understand, interpret, and evaluate carefully constructed 
objects of investigation (Howarth 2000). For this case study, there was no a priori 
understanding of what a “real” or “true” calculated sea level rise rate or risk, rather it was 
interpreted in the planning contexts and how different institutions articulated meaning 
around what they considered “risks.” 
Methods used in this study are summarized on Table 4.3 with a definition of the 
method and the purpose. Qualitative methods are used to generate and collect empirical 
material like historical, ethnographic, and anthropological forms of research. This 
includes a process of gathering information from a range of possible sources, including 
newspapers, official reports, unofficial documents such as pamphlets, organizational 
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minutes and agendas, and supplementing document review with interviews and 
observation.  
Table 4.2 Summary of methods used in dissertation research. 
Method Definition Purpose 
Discourse 
Analysis 
Interpretation of how social 
practices construct and contest 
shared meanings that constitute 
social reality (Howarth 2000) 
To develop an understanding and interpretation of 
socially produced meanings  
Document 
Analysis 
Systematic review of relevant 
planning, policy, and other 
documents (Yin 2014) 
To examine how risk is being constructed in different 
planning documents and media; to triangulate 
observations from interviews and observation; to 
support discourse analysis and case study 
development.  
Interviews Guided conversations that 
follow a line of inquiry (Yin 
2014) 
To examine how individual actors (who are a part of 
organizations) construct knowledge about risk to sea 
level rise and how these constructions interact with 
planning, governance and knowledge network 
processes; to triangulate findings from document 
review and field observation; to support discourse 
analysis and case study development  
Thematic 
Analysis 
Method for the systematic 
identification, organization, and 
providing insight to patterns of 
meanings (themes) across a data 
set (Braun and Clark 2006) 
To systematically identify patterns across documents 
and interviews. To inform discourse analysis. 
 
Document Analysis 
This research used document analysis to inform case development. Document 
analysis is the systematic review of relevant planning, policy, and other documents (Yin 
2014). It is important in both case study development and discourse analysis because 
documents can represent how organizations think and convey knowledge. This case study 
was informed by project and planning documents, vulnerability assessments, meeting 
agendas, newspaper articles, formal studies, and other documents relevant to sea level 
rise adaptation planning. Appendix B includes key planning and policy documents 
identified and used for this research. Documents were identified via institutional 
websites, through interviews, and as referenced in other documents. These documents 
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were reviewed for historical context of how risk knowledge has changed overtime, how 
risks from sea level rise are measured and characterized, how assessment limitations are 
framed, and to identify who was involved in document production. In addition, news 
articles, organizational websites, meeting minutes, and other articles were reviewed to 
provide planning context. Document relevance was determined by how often it was 
referenced and used in the planning process. In some cases, documents with high 
relevance informed interviews. When documents were referenced during interviews as 
being contentious, further questions were asked about the process and sources of 
disagreement.  
In-Depth Interviews 
Interviewees were selected from institutions involved and/or affected by sea level 
rise adaptation planning, identified through an iterative process using expert opinions, 
semi-structured interviews, snowball sampling, document analysis and participant 
observation. Early in the research process I identified key documents used by the 
Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (Compact), Miami-Dade County, 
the City of Miami, and the City of Miami Beach from their organizations’ websites. 
These documents include meeting minutes from different climate change and sea level 
rise committee advisory panels, proposed and analyzed sea level rise adaptation 
strategies, news articles, and other organizational websites of groups within the county 
that have information about sea level rise and/or climate change on their websites. I then 
identified institutions and individuals (when possible) who were involved in the 
document or activity. I also went to Miami-Dade County and met with some researchers 
at Florida International University and local contacts before beginning this research to 
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learn more about the planning context. These informal meetings were used to learn more 
about the planning context and what organizations are viewed as key to the planning 
process. I compiled a list of organizations, summarized on Table 4.3, and identified their 
role in sea level rise adaptation planning as stated in the different documents and through 
formal interviews. I selected my interviewees based on this list, which also expanded 
during the interview process.  
Table 4.3 Institutions involved in sea level rise adaptation efforts in Miami-Dade County, Florida 
Type of Institution Name of Institution Role in Sea Level Rise Adaptation  
Community-Based 
Organizations  
The CLEO Institute, New 
Florida Majority, Catalyst 
Miami, Urban Impact Lab, 
Neighborhood Associations, 
Miami Climate Alliance 
Organizations focus on community 
education and organizing.  Limited 
participation on advisory panels, design 
charrettes, and comprehensive planning, 
though recent community organizing and 
education programs have put pressure on 
formal governing bodies to be more 
inclusive.  
Foundations, 
Institutes 
Kresge Foundation, 
Rockefeller Foundation, 
Miami Foundation, Urban 
Lands Institute, MacArthur 
Foundation, First Street 
Foundation, Rand 
Corporation, Organizations 
from the Netherlands (e.g. 
Deltares) 
Support and fund analyses, design 
charrettes, provide resources to community 
organizations for education and outreach. 
Share best practices in conferences, reports, 
newsletters, and analysis.  
Environmental 
Organizations 
The Nature Conservancy, The 
Everglades Foundation, Sea 
Turtle Conservancy, Miami 
Waterkeepers, Miami Climate 
Alliance, The Audubon 
Society, Florida Wildlife 
Federation, Sierra Club, Urban 
Paradise Guild 
Participate in collaborative processes and 
serve on advisory committees. Work in 
environmental education (including on 
climate change) and advocacy organizing 
around environmental issues. Some 
purchase land and easements, conduct 
restoration projects and monitoring.  
Academic Florida International 
University, University of 
Florida, University of Miami, 
Florida Atlantic University, 
University of Florida 
Extension, Sea Level 
Solutions Center, Sea Grant 
Serve on advisory committees, conduct 
research on sea level rise and climate 
change, provide expertise that influence 
decisions, monitor changes to sea level rise 
and updates to science, monitor water 
quality and other impacts of sea level rise. 
Work with government and non-
governmental orgs to educate on climate 
change.  
Private Firms (many, 
listed a few) 
AECOM, Taylor Engineering, 
CHM2Hill, David Mancini 
Hired by governments to produce 
vulnerability assessments and other reports. 
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and Sons, Duany Plater-
Zyberk and Company, Coastal 
Risk Consulting, Dover, Kohl 
and Partners, Rand 
Corporation 
Contracted to help design and implement 
adaptation strategies. 
Business Interests 
(many, listed a few) 
Greater Miami Chamber of 
Commerce, South Florida 
Builders Association, Latin 
Builders Association, Miami 
Association of Realtors, 
Independent Insurance Agents 
of South Florida, Terra Nova 
(real estate development) 
Participate on advisory committees and help 
set direction for action. Foster connections 
between governments and industries they 
represent.  
City Governments 
(34 Municipalities, 
listed by population) 
Miami, Hialeah, Miami 
Gardens, Miami Beach, 
Homestead, North Miami, 
Coral Gables, Doral, North 
Miami Beach, Cutler Bay, 
Aventura, Miami Lakes, 
Palmetto Bay, Hialeah, 
Gardens, Sunny Isles Beach, 
Pinecrest, Opa-Locka, Miami 
Springs, Sweetwater, Key 
Biscayne, South Miami, 
Florida City, Miami Shores, 
North Bay Village, West 
Miami, Surfside, Bay Harbor 
Islands, Biscayne Park, Bal 
Harbor, Virginia Gardens, El 
Portal, Golden Beach, Medley, 
Indian Creek 
Cities have different capacities to identify 
and plan for risks from sea level rise. Some 
cities are more actively involved in 
updating their stormwater management and 
other planning, while other cities lake the 
resources. Use formal plans, comprehensive 
planning, assessments, and set budgets for 
adaptation and resilience strategies. Focus 
on infrastructure and government owned 
properties.  
County Government 
(Departments active 
in sea level rise) 
Water and Sewer; Parks, 
Recreation, and Open Spaces; 
Regulatory and Economic 
Resources (Resilience, Public 
Works, Stormwater, 
Planning); Transportation; 
Emergency Management 
Oversee large region of unincorporated 
county. Use formal plans, comprehensive 
planning, assessments, and set budgets for 
adaptation and resilience strategies. Focus 
on infrastructure and government owned 
properties.  
Regional 
Organizations 
Southeast Florida Regional 
Climate Change Compact; 
South Florida Regional 
Planning Council, Florida 
Institute for Health Innovation 
Coordinate multi-jurisdictional planning 
activities to help prioritize adaptation 
strategies and offer guidance to local 
municipalities.  
State Agencies  Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection, 
Florida Division of 
Emergency Management, 
Dep. of Transportation 
Limited role in adaptation planning, not 
allowed to use “climate change” in planning 
documents. Existing policies shape local 
strategies. Some highway projects to 
mitigate flooding.  
Federal Agencies NOAA, Everglades National 
Park, Biscayne National Park, 
USGS, FEMA, EPA, USACE 
and SFWMD (Quasi 
Federal/State agreement) 
Emphasis on NFIP mapping, Everglades 
restoration, and water conveyance systems 
run by USACE. Set Federal sea level rise 
projections used in local planning.  
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Fifty-nine people were interviewed in-person and on the phone between 
September 2016 and June 2017. In person interviews were primarily conducted in 
Miami-Dade County, though some were conducted in Broward and Palm Beach 
Counties. Some of these interviews were conducted jointly for people who worked 
together responsibilities requested to be interviewed together. This resulted in a total of 
50 independent interviews. Forty-seven out of fifty of these interviews were recorded and 
transcribed and for three of these interviews detailed notes were taken as interviewees 
declined to be recorded. The average length of interview was 63.5 minutes with a range 
from 25 minutes to 214 minutes. Interviewees were purposefully selected and intended to 
cover the broad range of institutions active in this arena. This includes individuals from 
local and federal government, private consulting firms, environmental and community 
organizations, and research institutions (see Table 4.4 for a breakdown of interviewees by 
type). In some cases, a convenience sample was used to draw out groups who may be 
peripherally involved or impacted by sea level rise adaptation planning. The interviewees 
represent several different dimensions of sea level rise adaptation including: coastal and 
civil engineering, planning, public health, geophysical sciences, community 
development, ecological processes, agriculture, insurance, and development (see Table 
4.5 for a breakdown of interviewees by focus). “Focus” is related to the institutions 
primary motivation. For example, the South Florida Water Management District is a 
regional governing body primarily concerned with managing water for municipal, 
agricultural, and other uses—their focus is “Water.” A private business that has been 
hired to implement adaptation strategies is Type: “Private Sector—Consulting” and 
Focus: “Climate”. The ten types of Focus were selected using both the literature and 
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preliminary analysis of the different interests of institutions involved or impacted by sea 
level rise adaptation planning. 
In case studies, interviews are guided conversations rather than structured queries 
(Yin 2014). While I followed a general set of core questions through a naturalistic 
conversation flow, I adjusted this interview guide as time went by (for interview guide, 
see Appendix C). After each interview, I reviewed my notes and reflected on emerging 
themes. I did not hesitate to ask follow-up questions that would lead me down 
unanticipated paths, and I made some changes to my guide following most interviews. I 
also asked specific subsets of questions that varied according to roles and experiences of 
each interviewee. For example, a subset of questions to scientists were different from 
those asked to community organizations. Often these subsets were uniquely tailored to 
learn about a committee, assessment, or plan an interviewee had experience with. I aimed 
to maintain a thread of common experiential and perception-oriented questions 
throughout. Interviews are semi-structured and open-ended with some more specific 
questions developed from document review. Interviews were transcribed and coded using 
Atlas.ti software (for code book, see Appendix D).  
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Table 4.4 Interviews Conducted by Type   
Type Number of 
Interviews 
Government- Federal/State 4 
Government- County 12 
Government- City 10 
NGO-Environment 7 
Private Sector- Business 4 
Private Sector- Consulting 5 
Community Organizations 7 
Elected Officials 4 
Scientists 6 
Total 59 
 
Table 4.5 Interviews Conducted by Focus 
Focus Number of 
Interviews 
Environment 13 
Engineering/Hydrology 9 
Climate Change  13 
Health 1 
Insurance 1 
Planning 4 
Community Development 5 
Business 3 
Agriculture 6 
Political 4 
Total 59 
Thematic Analysis 
 Documents and interview transcriptions and notes were coded and analyzed 
according to the methods outlined in Braun and Clark (2006). The coding could best be 
described as manifest content coding, where coding was used to identify the tangible 
interpretation of the text. Using Atlas.ti software I created the following meta-categories 
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(parent codes): Focus of Risk; Interpret Information About Risk; Risk Boundary; 
Planning Process; Governance; Knowledge Networks; Solutions; and Other. These parent 
codes were determined a priori and based on the research questions around risk 
construction and knowledge integration. From there, I created 93 sub-categories (or child 
codes). Some of these child codes were identified in literature and preliminary document 
review a priori, and some of them were identified during the coding process. I used codes 
mainly as a system of indexing to sort and retrieve data for future analysis. This kind of 
coding is common in many techniques of qualitative analysis including thematic analysis, 
as schematized by Braun and Clarke (2012). My process mirrored their suggested steps: I 
immersed myself in the data, coded, identified themes (identifying themes throughout 
data collection, not just following transcription), refined and finalized themes and then 
began writing. A specific description of how codes were used, organized, and interpreted 
for analysis are included under the analytical approach for each chapter.  
Field Observation 
Some field observation was used to contextualize case study development and 
identify interviewees. This dissertation defines field observation as the witnessing of real-
world activities taking place that are relevant to the case study. I attended fourteen events 
for field observation to contextualize case study development and identify interviewees. 
These events include public workshops on sea level rise adaptation planning, a community-
based course, and public meetings (for a full list with descriptions see Appendix E).  
Analytical Approach for Chapter 5: 
This chapter is primarily concerned with how risk knowledge is constructed in the 
planning process. Thematic analysis was primarily inductive with the identification of 
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emerging themes around formal assessments that address sea level rise. Planning 
documents were reviewed with the purpose of identifying how sea level rise rates and 
projections, knowledge of the physical geography, infrastructure vulnerability, and 
knowledge about social and economic contexts were produced. Interviews provided more 
information as to the process of how these studies were put together, the contestations 
among different authors and participants, and how they have been used to inform 
decision-making. Early on during document review and interviews it became clear that 
identifying a baseline for sea level rise was an important and political issue. In addition, 
both experts and planners discussed the challenge of interpreting sea level rise risks 
across the physical landscape. These themes identified early in the research process were 
explored in greater detail using thematic analysis. This chapter primarily relied on the 
codes that fell under Focus of Risk; Interpret Information About Risk; Risk Boundary; 
and Planning Process. Child codes under these categories were compared across groups. 
Codes were then compared across themes to construct the planning history and use of 
different key ideas around the way risks are understood in sea level rise adaptation 
planning. 
Analytical Approach for Chapter 6: 
This chapter addresses research questions related to knowledge integration. 
Documents and interviews were used to determine the institutional context and roles and 
responsibilities of institutions involved or affected by sea level rise adaptation planning. I 
also identified the different adaptation pathways, which organizations are involved, how 
are they are involved, how the institutions and adaptation pathways relate to each other. 
This chapter also used thematic analysis to characterize the four emerging discourses 
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shaping sea level rise adaptation governance. These discourses were identified 
inductively as emerging themes from the data. Sub codes from the Focus of Risk; 
Interpret Information About Risk; Governance; Knowledge Networks; and Solutions 
were primarily used for this chapter. Using Atlas.ti I first identified emerging themes 
around the four discourses. I then examined the codes using co-occurrence tables and 
based on the different types of institutions to understand patterns around the emerging 
discourses, what types of rationalities and authority they draw on, and how they interact 
with other discourses. This analysis helps identify the dominant narratives and where 
they sit in terms of adaptation planning strategies.  
Analytical Approach for Chapter 8: 
   This chapter uses a literature and theoretical review to propose a framework of 
how sea level rise risk knowledge and expertise is negotiated and enacted across scales 
through the science policy interface. We developed the framework through literature and 
theoretical reviews. We then applied two case examples from South Florida, United 
States, and the Pacific Islands, to contextualize this scalar framework.  
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Chapter 5: Constructing Risk Knowledge in Sea Level Rise Adaptation Planning in 
Miami-Dade County, Florida  
  
5.1 Introduction 
 Sea level rise adaptation planning is predicated on understanding risks from 
changing and uncertain future conditions and identifying strategies to mitigate those risks 
(McCarthy et al. 2001). Risk knowledge is wrapped up in sea level rise discourses, 
projections, regional assessments, maps, and other planning tools created and used by 
governments, private firms, NGOs, and other organizations. These adaptation planning 
efforts often follow a hazards assessment and approach to determine risks, in which risks 
are considered a function of the physical components of the hazard (i.e. rate of sea level 
rise) and their interaction with social, ecological and technological vulnerabilities and 
adaptive capacity (e.g. topography, infrastructure, human life) (Wisner et al. 2014). 
Because there would be no risks without incomplete knowledge of future outcomes, 
knowledge gaps are often addressed through improving measurements and techniques to 
predict and identify uncertainties in anticipation of modeled future conditions (Gross 
2010). Indeed, planning requires some idea of what that future might look like, and such 
future knowledge around risks are primarily focused on the physical, economic, and 
ecological impacts of climate change (Adger 2005). At the same time, however, 
knowledge about climate risks do not represent objective “facts”; the process of 
identifying and measuring risks is constructed, produced, and situated in political, 
economic, and cultural contexts (Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Jasanoff 2004; Miller 2008). 
The emphasis placed on physical and economic future conditions can create a planning 
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arena that overlooks other risks and knowledge relevant to the problem at hand 
(Brugnach and Ingram 2012; van den Hoek 2014). 
 Scholars point to risk construction challenges of hazards assessments and 
anticipatory planning, required for sea level rise adaptation planning. Identifying how 
risks from climate change are likely to emerge and implementing presumably—though 
not guaranteed—effective responses inherently “picks winners” where decisions made 
based on how risks are understood can favor some people while causing harm to others 
(Wildavsky 1988; Barnett 2001). While uneven impacts of climate change are widely 
recognized (O’Brien and Leichenko 2000; Shi et al. 2016), uneven knowledge practices 
and problem framings which affect planning outcomes are often unexamined. The way 
that knowledge around climate risks is constructed shapes decision processes. As 
McCubbin et al. (2015) found in their study on sea level rise planning in Tuvalu, the 
emphasis on modeling and scenario-based climate impacts draws attention away from 
pressing challenges on livelihoods in the community and ignores effective points for 
adaptation. Climate change planning can emphasize physical hazards that are related to 
economic and political interests, rather than vulnerabilities that matter to the community, 
and by focusing on future conditions can potentially distract from current challenges 
(Kelman 2014; McCubbin et al. 2015). Additionally, constructions of biophysical hazards 
and their relation to social and technological systems, may favor technocratic and 
economic styles of reasoning and embed these value structures in risk knowledge while 
excluding and/or ignoring social and cultural values that may also be at risk (Adger et al. 
2009; Brugnach and Ingram 2012; van der Hoek et al. 2014).  
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Risk knowledge about sea level rise is at the core of how decisions are made 
regarding prioritizing and implementing adaptation strategies, yet the knowledge 
production practices around how those risks are determined is often left unexamined in 
the climate change adaptation planning literature, particularly in North America. This 
chapter addresses the call for research to open-up knowledge practices around identifying 
risks in climate change adaptation planning (Adger et al. 2009; Brugnach and Ingram 
2012; van der Hoek et al. 2014). Using a case study of sea level rise planning in Miami-
Dade County, Florida, this chapter addresses the first part of my research question by 
unpacking the social process of how particular dangers come to be selected for attention 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). I do this by uncovering the dominant framings, styles of 
reasoning, and political context that are embedded in the way risks are understood 
(Lupton 1999). Building off the work of Gross (2010), Ignorance and Surprise, I open-up 
planning and knowledge practices that create two types of ignorance: nonknowledge and 
negative knowledge. Nonknowledge is the knowledge gaps around what is considered 
relevant. Negative knowledge is blind spots, or knowledge that is unknown and 
considered unimportant, often thought of as “undone science.” In this chapter, I connect 
Gross’s work on ignorance to the concept of “risk ambiguity” as used by Brugnach and 
Ingram (2012) and van der Hoek et al (2014) to understand how contestations around the 
focus, interpretations, and boundaries of risk shape knowledge practices. Through this 
analysis, this chapter articulates three findings around knowledge constructions of risk in 
sea level rise climate adaptation planning: 
1. Determining “objective” knowledge around the hazards (i.e. calculated rates, 
projections, and physical geographies) of sea level rise in Miami-Dade County 
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is a negotiated and contested process. Sea level rise rates and projections are 
shaped by political debates surrounding relevant science and processes, which 
are enrolled to justify minimizing risks at the local scale.  
2. Sea level rise risk knowledge that supports an economically viable future is 
favored over knowledge that either threatens that future or is seen as 
insignificant to achieving goals of that future. This creates knowledge 
practices that address ignorance within those arenas (e.g. through 
improvements to modeling accuracy around physical hazards) and precludes 
planners from other ways of thinking about risk.  
3. Problem closure around risk knowledge occurs to drive action and decision-
making, specifically around infrastructure and the economy. Actors more 
closely connected with decision-making subscribe to problem framings 
around infrastructure that serve to reinforce bureaucratic and “expert driven” 
institutional path dependency around knowledge and decision-making. The 
outcome is the reproduction of a system in which some communities gain 
more attention and authority over risk knowledge and adaptation solutions, 
over others.  
5.2 A Relational Approach to Risk in Sea Level Rise Adaptation Planning 
Applying theories from Society and Technology Studies and cultural approaches 
to risk can open-up the knowledge production of risk and ground that process in social 
reality (Latour 2004). While non-cultural theories of risk, such as those in economics, 
psychology, and hazards planning, largely treat risk as a taken for granted objective 
reality (Lupton 1999; Fox 1999; Wisner et al. 2014), cultural theories of risk differ in that 
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they assume an active rather than a passive perceiver of risk (Rayner 1992). This could be 
an individual or institution driven by their own cultural imperatives to select risks for 
management attention, or to suppress them from view (Douglas and Wildavsky1983). 
Institutional structure becomes the ultimate cause of risk perception, and risk 
management becomes the stimulus for risk rather than the outcome of risk (Rayner 1992). 
Risks, therefore, are determined by the process of how an individual or institution comes 
to define, measure, understand, and construct knowledge about associated dangers in 
relation to what they care about (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Fox 1999). In this way, 
even hazards—or measured physical impacts associated with the changing 
environment—are determined in relation to what an institution values and how the 
institution constructs and validates knowledge (Fox 1999).  
In this framing, knowledge refers to claims made by actors—either individuals or 
institutions—that either serve to tell us something factual about the world (with varying 
degrees of certainty) or are taken by actors to tell us something factual about the world 
(Miller et al. 2010). It is an idea or judgement that someone takes to be true, or at least 
relatively truer than other kinds of statements (Miller et al. 2010) and are often shaped by 
tacit skills and values (Collins 1974), problem framings (Miller 2000), and styles of 
reasoning (Hacking 2002). 
Knowledge about risks are co-produced in the planning process by individuals 
and institutions, where those involved in adaptation planning shape knowledge about 
risks, and that risk knowledge shapes the social and material world (Jasanoff 2004). The 
way risks are understood is ultimately linked to the design, planning, and implementation 
of proposed solutions (Sarawitz et al. 2000). To build an analysis around risks, the focus, 
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is therefore on “the forms of knowledge, dominant discourse, and expert techniques and 
institutions that serve to render risk calculable and knowable, bringing it into being” 
(Lupton 1999, 7). Risks that matter are those seen as a threat to community—or 
institutional— order (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983), and, because of the uneven 
distribution of risks, the process of determining risk definitions and knowledge, and 
adopting those into formalized governance processes is inherently political (Beck 1992). 
Ultimately, knowledge practices around risk determine what institutions know and what 
they do not know, what kinds of questions get asked, the methods used to gather 
information, and the standards by which to evaluate evidence (Lupton 1999).  
  Gross’s (2010) classification of ignorance offers a particularly useful approach to 
understanding how knowledge is constructed in sea level rise adaptation planning in 
Miami-Dade County, Florida (Figure 5.1). Sea level rise adaptation planning is 
predicated on multiple forms of knowledge produced at different spatial, temporal, and 
administrative scales, with variegated actors involved in different contexts (addressed in 
Chapter 8 on knowledge politics of scale). Scientific knowledge is the primary means by 
which global and regional sea level rise rates and impacts are understood, and the 
emphasis of scientific uncertainty often becomes the focus of where to produce new 
knowledge. Gross offers another way of thinking about this process using the concept of 
ignorance which points to the limits of knowing, including the intentional and 
unintentional bracketing out of information (Gross 2010). He points to two forms of 
ignorance: nonknowledge and negative knowledge.  
The first type of ignorance is called nonknowledge, which encompasses 
uncertainties around scientific knowledge where actors lack sufficient knowledge about a 
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certain problem, however, they know the point of reference of that uncertainty. Within 
sea level rise, future conditions can never be fully knowable and actors from different 
institutions work toward identifying knowledge about those uncertainties. For example, 
sea level rise is understood as a process that is affected by currents, thermal expansion of 
water, tectonic activity, glacial ice melt, and other factors (Hine et al. 2016). While 
scientists recognize glacial ice melt as a crucial factor, they lack complete certainty and 
confidence as to how fast glaciers will melt with climate change (Hansen 2007). 
Therefore, under Gross’s classifications of ignorance, rates of ice melt acceleration are 
characterized as “nonknowledge” and scientists work to better understand those 
processes. This practice makes up knowledge claims that are recognized and debated in 
the institutional and planning structure. The development of new or extended knowledge, 
results from further assessments, planning, tinkering, or acting in the face on 
nonknowledge. New knowledge connects back to ignorance, by addressing some of the 
initial ignorance and uncertainties and also creating new forms of ignorance and 
uncertainties (Gross 2010). To address issues of scientific uncertainty in sea level rise 
adaptation planning, scientists and planners continue to explore known uncertainties born 
out of climate modeling, ecological and geological science, and other knowledges that are 
used in decision-making (Hine et al. 2016). The uncertainties are known and identified, 
and new knowledge seeks to address those uncertainties.  
The second type of ignorance is negative knowledge which is the active 
consideration that to think further in a certain direction will be unimportant. This occurs 
as some consequences of an activity might be anticipated but are deemed unimportant or 
unlikely to be severe. This is also related to Tannert, Elvers, and Jandrig’s (2007) idea of 
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the Galileo effect which refers to Bertolt Brecht’s play during which a cardinal refuses to 
look through a telescope to avoid having to accept the knowledge that the planets revolve 
around the sun. Negative knowledge can lead to what Hess (2007) calls “undone science” 
where knowledge could be produced based on clearly defined ignorance, but it is not 
pursued further (e.g. science is driven towards results that are patentable, and away from 
other pursuits). Hess goes so far to argue that there is a “systematic nonexistence of 
selected fields of research” (Hess 2007, p. 2). Frickel (2008) applies this thinking to the 
term knowledge gaps to situate organizational outcomes of undone science in his work on 
the social determinants and effects of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans. Such undone 
science may result in social movement organizations lacking potentially helpful research 
results because they are undone, a consequence of lack of funding based out of 
knowledge avoidance practices by funders and planners who would have the capacity to 
support this research (Hess 2007; Frickel 2008).   
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Complementary to Gross’s work on ignorance, the concept of institutional 
positionality can be used to explain these two forms of ignorance. Applied to risk, 
institutional positionality determines what institutions place as the substantive focus of 
risk, how institutions interpret information about the system, and how institutions bound 
a system regarding climate risks (Brugnach et al. 2008; van den Hoek 2014). Risk 
constructions stem from different ontological perspectives from which institutions align 
themselves and what values they prioritize on the landscape (Hilgartner 1992; Short and 
Clark 1992; Rayner 1992; Wisner et al. 2014). Different institutions come to understand, 
validate, and interpret risks and those epistemological differences can create conflict 
around what knowledge is considered valid (Bocking 2004). For example, there are 
Figure 5.1 Two types of ignorance: nonknowledge and negative knowledge. Nonknowledge results in the 
production of new knowledge to try and reduce the ignorance. However, negative knowledge is ignored by 
the system and no new knowledge is created to address this form of ignorance. (Figure adapted from Gross 
(2010) Ignorance and Surprise)  
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different scientific representations of risk, such as those used by climate scientists, 
hydrologists, versus geomorphologists. These representations are often considered 
credible sources because of their knowledge production system integrates testable and 
defensible biophysical laws (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Gieryn 2006). At the same time, 
however, these “facts” may be contested based on the epistemic choices made during 
their production (Ozawa 1996). Finally, risk knowledge encounters different system 
boundaries which can shape which knowledge is used and integrated in a planning 
system, and which knowledge is ignored or discarded (van den Hoek 2014). Institutions 
may bound the system differently in terms of both spatial and temporal scales and these 
differences may not only emerge in different constructions of risk, but also impact the 
planning process and knowledge integration (Adger 2005). Each of these risk knowledge 
construction processes related to institutional positionality can determine which form of 
ignorance is produced in the planning system.  
Communities facing risks from climate change, such as Miami-Dade County, 
address those risks by first creating knowledge about them. In Miami-Dade County, this 
knowledge process primarily follows a format of a combination of the physical hazard, 
the vulnerability and adaptive capacity. The following three sections discuss the 
knowledge practices and contestations within the way risk has been understood in Miami-
Dade County with a discussion of how sea level rise rates were adopted locally (physical 
hazard), how this interacts with conditions on the landscape emphasizing knowledge that 
supports economic growth (vulnerability), and how this is understood in a vulnerability 
and adaptive capacity context.  
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5.3 Scientific Reticence, Political Uncertainty, and Confronting Denialism—
Agreeing on 81 Inches in 2100  
 To plan for sea level rise risk, governments adopt regionally relevant rates and 
projections. Currently, Miami-Dade County and municipal governments within the 
county recognize and plan for sea level rise projections up to 81 inches by 2100 (Figure 
5.2 shows projections currently used in adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County). 
Determining the use and application of different sea level rise rates and projections has 
been a contested process with scientists from academic institutions, federal agencies, and 
local governments interacting with planners, policymakers, and other stakeholders to 
identify relevant global processes and knowledge to apply to Miami’s context. Three 
processes underscore the contestations around which rates and projections to apply 
locally: scientific reticence surrounding the role of ice melt acceleration, political 
uncertainty, and climate change denialism.  
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Figure 5.2 Sea level rise projections adopted by Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact in 
2015. 
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 The local government’s first formal instance of identifying sea level rise 
projections in the county was in 2006 when the Board of County Commissioners 
established the Miami-Dade County Climate Change Advisory Task Force which 
included a Science and Technology Committee.1 Collectively this committee produced 
and signed the Science and Technology Committee’s Statement on Sea Level in the 
Coming Century.2 This statement presented an argument that the 2001 and 2007 IPCC 
sea level rise projections, recommended for use by the US Government and project 1-3 
feet of sea level rise over the coming century, underrepresented the risk by failing to 
incorporate the accelerated melting of the Greenland and Arctic Ice Sheets. Building their 
own sea level rise model that integrated Arctic and Greenland ice melt, the committee 
projected a 1.5-foot increase in the coming 50 years and a total of at least 3-5 feet by the 
end of the century, and formally presented their recommendations to the county 
government in report published in 2008 (Recommendations 2008).   
The incorporation of ice melt acceleration in this projection was questioned by 
county planners and policymakers, discussed by interviewees from both the scientific 
community and local government planners. Although the county formally adopted the 
Climate Change Advisory Task Force Recommendations (Resolution: R-48-15) two key 
planning documents produced following this adoption, the Comprehensive Development 
                                                          
1 Legislation number 06-113 sponsored by commissioners Seijas (lead), Diaz, Gimenez, Edmonson, 
Jordon, Rolle, and Sosa. The committee included 10 scientists (specializing in oceanography, 
sedimentology, coastal processes, chemistry, ocean-atmosphere interaction, paleoecology, hydrology, and 
ecology), two county employees (including the Deputy Director of Miami-Dade County Water and Sewer), 
and a biodiesel and public policy specialist. 
2  Drawing on oceanography, geology, and other sciences to reconstruct thousands of years of coastal 
history and use contemporary data to identify ongoing shifts and changes in sea level rise in recorded 
history (e.g. Dr. Hal Wanless Presentation April 22, 2008—Wanless 2008) 
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Master Plan 2010 Evaluation and Appraisal Report and the sustainability plan called, 
“GreenPrint: Our Design for a Sustainable Future” did not include sea level rise 
projections and instead reference incremental changes of sea level rise observed by the 
Key West Tide Gauge since the early 1900s (see Figure 5.3). While some scientists 
shared that knowledge about accelerating ice melt is disregarded as an extremist 
perspective, others expressed that the disagreement stems from scientific uncertainty 
around ice melt acceleration having never been recorded or documented in human 
history. Because there is no baseline, scientists are learning about this as it is happening 
and using geological indicators to reconstruct the past. While many geologists focusing 
on sea level rise agree on the importance of ice melt acceleration, there is disagreement as 
to how much to include and how well the instruments are measuring the rate of ice melt. 
Additionally, challenges with global datasets and measurement instruments and 
technologies creates debates around how to model and predict sea level rise. This 
scientific reticence around ice melt acceleration and other gaps in sea level rise processes 
playing out among climate scientists at the global scale (see Hansen 2007) is called into 
question by planners at the local scale; while some scientists may be more comfortable 
with a wider band of possibility—or nonknowledge— surrounding rates and projections, 
planners wanted a narrower target.  
 
93 
 
 
  The failure of the county to address the Climate Change Advisory Task Force’s 
recommendations resulted in ongoing pressure from scientists, environmental 
organizations, and growing concerns in the media. In 2013, five years after the Climate 
Change Advisory Task Force’s recommendations were presented to the county, county 
Commissioner Sosa introduced resolution R-599-13 to create a Miami-Dade Sea Level 
Rise Task Force. While the 2006 Climate Change Advisory Task Force examined 
multiple dimensions of climate change and had several committees and dozens of 
members, the Sea Level Rise Task Force was focused on sea level rise and had seven 
members, with one scientist. Some planners shared that the idea behind focusing only on 
sea level rise was to avoid more political issues of greenhouse gas mitigation that had 
Figure 5.3 Representation of sea level rise trend in Miami-Dade County GreenPrint document. 
Did not include projections, focused on recent historical changes observed at Key West tide 
gauge 
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slowed down the Climate Change Advisory Task Force and the GreenPrint. The scientist 
selected for the Task Force was met with skepticism as other scientists expressed that the 
committee chair purposefully selected a scientist who was not vocal about ice melt 
acceleration and higher projections. As one scientist shared in talking about the hurricane 
scientist selected for the second task force, “You know, one of the first things he said on 
the committee was, ‘I’m not a sea level scientist,’ yet he was in charge of it. But the 
whole thing in fact was a total farce of a committee, the second task force.” Another 
scientist commented on the reluctance of this scientist to view ice melt acceleration as a 
factor for determining rates of sea level rise:  
So now the second committee was a problem because of David Enfield. 
And a few others… And like I said, David's a hurricane guy that sees 
everything as decadal and other cycles. Even today, and he said ‘We don't 
know until it's already past if something really changed.’ Because he's so 
dedicated to that. 
 
 While scientists discussed how their knowledge around ice melt acceleration was 
discarded and ignored, planners shared that during the early years of determining 
projections there was reluctance to incorporate projections into planning and share the 
information with the public because of political uncertainty as to how the public would 
respond. As one interviewee expressed when talking about the county planner in charge 
of the Climate Change Advisory Task Force and Sea Level Rise Task Force Committee 
Chair: 
Harvey had in his mind from day one the need for a major vision on how it 
needed to be instilled that was commensurate with his view of the 
risk…The numbers started the pile up, the different projections… There 
were a couple really key reports that Harvey said look, we’re 
underestimating the potential of sea level rise. We could be looking at two 
or three feet… In fact, we’re now [today] looking at numbers of six feet… I 
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think if we look back honestly everybody was afraid to say that. We didn’t 
know what the reaction would be to saying 6 feet. 
 
Part of this reluctance to adopt higher rates was wrapped up in planners stating 
they were ill-prepared to plan for and deal with the impacts of sea level rise. As 
one planner shared,  
They were starting to see these tools that you can look at it in a computer, I 
said show me three feet on Miami beach. All of a sudden Ocean Drive 
buildings are, water is up there, up to the top bar stool… So, you know they 
were fairly elementary tools. But they are not talking about a storm surge, 
they are talking inundation that doesn’t go away. That’s scary because 
there is frankly no known experience for dealing with this. People have had 
tidal waves they’ve had what do you call the big waves, coming from 
tsunamis. We’ve seen those pictures. But they always recede. 
 
 In talking about why sea level rise experts were left off the second county task 
force, one scientist expressed that the drive for individuals to want to create positive 
environmental change in the county requires the idea that it is possible to save the 
environment and region, and high sea level rise projections could limit action. As one 
scientist expressed frustration about an influential local planner that blocked the adoption 
of higher projections: 
He's been an environmentalist from before there was any environmental 
stuff, in the 70's… he wants his life to be success, that's why I'm 
convinced of this… he wants us to plant a tree and buy a Prius and maybe 
in a few years it will all be okay. Well the problem is, that 93% of global 
warming heat is transferred to the ocean. We're not turning this around, 
there is no way. Almost all the heat of global warming is in the ocean. 
And that's with us for centuries. And the residence time of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere is something like 4,000 years. You know, we're in for 
this. We've really done something. And [he] just can't buy that. He feels 
he's been a failure… And they're almost more problem than a denier, 
because they're coming to you as one of the people involved in climate 
change and sea level rise, and then they don't want to face the reality.  
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Similarly, several shared that rates and projections are shaped by the possibility of 
adapting. Smaller sea level rise rates are favored to allow for an economy to grow around 
building those adaptations. If the rates are too high, it will be impossible to plan to adapt 
to those risks.  
 While Miami-Dade County was trying to reach agreement on sea level rise rates 
and projections, similar debates around which sea level rise rates to adopt were taking 
place in neighboring counties and cities. Philip Levine had just been elected to serve as 
the Mayor of Miami Beach, running on a campaign to save Miami Beach from sea level 
rise and sunny day flooding. Broward, Monroe, Palm Beach and Miami-Dade County 
were all referencing different sea level rise projections for State and Federal lobbying and 
funding proposals. In response, these county governments formed a four-county regional 
effort beginning in 2009, called the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact 
(Compact) to create a unified projection and recommendations for addressing 
vulnerability. The Compact’s science and technical committee oversees reviewing current 
government projections and scientific research to determine which projections to use. The 
first unified projection was published in 2012 used USACE guidance and projected 9-24” 
of sea level rise by 2060 (Compact 2012). Following the publication of NOAA and 
updated USACE regional projections for planning guidance for federal agencies, the 
Compact reevaluated this initial unified projection. The second unified projection—
currently being used—was published in 2015 and projects up to 6.6 feet of sea level rise 
by the end of the century, much greater than the original 1-3 feet the federal government 
was recommending in 2006 (Compact 2015).  
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 While there was Federal precedence for determining rates of sea level rise at the 
regional scale, the effort for adopting projections was interrupted by local politics and 
climate change denial. Several people involved in this effort pointed to representatives 
from Palm Beach County as being the primary barriers to adopting higher projections. As 
one scientist expressed, “That was a fight… Again, it was scientists in Palm Beach, we 
got a few. One of the guys from Palm Beach… said, ‘I’m not authorized to project more 
than two feet [by the end of the century].’” Several sea level rise scientists expressed that 
they would have pushed for higher projections, however, they saw a “big fight” with 
climate change deniers in Palm Beach County and internally with some of the scientists 
on the committee and instead pushed for the United States Government projections, even 
though they expressed these projections were too conservative. For example, one scientist 
expressed an interaction they had with another scientist who did not agree that Arctic and 
Greenland ice melt acceleration models should be included in sea level rise projections 
early in the Compact’s effort to unify projections:  
He came up to me the first meeting and he said… Because we were 
talking right off, this was the second time we had the compact see over it. 
And he said ‘Are you agreeable not to go above 6.6 feet?’ And I said 
‘Yeah. I mean I think it's going to be more, but I think for planning 6.6 
feet is so severe for coastal communities that it drives home the reality and 
you start planning.’ That's been my goal. And if we get on our high horse 
and say ‘It's going to be 25 feet’… Then they're just going to buy a bottle 
of Jack Daniels and forget it. Which, they can't. The government's 
supposed to be Protecting their people. And you can't protect your people 
by ignoring this.  
 
 Some scientists stated that the decision to have a smaller projection for the county 
was in the political expedience of a lower rate. As one shared,  
The politicians, most of them, are interested in reducing the projections. In 
fact, the Four-County Climate Compact was too aggressive, so, Harvey 
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Ruvin, who's an environmental guy who's on the Dade county… and he's 
been involved in sea level rise and things of that kind for a very long time. 
He suspected, or he hypothesized, that if the rate of rise was too 
aggressive, the people on the County Commission would just tune the 
whole thing out and not do anything. And so, he started another sea level 
rise group in order to moderate the forecast by the Four-County Climate 
Compact so he could get by the Dade County Commission. 
 
 When the Compact was trying to adopt unified projections, many on the 
committee wanted to at least suggest a sea level rise projection of 100 years because 
infrastructure projects are expensive and built to last longer than 60 years. Several 
interviewees involved in this process indicated that this was a struggle, but attributed 
agreement to a USACE employee who shared that USACE planners are required by law 
to plan to the 100-year mark to make sure that infrastructure projects will last their 
lifetime. While the science committee used refereed publications, IPCC reports, and other 
scientific and credible data to suggest rates of sea level rise, some shared that the USACE 
was viewed as being the most politically expedient. As one scientist shared,  
… politically, it's easier for the people in Palm Beach to acquiesce to 
something that a military group puts forward because they're heavily 
Republican, and if a military group like the US Army Corps of Engineers 
says that something is happening that gives it credibility, whereas if a 
scientist were to say it, even though the Corps of Engineers projections are 
based on what the scientists have said, it's the politics of the whole thing. 
The people in Palm Beach were always holding out for minimal projected 
rises. 
 
 Currently, the county, city, and local governments use the agreed upon Compact 
projections published in 2015 which include the NOAA High, USACE High, and IPCC 
AR5 Median, for a projected sea level rise range of 6-12” by 2030, 14-34” by 2060, and 
31-81 inches by 2100 (Figure 5.2) (Compact 2015). While some sea level rise adaptation 
planning took place within the county prior to the Compact finalizing their projections 
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(e.g. City of Miami Beach3), presently, nearly all locally produced plans and assessments 
that include sea level rise reference the Compact’s unified projections. At the same time, 
the range of projected rates of sea level rise do not provide an exact number for 
municipalities to plan for, rather the suggestion is for planners to use this information to 
determine the specific level of risk their project can support. For excessive cost 
infrastructure upgrades, for example waste water treatment facilities, the idea is that 
erring on the side of caution and aiming for the higher projection makes fiscal sense as 
those systems are expensive and built to last a long time. Although this flexibility is by 
design so that municipalities have guidelines for determining design standards, some 
view these guidelines as a mechanism to focus attention on short-term adaptation 
strategies while avoiding longer-term challenges. For example, the City of Miami-Beach 
is planning stormwater infrastructure adaptations for 2 feet above the current hightide 
mark, which corresponds to roughly a 30-year planning horizon. Several critics shared 
that they consider this a “band-aid” solution and that local governments are using the 
short-term projections to avoid discussing longer term strategies. 
 Sea level rise scientists and environmental organizations continue to be active in 
the community, sharing both the Compact projections and higher projections from 
scientific publications at different community meetings and with the public. Many of 
these scientists as well as environmental organizations and community activists expressed 
                                                          
3 When determining how high to raise roads for the initial stormwater projects, the City of Miami Beach decided to use 
current high tide as a baseline and add a foot (later two feet) on top of that baseline to use for the design standard for 
road elevation. The reason being that they shared they could not wait around for the compact to agree so adopted their 
own rates 
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concern that the adopted projections from the federal government and recent IPCC should 
be looked at as a minimum, as one scientist explained in an interview:  
But those are government projections, and they do not incorporate either the 
accelerating feedbacks, mostly accelerating feedbacks we're seeing with ice melt. 
There are about 15 of them that are really important. That are speeding up ice 
melt beyond what the models are projecting. And those aren't in those models. So, 
those have to be really looked at, at the low end. This is where people that don't 
take the time to truly understand this, sort of blow off any of us that are projecting 
higher rates as extremist. But we're not. We're taking the models that they use and 
say “Okay, but it's gonna be faster than that, because you don't have these things 
in the models.” Somebody last year, put out a publication adding three of the 
models. Three of the feedbacks. Just looking at Antarctica, and they added 
another meter or two. 
These individuals expressed that local governments are not doing enough to 
communicate the projections and the risks of climate change to the public. Some of these 
scientists call on local government to initiate transparent planning. For example, as one 
shared: 
Let's take the high projection, and let's not put a date on it, but let's realize 
this may well happen this century. And what you do is, you say ‘Okay. 
These are the things we're going to have to do at six inch more sea level 
rise, or a foot, or a foot and a half, to maintain the integrated 
infrastructure. All these things. And then to keep the water sort of out of 
the way and stuff. And then you figure out how much each part of that 
costs, and then when you do that, all of the sudden you're going to realize 
that a foot and a half, this whole part of your city, you won't be able to 
afford maintaining the infrastructure… You're going to be on your own 
with your infrastructure.’ That would be really nice to know, if you're 
buying down here. Or if you're trying to sell, I mean it would be nice to 
know this. 
 
Several scientists shared that governments are afraid to be transparent about sea level rise 
projections because of the tax base and not wanting to scare people. Many were vocally 
opposed to this lack of transparency. As one scientist shared,  
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But what I'm trying to do is just get people to honestly, transparently plan. 
Because I truly believe that the only purpose of government is to protect 
your safety, your welfare, your health, your risk, you know… Reducing 
risk for you. One of the problems with sea level rise is storm surges are 
gonna become exponentially more devastating as they push farther in. 
Because they're a horizontal horror of water pushing in. And those are the 
things that are gonna move us on, but it's going to be devastating at some 
point… Just figure out what's going to happen, because it will happen. At 
each step and figure out what it's going to cost to maintain the 
infrastructure. 
 
Some of the scientists actively involved in aiding local governments with their modeling 
and project planning shared that they communicate to managers and planners that the 
highest government rate may be a bottom line. In addition to rates of sea level rise, 
several scientists and planners pointed to unknowns around climate change impacts to 
rainfall and storm surges, which will also create future inundation and flooding 
challenges. As one government planner shared,  
I think we have a very good handle on the sea level rise projections 
although there is some more work needed for storm surge projection. The 
biggest science gap is this climate model for rainfall, highly uncertain for 
this region because a lot of models… they cannot capture the kind of 
dynamics of climate like sea breeze and other things. In terms of extreme 
rainfall there's a big gap in what will happen to like hundred-year rainfall 
for example. The other issue is that even the average rainfall the question 
is if rainfall averages go down or go up what are the implications for the 
Everglades Restoration?  
 
Further examining rainfall and other biophysical climate dynamics that 
may worsen the impacts of sea level rise appears to be the next frontier of 
nonknowledge and new knowledge. The emphasis on ignorance surrounding 
biophysical hazards emerges out of interviews and documents as key uncertainties 
or unknowns surrounding sea level rise risks.  
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5.4 Risk Constructions of the Physical Landscape that Support an Economically 
Viable Future 
  Part of the drive for local governments to present rates and projections that 
minimize risks is wrapped up in the desire to portray an economically viable future for 
the region to investors, residents, insurance brokers, and others. Many scientists and 
interviewees expressed that part of what shaped the adoption lower projections and rates 
of sea level rise over those that incorporate ice melt acceleration and result in higher 
rates, is the focus on the way different projections affect buildable land in the county. As 
one scientist expressed:  
And from my view, 6.6 feet by the end of the century is catastrophic for a 
place like south Florida. If you wanted to build houses at 6.6 feet … Sea 
level rise in areas that were say, more than two feet above just normal high 
tide, not the king tide, just normal high tide, you're down to less than 10% 
of Miami-Dade County that's still buildable. We're so low, we're just 
ridiculously low. This is a real problem. And let's say sea levels at five 
feet by the end of the century. With this accelerating ice melt. It will be 
rising at a foot per decade and accelerating. 
By adopting a smaller sea level rise projection, several planners suggested that private 
companies can innovate building, design, and engineering techniques to address the issue 
and make a profit. Many scientists and practitioners shared that private, economic 
interests shaped adopted rates and projections. Planning for projections of more than a 
few feet means that adaptation work would be prohibitively expensive, and it would not 
attract economic growth. 
This idea of constructing risks that commensurate with a viable economic future 
is reinforced in knowledge about the physical geography and how projections will 
interact with the landscape and infrastructure. Several interviewees expressed that in the 
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early years of the planning process the county and local governments were hesitant to 
acknowledge and share information about sea level rise because of the threat to property 
values. For example, despite this being a formal recommendation from the county’s 
Climate Change Advisory Task Force4 there was a reluctance on part of the county to 
produce high resolution elevation maps to identify impacts of sea level rise projections.5 
And today, contestation occurs between actors that seek to minimize the location of 
where sea level rise risks occur and those that try to determine hyper-local risk 
knowledge for planning solutions, despite having somewhat similar goals of maintaining 
developable property and allowing for economic growth to continue.  
 Generally, a modified bathtub model6 is used to assess where sea level rise 
inundation will occur. The county, the Compact, and other municipalities acknowledge 
                                                          
4 In 2008 the Climate Change Advisory Task Force Science and Technology Committee made a second 
recommendation to the County to get high resolution elevation maps, stated: “The County should 
commission detailed maps for all Miami-Dade County created from calibrated LiDAR (Light Detection and 
Ranging) surveys (or other elevation survey technology that employs best known practices). These maps 
will show mean high, with water (MHHW) levels for 1-foot through 6-foot rises in sea level. (MHHW level 
is the spring high tide level which occurs every 14 days around full moon and new moon.) The maps will 
allow identification of which areas will become flooded in association with different sea levels and will 
provide a basis for assessing risk to the County’s development and infrastructure.” (Recommendations 
2008). The rational provided for this recommendation is to obtain higher resolution elevation data to 
determine vulnerability to infrastructure, roadway elements, the susceptibility of coastal, wetland, and 
artificial fill areas to erosion, areas of potential pollution and contamination release, changing drainage and 
storm surge risks, assess structural viability of buildings and levees with changing groundwater levels and 
saline water intrusion, and assess future fresh potable water sources. 
5 One scientist shared that there was opposition within the local government to create those maps, as 
expressed: “And there was a commissioner… that made sure those maps never appeared.” In response to 
the County’s reluctance one FIU scientist used the State’s LiDAR data to produce and share maps showing 
inundation across the county up to 12 feet of sea level rise (Harlem 2008). Several people shared that the 
scientist’s maps strongly influenced public opinion on sea level rise and resulted in more action and 
awareness, particularly in the environmental community for calling for GHG emissions reduction, concerns 
over sea level rise risks to a nuclear power plant, and natural systems restoration and protection. And while 
by 2010, the county did update a digital elevation model using 2003 LiDAR data, they were not made 
publicly available. 
6 The bathtub approach consists of overlaying current high-tide levels and different increments of sea level 
rise on existing water and elevation maps, simulated by intersecting the land surface with a water surface 
that includes the added water of a given sea level rise scenario linearly superimposed over the baseline 
reference (0-ft sea level rise tidal water surface). 
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the limitations of bathtub modeling because it assumes that land geomorphology, tidal 
surface variability and other conditions remain constant as the landscape is “inundated”, 
and it does not consider additional hydrodynamic effects during storm surges. For 
example, though they show future conditions of sea level rise projections, bathtub models 
fail to account for land use changes, higher groundwater levels, coastal barrier island 
migration, changes in sedimentation rates and deposition patterns, changes in tidal 
hydraulics due to land geomorphology changes and physical barriers, and other 
weather/ocean factors (e.g. storm surge, wave activity and anomalous events) 
(Vulnerability Assessment 2012; NOAA CSC August 2010b; NOAA NOS September 
2010).  
 Based on these limitations, several managers shared that the bathtub modeling 
completed for the first sea level rise vulnerability assessment for the Compact, 
underrepresented the risk and pointed to known areas of flood complaints that were not 
showing up as flooded in assessment. One modeler associated these complaint areas with 
older housing stock, in an area considered higher elevation but that still floods due to 
precipitation, land use, and other factors. Shortly following the Compacts initial 
vulnerability assessments in 2012 different modelers from county government, City of 
Miami Beach, agencies and others began expanding their practices to ameliorate bathtub 
model limitations. Both Miami-Dade County and the City of Miami Beach, are working 
on dynamic groundwater/surface water model and well monitoring to address this 
uncertainty. For Miami-Dade County, this took place with a plan to integrate sea level 
rise into updates to the Stormwater Master Plan as well as modeling in the Water and 
Sewer Department.  
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 Within the county, part of this focus on groundwater came from a top-down 
mandate from the South Florida Water Management District, an agency that oversees 
water resources in the region. When the county sought to increase their municipal water 
supply to allow for more regional growth through additional drawdown of the Biscayne 
Aquifer, the South Florida Water Management District required the county to prove this 
would not impact canal water (i.e. surface water) and water flow in the region 
(assessment published in Hughes and White 2016). The county applied this groundwater 
and surface water model to sea level rise bathtub models and more locations became 
flooded based on this additional information. While county stormwater and water and 
sewer managers utilize modeling that incorporates this model of groundwater and surface 
water interactions, getting these updated maps in the county’s comprehensive land use 
plan to inform land use policies, building codes, and published for the public to view has 
been an ongoing challenge. As one interviewee shared, 
So the problem is, is that some internal departments aren't comfortable with 
releasing information, because it could be wrong. And because … so, part 
of it's really valid, in that… so when you do the bathtub model, you 
inundate the coast. But that's underestimating the risk, because our ground 
water also rises, and there will be areas on the west, and on the canals, and 
then the south, that also are soggy. They're like, the ground water's so high 
that basically, they're not that livable. So when you do just the coastal 
bathtub model, you miss this other component. So from, like, a very valid 
science perspective, they say like “You know, that's not really a great map, 
cause you're missing these other pieces”…  
 
But then what we have is just different departments that are in charge of 
different things, and seaming those together is difficult. And then, truth be 
told, there are people within the department that are deniers, that don't want 
to publish this information… even the bathtub one. And so, they use all 
their excuses to say why we can't publish it, and it's confusing to 
everybody, and no one understand why… really it's a moot point. [Other] 
maps are publicly available, you know, they're on TV, they're in the news, 
it's whatever. But we haven't been able to get all of the departments to 
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agree on, sort of our uniform… like, what we want to present [the bathtub 
model]… Which is, again, it's gonna underestimate the risk. But you gotta 
start somewhere. [Others] may object to our map. But, you know, we've 
gotta start somewhere. 
 
One of the primary concerns for publishing comprehensive maps that show the full extent 
of where sea level rise inundation may occur is connected to the risk of these sea level 
rise maps devaluing property. As one informant shared, “The real fear, from one person, 
is that providing this information we may devalue homes, it may devalue property by 
releasing this information.” While the threat of devaluing land is at the core, this gets 
wrapped up in debates over other uncertainties of mapping, as another informant shared, 
The problem is, is that you can't really map out into the future. Because… 
so let's just take for example, we go to 2060, we've two more feet of water. 
So then we could do, okay, well if the sea is this much higher than the 
ground level will be this much higher, but then that's assuming that the 
canals are operating the same way. But they'll be flowing… they won't be 
flowing anymore, to the sea, and so that's not really a valid assumption. So 
then what do you map for 2060? Depends on what the district does, and 
how they manage the system, and… so it loses, sort of, meaning as you go 
out that far. 
 
 While there is no local government produced map that is publicly available map 
that shows where inundation from sea level rise might occur given ground water and 
surface water dynamic modeling, the county does present a map using bath tub modeling 
(Figure 5.3). In this online interactive map made in partnership with NOAA and the 
county, areas in blue are considered hydrologically connected, either by the coastline or 
the canal system, whereas areas in green are low-lying areas in relation to a 3-foot mark 
of sea level rise, but not considered hydrologically connected using the bath tub modeling 
approach. The green areas on this map represent much of the regions that several 
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interviewees were concerned are not being addressed in current sea level rise 
assessments.  
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Figure 5.4 Map of sea level rise impacts, created by Miami-Dade County: Miami-Dade County created this 
map adapted from NOAA’s Sea Level Rise Viewer, Miami-Dade County shares a map of possible sea level 
rise inundation based on bath tub model and elevation. Areas in blue are considered possible sea level rise 
inundation regions based on hydrologic connectivity of coastlines and canals. Ground water surface water 
dynamic modeling is not included, but the green areas represent low elevation regions (below 3-feet).  
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 To lessen the risk of economic impacts to the region, many interviewees 
discussed the need to support projects that will help keep insurance costs down and 
protect continued investment in the region. Several planners and interviewees shared 
efforts designed to “get ahead of the issue” of risk from sea level rise by focusing on 
infrastructure vulnerability and adaptation solutions. Because local governments are 
responsible for supporting infrastructure the link between infrastructure vulnerability and 
property is not surprising. In 2012, the Compact was one of the first organizations to 
publish a vulnerability assessment, publishing “Analysis of the Vulnerability of Southeast 
Florida to Sea Level Rise”7. The physical features identified for vulnerability include: 
ports and airports, railroads, miles of road, water and wastewater treatment plants, 
landfills, hospitals, schools, emergency shelters, evacuation routes, and marine facilities. 
In addition, analysis was conducted to determine taxable value of property8, acres of 
future land use, and acres by habitat type/land use that would be impacted by sea level 
rise. The link between infrastructure and property values is underscored by vulnerability 
assessments that emphasize property values as a driving force to measure risk in the 
region. Part of this is shaped by the need to maintain local property taxes to support 
infrastructure upgrades, and another component of this is driven by external policies, 
                                                          
7 This document used 1, 2, and 3-foot sea level rise scenarios and a bathtub model to identify where sea 
level rise would intersect with infrastructure. The Compact facilitated discussions and used surveys and 
workshops to develop planning parameters that would be part of the regional sea level rise vulnerability 
assessment. While this assessment was based on land and sea elevations only and does not consider 
flooding related to existing drainage issues, associated with rain or tropical storm surge, they suggest that 
additional analysis and more sophisticated models is needed to better understand the hydrologic 
connections and surface water response to rising sea levels 
8 When putting together this report, Miami-Dade County would not include property value information. It 
was shared by several interviewees that this was because bathtub modeling underrepresented the risks, 
other interviewees expressed that there may have been internal pushback within the county to not want to 
publish those maps to scare developers. 
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development investments, and insurance priorities. The emphasis gets placed on design 
standards and building codes around how the region builds, without discussions of where 
growth should happen. As one insurance expert shared,  
[Building standards] are not a bad thing to discuss. My quibble would be 
that it's the only thing we discuss, and that's the problem. The analogy in 
coastal management from my perspective is… and resilience in the built 
environment, is that we spend all this time talking about how we build. 
The sacred cow, or the elephant in the room, whatever you want to call it, 
is that we will not discuss where we build. That's the real problem. It's not 
just how, and that's because legally, it's really easy to just keep increasing 
building standards. Comparatively speaking, I mean, sure you get pushed 
back from the building industry, but that's nothing compared to the 
property rights implications of starting to look at serious, where we build.  
The importance of property value as a proxy for vulnerability shows up in 
assessments that address socio-economic conditions. For example, the “Sea level Rise 
and Health Vulnerability Assessment” published in 2016 provides another example of 
how the focus of risk knowledge is underscored by physical and economic conditions. 
This planning document, produced by the Florida Institute for Health Innovation used 
bath tub modeling, state LiDAR, and socio-demographic data to measure vulnerability to 
sea level rise from a public health perspective. This technical, expert driven assessment 
looked at vulnerability and income in two, competing ways. It addressed low-income 
communities of color as socio-economically vulnerable, while at the same time factored 
property values into the assessment—where high-valued assets on the landscape are 
considered more vulnerable. The assessment found that low-income communities of 
color are less vulnerable to sea level rise than high income areas, because those 
communities are at higher elevations. Similar logic was used by several interviewees that 
acknowledged low-income communities and historically marginalized communities of 
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color will experience impacts from sea level rise based on their socio-economic status, 
but that these impacts are no different or less so than those experienced by wealthier 
communities, because wealthy communities have financial assets at risk. Community 
organizations contest this idea and contend that low-income and marginalized minority 
populations are at greater risk of displacement from climate gentrification, storm surge 
and hurricane events, and public health and economic impacts of climate change. Yet, 
aside from limited assessments being conducted by academic institutions, the risks these 
organizations are concerned about are largely un-recognized in formalized risk 
assessments used for planning purposes.  
It could be argued that socio-economic vulnerability should be examined on a 
more local scale, during project specific planning and design. Several planners shared 
that it is more appropriate to consider social factors in the hyper-local scale that they 
exist. In this way, socio-economic vulnerabilities are considered during pilot case studies 
and design charrettes. In the Arch Creek Adaptation Action Area design charrette 
organized in partnership with the Compact in 2016, for example, Census block data is 
used to look at poverty rates (see Figure 5.4). Yet this and other design charrettes serve as 
pilot assessments and have been completed with little involvement of local communities 
and assessing other information related to priorities and risk understandings experienced 
by those within these communities. Instead, a limited number of stakeholders and experts 
examine things like municipal codes, ecological functions, planning tools, and 
infrastructure projects that could be used in this region. What we see are contradictions 
surrounding how some planners view integrating communities— including socio-
economically marginalized communities—into planning. On the one hand, interviewees 
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shared the importance of this when it comes to developing comprehensive plans, and on 
the other hand, some of these same planners expressed that it may not be appropriate for 
the public to comment specific technological roles of governing infrastructure, such as 
stormwater management planning.  
 
Figure 5.5 Map of percentage of individual poverty for Arch Creek project: Included in assessments for 
Arch Creek Adaptation Action Area design charrette in addition to other sources of information around 
stormwater, sea level rise inundation, and planning and zoning. The design charrettes are often pilot studies 
and done in a short period of time with little community involvement.    
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While issues of poverty, public health statistics, and other formal assessments can 
tell part of the story of socio-economic vulnerability, they fail to capture the diverse ways 
in which those communities themselves frame the problem. For example, many 
community organizers brought up their concern over climate gentrification, where they 
are experiencing developers coming into their high elevation communities and 
purchasing property. While community members shared they were discussing this issue 
for over a year prior, it was in 2017 when geographer Dr. Hugh Gladwin was attending a 
community organized listening session that they came up with the idea to produce a map 
that shows which developers have been purchasing land in high elevation areas (see 
Figure 5.5 for the map). Despite community organizing around issues of gentrification 
and other issues related to climate change vulnerabilities, these concerns are poorly 
integrated into formal planning efforts. Some planners questioned whether climate 
gentrification was really because of sea level rise or if it was just “normal” gentrification. 
At the same time, many of these high elevation areas are frequently discussed by local 
government planners as areas to promote growth because they are less vulnerable to sea 
level rise, running counter to concerns from people in those communities about 
displacement. 
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Figure 5.6 Map created by Dr. Hugh Gladwin with community organizers to show climate gentrification in 
high elevation neighborhoods in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The image on the left shows elevation and 
the image on the right shows where parcels have recently been sold and the developer and/or bank they 
were sold to.  
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In addition to minimizing knowledge from socio-economically marginalized 
communities, risk knowledge that runs counter to an economically viable future, or that 
points to issues and concerns about the way in which risks are being measured and 
addressed were marginalized and often ignored in the planning process. For example, 
many community and environmental organizations discussed the political inertia towards 
addressing sea level rise with the nuclear power plant owned by Florida Power and Light. 
As one interviewee suggested, 
The Florida Power and Light [are] persisting in the myth that their power 
plant won't be affected by sea level rise, and that they've got a plan to deal 
with two feet of sea level rise and it's what they're counting on. 
 
This private sector sea level rise knowledge avoidance persisted in attitudes towards the 
development community and real estate community. Policies and regulations often fail to 
integrate sea level rise and thus shape the conversation away from regional economies. 
For example, when discussing the challenge of getting realtors on board with 
understanding and sharing sea level rise risks, one interviewee shared, 
And then, in real estate… regard to flooding has a don't ask, don't tell 
policy, so their standard of conduct for the realtors is don't ask, don't tell. 
So, if the realtor did not see the flooding, they have no obligation 
themselves to tell a buyer about tidal flooding. All they have to do is say, 
“Here's the FEMA flood map. Find your home. Figure out where you are. 
Have a nice life. Buy it, don't buy it, whatever.” But, they have no 
obligation because the sea level rise flooding is not covered by FEMA 
maps, and I'll admit, the realtors know about it because they're not stupid. 
And they drive their cars through seawater, and they're going like, “I never 
saw that property flood. Never.” Of course, they didn't go there in 
September, October, November when it was flooding. 
 
 And while private sector avoiding the issue of risk due to financial strain is not 
entirely surprising, in some cases, environmental and community organizations challenge 
the way that risks are understood and addressed in infrastructure adaptation planning. 
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Several environmental organizations express concerns over the county’s proposed 
adaptation to use inland injection sites that send treated wastewater to an area below the 
Floridian aquifer in the boulder zone, including uncertainty from taking water out of the 
water cycle and the impacts the treated wastewater will have on the aquifer. As one 
informant expressed their concerns,    
It's taking hundreds of billions of gallons of water out of the water cycle 
and putting it into a hole, which I think is not sustainable. It's also a 
somewhat untested technology. What's going to happen to that water down 
there? Is it just going to stay down there forever? Is it going to migrate, is 
it going to contaminate the aquifer, is it going to create a methane bubble 
and become anoxic? It's becoming more and more clear that, particularly 
in Miami, where we have porous limestone, things are not very well 
contained underground… There are fissures even into the boulders now 
that we don't even know about.  
 
Additionally, some interviewees expressed uncertainty around stormwater pumps 
installed in the City of Miami Beach, and that they create more concentrated pollution 
into the waterway. As expressed by one individual:  
Well, it has been effective in short term lowering of the water in the 
streets. The downside of it is that the stuff is pumped into the bay without 
any real treatment. They might strain out a few chunks or something like 
that, but it's… So, North Biscayne Bay sea grasses are dying off, and it 
probably relates to turbidity in the bay, and it started to happen about the 
same time that the pumps were turned on. That's not proof that that's the 
case but… It's an observation, and one of the obvious candidates. Florida 
International University did measurements of the nutrient loading in the 
plumes of stuff going into the bay, and the mayor of Miami Beach, 
Levine, was outraged because they were finding there were some 
problems with the amount of nutrients, and so, instead of working with 
them, basically a politician often attacks the messenger.9 
 
                                                          
9 In response to this testing and community pushback, the City of Miami Beach is now testing different 
methods to treat stormwater at these pump sites.  
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And community organizations question whether the focus on infrastructure is ignoring 
the people that rely on that infrastructure and call for other adaptation approaches to 
support low-income and historically marginalized communities. Knowledge that 
addresses several ecological and social components of sea level rise risks remains as 
negative knowledge, and “undone science” while knowledge about sea level rise impacts 
transportation, wastewater, water treatment, and stormwater take priority. 
5.5 Prioritization and the Creation of Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity 
The way that risk knowledge is constructed is connected to adaptation project 
selection and prioritization. In Miami-Dade County the production of knowledge about 
biophysical hazards shaped by economic and political values leads to a path dependency 
around knowledge and decision-making and creates a system in which some communities 
gain more attention and adaptation solutions, over others. During interviews, planners 
focused on two types of decisions related to vulnerability (primarily of infrastructure) that 
they make and how they use sea level rise risk knowledge to make those decisions which 
reinforce this finding. The first type of decision is where to invest in adaptations, and the 
second type of decision is how to integrate sea level rise projections into the 
infrastructure adaptation designs.  
Currently, planners within Miami-Dade County and city governments are working 
towards developing different criteria for determining where to invest. Several managers 
reported how difficult adaptation decisions are to make. One stormwater manager 
commented,  
There are some difficult decisions to make in that, [we] had this vision of 
like are there neighborhoods that we leave as is and we let them flood. Are 
there neighborhoods we protect? Well if you make a decision like that, 
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how do you do that? How do you make a decision that this neighborhood 
is going to get protected, this one is not? Kind of developing that criteria 
like well is it about severity of that risk or potential vulnerability. 
 
Much of this is already established in policies around flooding and stormwater 
management. For example, the South Florida Water Management District holds the most 
authority over flood control and water infrastructure management in the region. In 
analyzing the risk associated with sea level rise they apply formulas for storage capacity 
based on level of service which inherently prioritizes dense urban areas over rural regions 
in the southern portion of the county. Similarly, though the NFIP does not consider future 
sea level rise conditions in modeling, it determines a lot of how the region understands 
and addresses current risks and is connected to prioritization. Stormwater management 
and prioritizing projects is based on a combination of modeling components (NOAA 
Historical High Tide Data, the groundwater table, existing land use, elevation data, and 
different flood event data), FEMA insurance claims, and complaints. The county, for 
example, prioritizes drainage capital improvement projects in areas with most repetitive 
losses, flood complaints, and low-lying areas, with flood protection levels of service 
(integrating sea level rise projections) below the threshold identified in the 
Comprehensive Development Master Plan. Because many shared that insurance rates are 
a major concern for homeowners, the focus of mitigating risk is related to projects that 
can reduce insurance costs for homeowners. Much of this takes place using flood risk 
management activities that are included in FEMA’s Community Benefits Rating System. 
In this way, FEMA flood insurance and local government actions that address those risks 
are building people into more risk. At the same time, the local governments have no real 
information around how flood insurance rates or not having flood insurance impacts low 
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income and historically marginalized communities—who tend to live in older houses that 
may not require insurance. Despite these challenges around insurance, it still drives a lot 
of the focus and attention for how sea level rise adaptation planning is taking shape. As 
one interviewee shared,  
Well, it's all about insurance at the end of the day. There's two main users, 
insurance and then the local flood plan administrators are the guys who are 
really using it to then mitigate disasters and risks. But the insurance drives 
a lot of the conversation with the homeowners. Homeowners aren’t 
concerned with mitigating risk, they're concerned with, what am I paying. 
Just bottom line. And so the insurance drives a large part of that. 
 
 And while several planners discuss the need to create objective approaches to 
avoid favoring some regions over others, several of these same planners shared how the 
outcomes of these efforts favor those who have flood insurance—which are primarily in 
low-lying coastal areas that also represent more affluent parts of the county. Nearly all 
informants expressed that areas like Miami Beach and other affluent communities will 
have the most resources available for adaptation and protecting infrastructure. Beach re-
nourishment, for example, is funded in part by the USACE, the State of Florida, and local 
municipalities and several people expressed that Miami Beach receives the most funding 
for this, as expressed by one planner:  
They [Miami Beach] get lots of funding for beach re-nourishment projects 
which are helpful to sea level rise. But in some of those areas like Miami 
River and some of those back areas, they're not going to get any funding to 
do anything on theirs. So they're just going to be more susceptible to the 
sea level rise… Anywhere that doesn't have a beach and tourist dollars, is 
probably in trouble. 
 
From the USACE’s perspective, the purpose of beach re-nourishment is to protect 
building structures and prioritizing funding is based on exposure and cost benefit analysis 
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of property values and number of human lives, again favoring low-elevation, densely 
crowded and high-property value regions.  
In addition to differences in external funding sources and prioritization, there are 
also differences in internal funding and tax base to support adaptations. Floodplain 
administrators for small and under-resourced cities and municipalities may lack the 
ability to influence planning decisions, shaping how risks are distributed across the 
landscape. As one planner shared, 
Most [Floodplain administrators] have a very challenging job. Because 
[Miami-Dade County] obviously has a lot of resources and we go down to 
many of these other communities they have one person and they're also 
doing whatever. Ten other jobs, and so it's a very small piece of their job. 
So imagine if you had something like this [flood map] and you wanted the 
community to be more resilient in the coastal areas, so you said hey to 
your board of commissioners, hey we really need to change our code to 
enforce this. And she's a little nobody down in the middle of some 
organization. The board is going to be listening to all their developer 
friends and anybody else that wants to develop in those areas and doesn't 
want those stricter regulations and so they're going to fight it. She has an 
uphill battle to even convince her board of county commissioners that this 
is a good thing.  
 
 Both current and future loss of property values becomes one of the key ways risk 
is understood and in adaptation planning. When discussing wastewater treatment and 
hooking septic systems up to the sewer system as a sea level rise adaptation, one 
interviewee shared that it is a difficult decision because some of the areas on septic 
systems are low elevation areas that may not be ideal for development because of sea 
level rise impacts. So, the question is whether or not it makes sense to invest in those 
areas that may be abandoned in the future. In this way, infrastructure vulnerability gets 
caught up in debates and decisions regarding the economic and social values across the 
region, in determining what is and what is not worth investing. As one insurance industry 
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expert shared, “The way we fund government is part of what’s driving how our 
organizations see risk. Because for local governments, their property value is what they 
need to operate.” Informant interviews corroborated this with their emphasis on needing 
to protect the economic core to fund future adaptation efforts. As one interviewee shared,  
Well, the city and the area around Little River and Shorecrest, they were 
talking about basically allowing the areas that are low to flood and become 
more marsh like, and, just accept the water coming on to the land. Well, 
my own personal feeling is that the water front areas are the high value 
areas and they are the economic drivers that would finance the changes 
that we need to make, so we need to… For example, if you go to Fort 
Lauderdale and you drive around, you'll notice that there are a lot of big 
yachts and so forth that are up there next to very opulent water front 
homes that are on top of fill pads, and basically if you made the North Bay 
more accessible to upscale yachts, then it would be possible to raise the 
money to elevate the bridges, to do the… Whatever is necessary. 
 
Another reason people suggested prioritizing areas that are high property value is that 
wealthier people can afford adaptation strategies on their property. While at the same 
time, others expressed the challenge with aiding lower-income communities with 
addressing the risk of sea level rise. This is wrapped up in who’s responsible for adapting 
private property, as one respondent shared,  
So that's one of the big challenges, is that… rightfully so, people say we 
should focus on the most vulnerable areas, and we should focus on the 
most socially vulnerable areas, these, sort of, economically vulnerable 
areas, which makes sense. But then, again, when you get into those 
communities, what is the solution? The solution, in Florida, is that you 
have to elevate your homes, and you have to elevate the roadways, and 
you need to connect the septic systems to sewer, and those are 
expensive… So then, if you take no action, you get into a blighted 
condition, or exacerbating the housing disparity. 
 
In line with what this individual shared, several other interviewees recognize that socio-
economic conditions can shape peoples’ experience of climate risks. At the same time, 
many interviewees across sectors expressed concern that these communities will be 
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ignored in the planning process. As one person shared regarding how adaptation planning 
will take place within low-income communities, 
They are not even gonna talk to those people. They're gonna ignore them, 
and the developers are gonna develop. That's how it works… it's gonna be 
business as usual. It's [sea level rise] playing a… It's a big forcing 
function, and so it's stimulating people to move, and so the relocation, 
there are plans for big buildings in the Overtown area. Maybe they haven't 
been put out in public yet, but I'm sure… I've been in some of the climate 
marches, and those people are marching. They're literally beating the drum 
about this… I haven't talked to the development side about it, it's mostly 
either outside of town money. Miami is a speculator's paradise, always has 
been. 
 
And part of this is linked to the way in which vulnerability is understood, when 
discussing one key vulnerability assessment being created for county planning an 
interviewee shared, “Purely economic.” Planning documents use inundation maps of sea 
level rise combined with property value and demonstrate the estimated costs of sea level 
rise to these assets. This takes place in diverse ways including, beach re-nourishment 
programs focused on protecting coastal properties, the attention to building codes and 
developing differently.  
Yeah, they [different committees] seem to be sort of fixated on building 
code changes, and asking for money to get surveys, or risk assessments, or 
experts, or things like that. That has been slow in coming. 
 
However, this same individual elaborated on the challenge of focusing on building codes 
and other economic priorities in that it can shift attention away from things that the 
region could be doing now, for example, fixing sewer overflow and investing in green 
infrastructure.  
It's very slow and difficult to get changes to the building code. It takes 
years. The City of Miami just did this Miami 21… new building codes. 
They don't cover resiliency but they're more modern than they were 
before. And then Miami is a very developer driven town economically, 
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and so adding additional burdens onto developers for doing things with 
sea level rise in mind is slow going. Because it's going to cost them more 
money to build their buildings differently, or elevate them, or so on and so 
forth. Because right now most of the costs are pushing on people who are 
buying apartments and things like that, because developers sort of engage 
for three to five years, and then they sell them. 
 
[Things we could be doing instead of focusing on building codes and 
infrastructure] Holding up the dune infrastructure, restoring mangrove 
habitat. New infrastructure needs to be built with sea level rise in mind. 
Stormwater master plans. Making sure that there are storm water master 
plans, that the water can percolate, that there are enough impervious 
surfaces around that we have areas that can flood. That the sewage 
infrastructure is well maintained so that it doesn't flood when it rains. 
 
Other interviewees expressed their frustration with calls to spend $100,000 for high 
resolution studies to create a fine detail elevation map of downtown Miami. While 
proponents argue that this will help the city better understand where to invest in 
stormwater management and change building codes, several respondents expressed that 
those funds could instead be used to support socio-economically vulnerable communities 
to prepare for hurricanes.  
In addition to decisions around where to adapt there, planners shared approaches 
for how to integrate sea level rise projections into adaptation strategies. The concept of 
“design life” has been used and integrated into water and sewer infrastructure planning 
and discussed widely among different institutions governing infrastructure. When 
designing infrastructure projects, the projection used is based on the length of the useful 
life of infrastructure and the cost of that infrastructure upgrade. The risk that is embedded 
in talking about “design-life” are the risks of the physical impacts from sea level rise, the 
risk of the infrastructure failing and causing harm to property values and human life, as 
well as the risk of the investment of the infrastructure falling short of meeting its goal. 
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For example, wastewater treatment infrastructure that both costs a lot and has a long 
useful life would adopt the sea level rise curve showing a higher rate of projection for the 
year that the infrastructure would be expected to be used for. This is compared to 
infrastructure that may only have a useful life of 20-30 years and not cost as much, which 
would be designed for one of the more conservative projections at 20-30 years in the 
future. Many of the reports on infrastructure suggest or explicitly recommend a cost 
benefit analysis or optimization for prioritizing and designing projects.  
Ultimately, the way local governments portray information around sea level rise 
risks shows us how they are choosing to “get ahead” of the issue and construct risk in the 
planning process. Despite individual efforts among some planners, community 
organizers, and scientists to address socio-economic and broader ecological risks around 
how sea level rise will be experienced, these areas of vulnerability have been somewhat 
ignored to different degrees. On the one hand, issues such as socio-economic 
vulnerabilities are brought up during design charrettes, while on the other hand, they are 
left out of local government information surrounding impacts from sea level rise (see 
Figure 5.6).  
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Figure 5.7 Image of sea level rise impacts from Miami-Dade County’s website: Represents how most 
municipal governments frame the issue of sea level rise risks and adaptation strategies. While some 
planners shared the need to integrate socio-economic vulnerabilities into planning, representations of the 
risk fall short of integrating those considerations. Here we see the emphasis is on flooding, erosion, storm 
sure, saltwater intrusion, infrastructure and economic impacts. Economic impacts emphasis property loss, 
insurance costs, and business interruption, not vulnerability from socio-economic marginalization.  
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5.6 Discussion 
Sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County is predicated in 
identifying objective facts and hazards about sea level rise rates and projections as well as 
knowledge about the hydrogeology of where water will flow, and how this will interact 
with the built environment. Bocking (2004) argues that regions focus on physical aspects 
and scientific assessments of risks and hazards in order to wrap decisions in the authority 
of science and avoid choices that would be deemed arbitrary and capricious. While 
identifying sea level rise risks, including anticipated projections and measurements is 
fundamental to planning, Carlo Jaeger et al. (2001, p. 24) summarize a common view of 
measuring risk, “Approaches for objectively quantifying risk, actuarial analysis, 
probabilistic risk assessment, and epidemiology/toxicology all assume that risks can be 
assigned a value of harmfulness independent of the social, economic, political, or cultural 
context.” Bocking (2004) elaborates on this drawing out common assumptions of risk in 
environmental planning. First, that risks are an objective property of the physical world 
and therefore freely amenable to measurement. Second, that people everywhere perceive 
hazards the same way, and third, that this can be revealed by science which override 
historical and cultural differences (Bocking 2004). Like the work of Bocking (2004), and 
other scholars who challenge these assumptions (e.g. Perrow 1984; Liftin 1994; Jasanoff 
and Long Martello 2004), the process of determining sea level rise hazards in Miami-
Dade County is shaped by political, social, and economic contexts. While actors within 
Miami-Dade County are driven towards identifying a sea level rise projection that 
represents “objective truth,” given uncertainties around climate change and sea level rise 
projections these same actors recognize the complexity and challenges of identifying 
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those risks. The presence of deliberative, science and policy panels to determine what sea 
level rise projections to adopt for the region demonstrates the recognition of this 
complexity, as does the decision to officially include three projections (Figure 4.2). At 
the same time, however, this case study shows how political processes shaped what sea 
level rise projection knowledge was accepted and what knowledge was discarded, 
demonstrating how sea level rise rates and projections are shaped by political debates 
surrounding relevant science and processes, which are enrolled to justify minimizing 
risks at the local scale (summarized on Figure 5.7). 
 
Figure 5.8 Construction of risk knowledge in sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County, 
Florida 
To this point, Gross’s (2010) theory on the link between nonknowledge and new-
knowledge, as well as negative knowledge (or avoided and ignored knowledge), can be 
used to explain path dependencies around risk knowledge practices in Miami-Dade 
County (summarized on Table 5.1). For example, interviewees shared that there are 
disagreements as to how ice melt acceleration factors into sea level rise rates and how 
water moves through physical geographies. On the surface, these disagreements appear to 
be about relevant science, yet findings from this case study show how debates around 
science are enrolled to control and shape risk knowledge is to protect the regional 
economy. The focus on the economy (and by proxy infrastructure that supports that 
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economy), continues to put pressure on identifying additional and more detailed risk 
measurements. For example, the emphasis placed on high-resolution elevation and 
LiDAR data to understand where risks will be at a finer resolution. Within each of the 
type of risk knowledge there is a cadre of actors and institutional structures that prioritize 
some risk knowledge over others. While this process is expected, it also leaves out other 
potential risks (expressed as negative risk knowledge), and instead can build a path 
dependency around nonknowledge, new knowledge, and feeding back into new 
ignorance. Many scholars discuss the importance of paying attention to the agglomeration 
of uncertainties when climate models are compiled. Those uncertainties are often only 
expressed in scientific terms of findings and associated uncertainties and without 
consideration of how the process of framing those uncertainties can exclude some risks 
from the planning process. But we also need to pay attention to the way in which those 
uncertainties are socially determined.   
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Table 5.1 Risk construction summary table. The findings examine what knowledge uncertainties are 
prioritized for further exploration and what knowledge uncertainties are ignored. 
Dimension of 
Risk 
Construction 
Description Explored Knowledge 
Uncertainties and New 
Knowledge 
Ignored Knowledge 
Uncertainties 
Rates & 
Projections 
Regional SLR models incorporate 
downscaled global climate data 
with regional and localized 
processes affecting sea-level, as 
well as regional and local data 
points. Agreement for which 
projections to use came out of 
collaborative effort with external 
Federal precedence. Adoption of 
more conservative projections are 
shaped by scientific and political 
uncertainty and climate change 
denialism.  
 
Impacts of global 
processes (e.g. ice melt 
acceleration); 
measuring errors and 
uncertainty 
Technological 
advancements for 
measurements 
 
Rates that 
incorporate ice melt 
acceleration and 
higher emissions 
scenarios 
 
Physical 
Landscape 
Bathtub models assume uniform 
landscape and static 
environmental processes. 
Government institutions address 
uncertainties via data gathering 
and modeling around 
groundwater-surface water 
interactions. Yet this knowledge 
is restricted in use, as is other 
knowledge regarding the physical 
landscape that impacts how SLR 
will affect the region. 
Limitations of bathtub 
approach (i.e. 
groundwater surface 
water interactions; 
changes to 
precipitation) 
Additional monitoring 
instruments for 
hydrologic shifts in 
aquifer, groundwater 
and surface water 
interaction 
Water flow for canal 
drainage; stormwater 
management; 
wastewater and water 
supply; storm surge; 
low-elevation coastal 
neighborhoods 
 
Enviro impacts from 
sewer overflow and 
deep well injection; 
health impacts of 
stormwater; 
community 
baselines of 
acceptability; 
salinization on 
agriculture lands; 
impacts to areas 
outside of low-
elevation areas 
 
Vulnerability & 
Capacity 
While understandings of the 
physical landscape reinforce the 
focus of risks along coastal 
affluent parts of the county, the 
economic focus to protect tax-
base and insurance costs also 
emerge out of how vulnerability 
and adaptive capacity is 
understood. Other concerns 
around how SLR will affect 
communities, including 
displacement and extreme events, 
exist on the planning periphery. 
Incomplete knowledge 
of the hazards, potential 
for infrastructure 
failures 
Parcel level information 
for elevation 
assessments 
Impacts to insurance 
and populated coastal 
regions 
 
How people interact 
with infrastructure 
in their daily life, 
infrastructure needs 
in less populated 
regions 
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The self-fulfilling process of scientific inquiry to identify and address risks 
shaped through a system that prioritizes economic, technological, and political factors, 
itself prevents adaptation planners from addressing social inequities and risks that could 
be addressed. This echoes Gross’s (2010) argument that the lack of acknowledgement 
and addressing the different forms of ignorance in knowledge practices, creates a system 
where knowledge production favors narrowly defined uncertainties while either 
intentionally or unintentionally ignoring areas that some groups shared need further 
exploration. Such knowledge practices are reinforced by institutional positionality 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983), how organizations identify and measure risks (Haas 
1992), and the emphasis on preparing for the future rather than dealing with things now 
(Barnett 2001). In sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County, the way that 
risks are understood, broken down into their most basic components, is connected to 
prioritizations and adaptation planning outcomes.   
Within climate adaptation planning in Miami, there is a push to capture more 
information at hyper-localized scales to better map climate risks. Being hyper-focused on 
addressing nonknowledge creates knowledge practices that address scientific 
uncertainties around rates, projections, and biophysical components the planning process. 
At the same time, this emphasis within Miami can serve to limit the integration of diverse 
risk constructions that exist on the periphery as negative knowledge around risk (Barnett 
and Cambell 2010). While hazards identified are often considered neutral and apolitical, 
they form the basis for how risks are determined on the landscape and can affect planning 
dynamics and processes (Wisner et al. 2014). This can create what Hajer (1995) calls 
“problem closure,” in which solutions are born out of well-developed but often 
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unquestioned problem framings (Hajer 1995). Within Miami-Dade County, problem 
closure around sea level rise risks being focused on where water goes and how it 
intersects with infrastructure and property values and ignores other ways in which sea 
level rise can impact the broader landscape and community functioning that it supports. 
In Miami-Dade County, the way in which risks are constructed support sea level rise 
problem framing as a technical issue in which more information about these physical and 
economic systems are needed to make technical engineered solutions. These problem 
closures are related to Stirling’s notion of technological commitments, in which the way 
the problem is appraised can “close down” the range of different technologies and 
approaches to solving the problem (Stirling 2009).  
The process of constructing risks and prioritizing certain risk knowledge in the 
planning arena, can limit policy options and the space for democratic debate over 
adaptation strategies, or opening-up ignorance to include more unrecognized risk 
knowledge and more integrative risk knowledge prioritized in the planning arena (Hajer 
1995). Within Miami, climate risks that exist outside of the dominant way in which the 
problem is framed are left on the margins, rather than integrated into assessments, 
projections, and adaptation strategies themselves. Barnett and Cambell (2010) extend this 
idea to scientific models of climate change which they argue are mechanisms of 
“problem closure” and one approach to a “well-defined problem” that, “Have the effect 
of rendering climate change as an environmental fact against which actors can do little 
but suffer. They deny the agency of people at risk: to define the problem in their own 
terms; to apply their own systems of knowledge; to implement the solutions that are 
appropriate to their needs and values and which accommodate uncertainty; and to make 
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knowledge claims of equal value to those of science.” (2010, p. 2) Through this idea of 
problem closure, based on the way in which hazards and risks are understood, some 
communities have more attention and access to adaptation planning decisions than others 
(Barnett and Cambell 2010). 
  While incorporating multiple knowledge frames into integrated risk assessments 
can be beneficial (Warren et al. 1995; MA 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2003), these efforts remain 
limited by risk constructions that favor biophysical and economic dimensions. As in other 
cases, this case study in Miami-Dade County demonstrates that knowledge around sea 
level rise adaptation risks favor credentialed experts that use formal scientific procedures 
(Brugnch and Ingram 2012) and the subsequent technical solution—like many climate 
adaptation strategies—are often unproblematized and considered objective, rational, 
scientific, and engineered solutions (Winner 1989; Jasanoff 2006). In Miami-Dade 
County, technical rationality—or the idea that risk decisions are made based on empirical 
evidence, gathered and evaluated by experts and expressed in universal, quantitative 
terms (Bocking 2004)—is favored over other forms of rationality, including 
communicative or cultural rationality. Communicative and cultural forms of rationality 
suggests that people do not calculate risks the way experts do, that is, by evaluating the 
expected consequences of a course of action and by multiplying them by the probability 
of their occurrence. Instead, they proceed more intuitively by recognizing patterns, 
classifying alternatives in terms of clusters of values, applying rules of thumb (Fischer 
2000).  In doing so, they take a broader view of environmental hazards, a view that 
encompasses aspects of the hazards themselves and how they are encountered (Fischer 
2000).  
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Conflicts are common outcomes when governments or companies apply a narrow 
technical perspective to risks, ignoring broader concerns, including awareness that this 
perspective itself incorporates tacit political and moral assumptions (Bocking 2004). 
Within Miami-Dade County, there are both conflicts that happen during public meetings, 
and conflicts that were discussed during interviews. Rational and technical approaches to 
constructing knowledge around risk differ from other knowledge constructions. For 
example, when determining climate change projections at the global scale, the process 
can be highly contentious and shaped by competing economic and political discourses 
(Hulme 2009). Adopting rates and projections at the local level is also politicized as local 
governments may be unwilling to recognize sea level rise as a problem because they 
would have to act or are concerned about devaluing property (Hulme 2009). While 
scientists may determine risks with quantified data and models, community activists may 
use knowledge of place-based experiences, linking outcomes from previous climatic 
events within their communities to a changing climate as well as social, economic and 
political histories (Fischer 2000). As such, people may think of risk from climate change 
in terms of impacts and changes to their daily lives and worry about housing, future 
employment, health, and asserting their rights (Fischer 2000; Jasanoff and Long Martello 
2004). These different forms of rationality rooted in discourse are further explored in 
Chapter 6 where I focus more explicitly on sea level rise adaptation governance and 
emerging discourse storylines among different institutions coming together to address the 
risk of sea level rise.  
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5.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter I articulate the social process of how risks are selected for attention 
in sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Using Gross’s 
(2010) notion of ignorance, I examine how some risk knowledge is included in the 
planning process while other knowledge is either ignored or deemed unimportant. This 
risk construction process is underscored by the political process of identifying sea level 
rise rates and projections; the favoring of risk knowledge that supports an economically 
viable future; and the path dependency of how these risks constructions can become 
embedded in adaptation strategies themselves.  
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Chapter 6: Pathway for Change or Business as Usual? Discourses in Sea Level Rise 
Adaptation Governance in Miami-Dade County, Florida 
6.1 Introduction 
Managing sea level rise adaptations is inherently contentious. Regions must make 
decisions around whether to limit or regulate development in low-lying areas, how to 
prepare socio-economically vulnerable communities, how to change design or building 
standards and transform infrastructure, among other choices and tradeoffs of how to 
address risks from climate change (Adger et al. 2005; Taylor et al. 2012). Planning 
activities like these take place in multiple arenas with diverse approaches and ideas of 
how to prepare and prioritize actions, bringing diverse interests together on the topic of 
adaptation (Adger et al. 2009; van den Hoek et al. 2014). This is in part due to the 
multiple ways that risks are experienced and understood (Dewulf et al., 2005; Brugnach 
et al., 2008; Renn et al., 2011) and different priorities and politics embedded in urban 
environments, policies, and institutions governing adaptation planning (Hilgartner 1992; 
Hommels 2005; Heynen et al. 2006; van den Hoek 2012). This decentralized planning 
arena mirrors theory on environmental governance, which suggest that decisions 
surrounding the urban environment take place through systems of shared authority and 
decision-making power among multiple organizations with different mandates and 
agendas (Jasanoff and Long Martello 2004; Leach et al. 2007). Climate adaptation 
governance is defined as the system of institutions, including laws, norms, policies, 
organizations, and regulations involved in decisions surrounding how to understand and 
respond to challenges posed by climate change (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Leach et al. 
2007; Chaffin et al. 2014). In both intentional and unintentional ways, governance 
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determines how scientific and technological processes are directed; how environmental 
issues are defined and addressed; and how consequences of these decisions become 
distributed (Leach et al. 2007). Each of these processes shape the future trajectory of 
social, ecological, and technological systems (Leach et al. 2007). Marking a departure 
away from considering governance as being directed solely by government and top-down 
mandates, decentralized approaches recognize a networked understanding of all the 
institutions—both formal and informal—involved in making decisions for the urban 
environment (Schmitter 2001; Lejano et al. 2013).  
Many scholars view this form of governance as being nimble and more responsive 
to local context with multiple organizations integrated across different scales (Healey 
1997; Sabatier et al. 2005).  Relationships among the different organizations are viewed 
as offering institutional flexibility necessary to achieve principles of adaptive 
management and planning under uncertain conditions (Elzen et al. 2005; Smith et al. 
2005). In many ways, cities have embraced this form of planning within climate change 
adaptation because of these benefits and engage in partnerships and promote strategies 
that connect and collaborate across formally bureaucratic siloed departments, between 
public and private sectors, and across various levels of governance to promote resilience 
strategies (Leach et al. 2007). Divergent perspectives and approaches to address impacts 
from climate change come together in a unique way where diverse interests converge 
around the topic of sea level rise to address a variety of issues in the urban landscape. 
This shift mimics calls for holistic planning approaches that emphasize planning for 
cross-sector resilience and point to problems with narrowly defined approaches (Leach et 
al. 2007; Adger et al. 2009; Taylor et al. 2012). 
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While decentralized governance arrangements may connect groups across scales 
to decision-making, there is no guarantee that they will offer democratic, participatory, or 
collaborative approaches (Cooke and Kothari 2001). With aspects of unequal power and 
authority in the planning process, decentralized governance arrangements can create 
dynamics where rights, responsibilities, and who bears the benefits and burdens are 
controlled by those with the most influence over decision-making, acting within the 
system (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Jasanoff and Long Martello 2004; Agrawal 2005). 
Although conflicts within network governance are expected, they can result in power 
struggles that further separate and entrench ideals (Fischer 2000; Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand, 2006). One reason for these challenges is because institutions have different 
levels and types of power, authority, and rationalities (Rydin 2003; Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand, 2006; Dryzek 2013). Some groups are more connected and have more power 
and authority over decision-making than other groups (Rydin 2003; Bäckstrand and 
Lövbrand, 2006). At the same time, other groups may justify their decisions with 
economic rationalities which often carry more weight within decision-making contexts 
than other forms of rationality (Healey 1997; Fischer 2000; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 
2006). Along these lines, several scholars have pointed out that the rationale and practice 
of urban planning and policy within diffuse governance arrangements have been 
dominated by concerns of economic efficiency, deregulation, and privatization (Thorns 
2002; Low 2008; Gleeson 2010; Taylor et al. 2014).  
In response to these challenges, a growing body of scholarship now exists around 
discourses, or shared meanings, among actors and institutions governing urban planning 
and climate change policy (Rydin 1998 and 2005; Hastings 1999; Bulkeley 2000; Lees 
 
138 
 
2004; Lindseth 2005; Jacobs 2006; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Lovell et al. 2009; 
Taylor et al. 2014). Most of these studies examine how global discourses around climate 
change interfere with local narratives, power, and knowledge (Hulme 2009). Few studies 
have examined discourses surrounding sea level rise adaptation planning, especially 
within the United States. This chapter addresses this gap and uses institutional discourse 
analysis to better understand how institutions—both formal and informal—shape 
decision-making around sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County. This 
chapter focuses on examining the process by which diverse risk knowledge are integrated 
into adaptation planning. I use discourse storylines (Hajer 1995) and rationality claims 
(Rydin 2003; Taylor et al. 2014) around key institutions involved in sea level rise 
adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County, Florida to shed light on knowledge 
integration practices. As new institutional arrangements emerge to plan for risks posed by 
sea level rise, this chapter asks, what are the different storylines and forms of reasoning 
around sea level rise and how are those connected to different adaptation pathways and 
planning processes. This chapter considers the basis of rationality within adaptation 
planning, the role this plays in legitimizing strategies, and the interplay of discourses 
promoted by governing institutions. The analysis seeks to identify the storylines 
alongside the interplay of interests and to explore the role that these discourses fulfill. 
This chapter contributes to planning theory around how institutions frame the problem 
and solutions with sea level rise adaptation, and how those problem framings are 
connected to institutional structures, power and authority within the system.  
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6.2 Institutional Discourse Analysis to Unpack Sea Level Rise Risk, Problem 
Framings, and Solutions  
 An institutional discourse approach can be applied to sea level rise adaptation 
governance to identify areas of divergence and convergence surrounding ways that 
different groups understand the problem in relation to different systems, power, and 
authority that exist in a particular place (Rydin 2003). This approach suggests that 
“discourses are the product of institutional practices and individual activities that reflect 
types of knowledge claims—different accounts of what is true and what counts as a 
representation of reality” (Taylor et al. 2014, p. 6). In this way, a discourse can be 
understood as a grouping of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced in a set 
of practices, and which meaning is given to social reality (Hajer 1995).  
One approach that has been widely used is to understand discourses through 
storylines of shared terms and concepts (Hajer 1995; Lejano et al. 2013). Narrative 
storylines do the task of creating shared meaning; actors that subscribe to a particular 
storyline and place themselves into the network of a particular discourse (Lejano et al. 
2013). Through storylines, meaning given to physical and social processes around how 
the problem is framed (Hajer 1995; Lejano et al. 2013). While competing storylines may 
highlight possible challenges and disagreements, they can also offer opportunities for 
policy change by uniting actors across domains and with different values into “discourse 
coalitions” through their adherence to shared terms and concepts (Hajer 1995; Mander 
2007; Lovell et al. 2009).  
Storylines align actors by which they ascribe credibility to the claims of certain 
groups (Taylor et al. 2014). One approach to doing this is by paying attention to the way 
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in which storylines are rationalized (Rydin 2003; Taylor et al. 2014). Claims to various 
forms of rationality embody assumptions about appropriate courses of action and are 
central to legitimizing planning policy and practice (Rydin 2003; Taylor et al. 2014). 
There are five rationality claims that are important to climate adaptation governance and 
these can be used to examine storylines (Healey 1997; Fischer 2000; Rydin 2003):  
procedural, scientific, economic, cultural, and communicative rationalities. Each of these 
can be used to legitimate policy decisions (Healey 1997; Fischer 2000; Rydin 2003).   
(1) Procedural rationality is based on the idea that there is advantage from ‘‘categorizing, 
listing and breaking up the policy process into steps and stages’’ (Rydin, 2003, p. 78–79), 
and that this process legitimizes the activities and centralization of public sector planning 
activities which strive to optimize for the public interest. 
(2) Scientific rationality stresses the scientific knowledge and processes related to the 
problem, focuses on reducing uncertainty, and the translation of scientific knowledge into 
the policy process. 
(3) Economic rationality considers concerns about the environment and urban 
sustainability from the perspective of economic decision-making, determining which 
policy choices have the greatest economic impacts, and/or results for the cost. This 
rationality views the environment as something that can be commodified and promotes 
the use of market-based solutions to resolve problems associated with externalities and 
other policy issues.  
(4) Cultural rationality sees environmental problems as hyper localized and related to 
peoples’ quality of life and daily lived experiences (Fischer 2000). This form prioritizes 
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personal and familiar experiences as a basis for knowledge, over detached and calculated 
forms of knowledge.   
(5) Communicative rationality recognizes the potential for groups with diverging interests 
to come together and co-construct knowledge and meaning relevant for decision-making 
(Healey 1997). This form views participation and inclusion in the policy process as the 
key to the informed acceptance of environmental risks.  
 Framing institutional discourse analysis from a rationality perspective allows us to 
examine what forms of discourses may be aligned with rationality claims, highlighting 
points of tension and areas for opportunity (Rydin 2003; Taylor et al. 2014). Discourses 
can be connected to an institutional analysis around how institutions act within a system, 
in relation to their political power and authority (Ostrom 1990; Rydin 2003). It enables us 
to look across the system of institutions governing various aspects of sea level rise 
adaptation problem framings and solutions and identify places where coalitions may form 
between actors or conflicts may remain entrenched (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; 
Taylor et al. 2014). Using Rydin’s rationality approach, we can identify how actors frame 
and reason their arguments within planning and policy debates around sea level rise 
(Rydin 2003; Taylor et al. 2014) and connect this to their political position and type of 
authority within the governance arena (Ostrom 1990; Rydin 2003) (summarized on Table 
6.1). This can also allow us to look at how those meanings connect and possibly 
influence the political and material outcomes of the planning process (Taylor et al. 2014).  
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Table 6.1 Rationality claims and implications for adaptation governance. There is no one “best” or 
“optimal” form of rationality claim to a particular discourse, each has its own benefits and drawbacks 
within a diffuse governance system and approach to understanding and managing risks. For example, 
scientific rationality provides information for decision-making regarding the natural world, but it can be 
uncertain and overshadow other forms of knowledge. Further, economic rationality is an important 
consideration for maximizing benefits for cost, but it can also leave people out who are not represented 
within this framework. The purpose of an institutional discourse analysis is to understand how rationality 
claims are being made and where there are points of integration and synergies as well as tensions. 
Rationality Location Authority Knowledges 
Benefits for 
Adaptation 
Governance 
Consequences for 
Adaptation 
Governance  
Procedural 
Federal, 
Regional, 
County and 
City 
Governments 
Rational-
Legal 
Norm and 
definition 
construction  
Procedures are 
streamlined 
and efficient 
Limited 
democratic access 
to sites of 
decision-making  
Scientific 
Epistemic 
Communities 
Expert 
(Miller 
2004) 
Authoritative 
Science 
(Bocking 2004) 
Provides 
needed 
information 
about the 
natural world 
Costly, time 
consuming, 
uncertain, and can 
overshadow other 
forms of 
knowledge 
Economic 
Private Firms, 
Businesses 
Practical Contextual 
Helps 
maximize 
benefits for the 
cost, can allow 
for more 
adaptation 
strategies 
Business 
community sets 
the tone for policy 
in the region, may 
overshadow other 
interests and 
control/limit risk 
frames   
Cultural  
Community 
organizations 
and members 
Local 
Hyper-
Localized and 
experienced 
(Fischer 2000) 
Draw attention 
to risks shaped 
by local 
dynamics and 
processes and 
expand 
planning lens 
Challenging to 
make this work 
for bureaucratic 
organizations due 
to limitations of 
addressing 
plurality of risks 
Communicative 
Deliberative 
and 
collaborative 
planning 
processes 
Relational 
(Healey 
1997) 
Shared, 
expressed, and 
communicated 
Create shared 
meaning 
around risk, 
integrate 
diverse 
knowledge, 
outcomes that 
satisfy all 
parties  
Difficult to get all 
parties to the table 
and to agree, time 
consuming, and 
can result in elite 
capture  
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In this chapter, I provide the interpretive governance context for emerging 
discourses among institutions involved in sea level rise adaptation planning in Miami-
Dade County (Lee 2004). This includes an overview of roles and responsibilities of 
institutions involved or affected by sea level rise adaptation planning and the associated 
adaptation pathways, or proposed strategies to adapt to sea level rise. I then use storylines 
to examine the emerging discourses that surround how the problem of sea level rise is 
framed, how it is understood, and proposed solutions (Tonkiss 1998; Rydin 2003; Lee 
2004). The institutional framework coupled with storylines around problem and solution 
framing are used to capture the dynamic processes by which risks are broadly interpreted 
in the planning process. How different groups understand risk is ultimately connected to 
their priorities on the landscape and how they rationalize problem and solution framing.  
6.3 Institutions and Sea level Rise Adaptation in Miami-Dade County, Florida 
Local Governments 
Local governments are central to decision-making around land use planning, 
zoning, stormwater management, and other infrastructure. Because of their position in 
overseeing municipal infrastructure, they are key decision-makers with adapting to sea 
level rise and hold formal authority over infrastructure design. Design codes around 
infrastructure and the built environment are embedded within municipal codes and 
regulations. These codes are set through comprehensive planning and other mechanisms, 
then adopted into plans by elected officials. In Miami-Dade County, the three largest 
local governments involved in sea level rise adaptation planning are Miami-Dade County, 
the City of Miami, and the City of Miami Beach.  
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• Miami-Dade County has a mayor form of government with an elected county 
mayor serving as the chief executive and the county commission serving as the 
legislative body. The county has 34 independent municipalities and oversees a 
population of over 1 million people in unincorporated Miami-Dade County.  
• The City of Miami is the county’s largest municipality and has an executive 
mayor who appoints a city manager to serve as the chief administrative officer 
while the City Commission is the legislative body.  
• Because of its role in tourism, the City of Miami Beach has a significant amount 
of regional influence and is viewed both nationally and regionally as a leader in 
adapting to sea level rise. The City of Miami Beach has a council-manager 
system, with the mayor and six commissioners setting city policy and the city 
manager serving as the chief executive.  
Property taxes serve as a large source of revenue for Miami-Dade County and city 
governments, and a recent report produced by local governments for the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Initiative claimed that the greater Miami region is 
strong financially (Resilient Cities Assessment 2017). Each of the three jurisdictions uses 
comprehensive planning which includes short and long term economic, social, physical, 
environmental and fiscal goals, with resilience being integrated into their next 
comprehensive plan updates (Resilient Cities Assessment 2017). Each of these 
municipalities either currently have or have had different sea level rise, resiliency, and 
climate change advisory committees to advise on policies and prioritizing work to 
varying degrees. These panels have comprised of business interests, environmental 
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interests, scientists, and government employees, with community-based organizations 
mostly absent from the process, though this has recently shifted in the City of Miami. 
Three cities within Miami-Dade County, Coral Gables, South Miami, Key Biscayne, and 
Pine Crest, have also been actively involved in sea level rise adaptation planning with 
their respective Mayors leading many of the efforts. Financial, scientific, and other 
resource limitations are a challenge for many of the municipalities, especially smaller 
and/or resource poor governments that do not have significant tax revenue from tourist 
dollars and property taxes. Maintaining and providing infrastructure and accessing 
resources needed to plan for sea level rise (financial and technical) are highly uneven 
across jurisdictions.  
Regional, State, and Federal Oversight 
Regional, state, and federal agencies and authorities have regulatory oversight 
over water quality, floodplain management, regional water management, the Everglades 
conveyance and restoration, and other areas. Each of these organizations has roles and 
responsibilities related to sea level rise adaptation planning. Sometimes these 
organizations work together and sometimes they have distinct agendas.  
• The South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) and the USACE are 
key water governing entities in Southeast Florida, responsible for overseeing 
Everglades restoration, in partnership with the National Park Service and other 
organizations, and the primary canal infrastructure that carries water from the 
Everglades out to Biscayne Bay and other regions across South Florida. Their 
water management strategies play a significant role in water supply, water quality, 
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and flood control in the region, and consequently shape Miami-Dade County’s 
and other municipalities water management strategies. These agencies collaborate 
closely with Miami-Dade County on issues of water management and supply, as 
well as Everglades restoration.  
• FEMA oversees the NFIP and has recently been updating the flood insurance 
maps and storm surge modeling for Miami-Dade and surrounding counties. In 
addition, local governments incorporate the Community Benefits Rating System, 
a component of the NFIP, into stormwater management planning to lower flood 
insurance rates for residents. The NFIP program operates locally through 
floodplain administrators that sit at each municipal government.  
• NOAA oversees much of the tide gage data on sea level rise trends, provides data 
on hurricanes, and offers planning support to local governments. Both NOAA and 
the USACE have regional sea level rise projections used by local governments in 
Miami-Dade County.  
• USGS primarily serves in a supporting role to local governments offering 
research services on the hydrology, hydrogeomorphology, and other aspects of the 
region’s geology.  
• The EPA and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection agencies are 
responsible for oversite of the Clean Water Act, including stormwater permitting, 
which has some overlap with sea level rise adaptation planning, particularly 
around wastewater treatment facilities.  
Non-Governmental Entities 
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There are numerous non-governmental institutions involved or affected by sea 
level rise adaptation planning. These include community-based organizations, 
foundations, environmental NGOs, academic institutions, private consulting firms, and 
various business interests. Diverse institutions operate at different scales, with differing 
levels of coordination, and on both distinct and overlapping adaptation strategies. In 
general, locally based community organizations are funded by two primary foundations, 
The Kresge Foundation and The Miami Foundation, along with donor and grant support. 
Individuals from environmental organizations, academic institutions, private firms and 
business interests are connected to the formal planning process through advisory roles, 
partnerships and contracts with departments in both city and county government. Some 
community organizations are connected to the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient 
Cities planning and with the City of Miami on the Miami Forever Bond’s by serving on 
community advisory panels. There is also one community representative on the City of 
Miami’s Sea Level Rise Committee, with the city yielding to political pressure to include 
community representation. Private firms comprised both of business that work in the 
environmental and adaptation fields and of businesses working in development, 
insurance, tourism, and other industries with different priorities and interests in 
adaptation. In general, the development and insurance community has been closely 
connected to sea level rise adaptation planning by serving on advisory roles to local 
government. Environmental and engineering firms have also been closely involved by 
conducting contractual work for local governments. Environmental organizations have a 
long history working in the region, primarily on issues related to the Everglades and 
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Biscayne Bay. They participate on several advisory committees and collaborative efforts 
related to sea level rise adaptation planning.  
Adaptation Pathways 
 Within Miami-Dade County, there are several adaptation pathways, or strategies 
for preparing the region for the impacts of sea level rise (summarized on Table 6.2). 
Changes to urban infrastructure is the primary focus of adaptation efforts followed by 
updates to building and landscape design, collaborative efforts, and emergency 
preparations. Beach re-nourishment, which is the replacement of sand along the 
shoreline, and Everglades and Biscayne National Park restoration activities are two 
dominant ecological strategies, while the focus on social capacity remains fairly limited 
in terms of resources and efforts. A recent report from the 100 Resilient Cities effort 
summarized the key actions that Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, and the City of 
Miami Beach has taken towards addressing sea level rise (summarized in Chapter 4 on 
Table 4.2). The projects these governing bodies are undertaking reiterate the focus on 
infrastructure, design, and the environment. The City of Miami Beach includes their 
recent outreach activities which are project specific to road and stormwater drainage 
upgrades.  
There are two primary collaborative efforts in the region related to sea level rise 
adaptation planning: the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (Compact) 
and the Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities initiative. The Compact is led by county 
governments and involves a diverse set of partners including, environmental 
organizations, city governments, the SFWMD, and recently has expanded to include 
some community organizations from Miami-Dade County. This organization operates as 
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a support role for local governments and to create a unified voice for the region to lobby 
for funding and climate adaptation support. The Compact hosts an annual meeting that 
brings together scientists, planners, private firms, NGOs, and others to share the state of 
knowledge around climate change in the region. In 2017 they published their second 
report, Regional Climate Action Plan 2.0 with strategies suggested to guide regional 
planning and individual municipal planning efforts. Since the first iteration published in 
2012, the new Regional Climate Action Plan has expanded to include public health, 
public outreach and engagement, and social equity. The Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities 
effort is led through a partnership between Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, and 
the City of Miami Beach, with the City of Miami expected to follow the prescriptive 
approach given that their Chief Resilience Officer is funded through a grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, where as the Chief Resilience Officers from the county and 
Miami Beach are funded through their respective governments budgeting.  
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Table 6.2 Adaptation Pathways in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The responsibility of formalized processes 
around sea level rise adaptation planning has largely been that of local government, especially Miami-Dade 
County, the City of Miami, and the City of Miami Beach. Formalized roles and responsibilities are not the 
only source of power over the sea level rise adaptation process, as private firms, community organizations, 
and environmental groups are also involved in adaptation planning efforts.  
Pathway Activities Description Institutions Involved 
Infrastructure Stormwater and Canal 
System; Drinking 
Water and Wastewater 
Treatment; Critical 
Infrastructure Planning 
System adaptations include 
increasing capacity, 
installing new and/or more 
pumps, moving electrical 
equipment out of flood area, 
identifying “critical 
pumping stations” 
SFWMD, City and County 
Governments, USGS, 
FEMA, Firms 
Design Comprehensive 
Planning; Sustainability 
Planning; Design 
Charrettes; Adaptation 
Action Areas 
Both for new developments 
and retrofitting existing 
communities. Includes ideas 
for localized retreat and re-
development  
City and County 
Governments, Firms, 
Business Interests, 
Academic, Institutes, 
Compact, SFWMD, Env. 
Orgs 
Emergency 
Preparations 
Transportation routes; 
Local Mitigation 
Strategy (LMS); 
Building Codes 
LMS in response to 
Hurricane Andrew and 
FEMA insurance policy. 
Also, projects for 
transportation facilities and 
critical infrastructure for 
emergency response  
FEMA, emergency 
services, transportation, 
County and City 
Government, Business 
Interests, Firms 
Social 
Capacity 
Education and 
Engagement; 
Grassroots Organizing 
and Community 
Development, Public 
Health 
Preformed primarily 
through non-profit 
community organizations, 
individual community 
leaders, public meetings  
Community-based 
organizations, 
Foundations, 100 Resilient 
Cities, County and City 
Government 
Collaborative 
Efforts 
Southeast Florida 
Regional Climate 
Change Compact, 100 
Resilient Cities 
Rockefeller Foundation 
Primarily focused on 
government, regional 
collaborations among 
different municipalities to 
coordinate efforts and use a 
unified sea level rise 
projection 
County and City 
Governments, Federal 
Agencies, Firms, 
Foundations, Env. Orgs, 
Business interests, 
Community Based Orgs 
(more recently) 
Ecological 
Restoration, 
Protection, & 
Adaptation 
Beach Re-nourishment, 
Mangroves, Everglades 
and Biscayne NP 
Restoration  
Emphasis is on ecological 
community in part because 
the regional economy is so 
dependent on a functioning 
ecosystem 
USACE, SFWMD, County 
and City Government, Env. 
Orgs, Firms, USGS, 
NOAA 
 
6.4 Sea Level Rise Adaptation Storylines Discourses 
Case study findings point to four discourses around risk of sea level rise used in 
the planning process and shaping adaptation priorities in Miami-Dade County. The first is 
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a focus on the economic core of development and tourism. This discourse arises out of an 
economic rationality for basing adaptation planning decisions in support of protecting the 
dominant economic drivers in the region. The emphasis is on “A city of the future” and 
what some call, “the future Miami.” The second discourse emphasizes infrastructure and 
is closely aligned with local governments and the desire to sustain a regional tax base to 
fund adaptation actions. This discourse is closely aligned with procedural rationality and 
is based in local governments efforts to understand and address sea level rise impacts 
through infrastructure. The economic and infrastructure discourses are reinforced by risk 
assessments and reports emphasizing and framing economic and infrastructure risks, that 
emerged in Chapter 5. Thirdly, a discourse around ecological impacts from sea level rise 
emerged among environmental non-governmental organizations, some government 
employees, and private interest groups, primarily underpinned by scientific rationality. 
Finally, considerations for the people using infrastructure and that people also matter 
emerged out of cultural rationality with community organizations and others purporting 
initiatives that recognize distributive justice and the unevenness of socio-economic 
vulnerabilities. In addition to the four discourses, there are examples of both individuals 
and organizations seeking to span boundaries and build connections across these 
storylines. Both from governmental and non-governmental entities, these individuals and 
actions of institutions represent opportunities for building and expanding collaborative 
approaches, based on claims for communicative rationality. For each discourse, I provide 
a thematic description of the problem framing, the actors involved, and the proposed 
adaptation approaches being discussed or implemented. I also include points of 
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contention and points of shared meanings, as they emerge within and among the different 
risk discourses.  
Economic Discourse: The Business of Sea Level Rise and the Future Miami  
 Under the “Business of sea level rise and the future Miami” discourse, people 
representing private business interests, politicians, and others emphasize the economic 
risks sea level rise poses to development and tourism, the two largest economies in the 
county. The risk of sea level rise is framed in an economic context and financial risks are 
prioritized through planning and vulnerability assessments that focus on the monetary 
assets at risk of inundation and coastal beach erosion. Such a focus is reinforced formally 
in the planning process through different task forces and advisory panels largely 
comprised of people from building, real estate, insurance, and banking industries. A large 
reason behind the economic framing is it reflects the priorities of those involved. It is also 
used to motivate political action and will to adapt. This is in part due to the notion among 
several people that economic considerations are the primary roadblock to adaptation. As 
one elected official shared when discussing the political sentiment around sea level rise 
risks and adaptation, “Elected officials aren't discussing. They aren't. It's all about our 
economic engine, which is development. That's why they're not talking about it.” And as 
a business leader in the region shared,  
Well, the big concern in the Business Community, mainly, is creating 
panic where it lowers property values. Starts lowering property values to 
such a degree that it creates this whole disaster… Yeah, disaster. 
People within this discourse framed the problem around how impacts from sea level rise 
on property values are inevitable, and that the loss of property value is the largest risk to 
the region. As this business leader expressed with the example of the housing market,  
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But it’s inevitable. It’s going to happen. People are going to start saying, 
“Does this house flood?” If I’m a buyer in Miami Beach, that’s what I 
would ask… There's other people that say, “Well, insurance will happen 
first and that will destroy the market.” Regardless, water will destroy the 
market.  
The notion that sea level rise will destroy the market was shared by some government 
employees and elected officials. Many of the government officials expressed that market 
failures would occur via anticipated impacts of sea level rise through the insurance 
industry. As one county employee expressed,  
I think we generally expect that, at least I do, that insurance will be a 
major driver… What starts to happen with property values will end up 
providing some influence. If there's a major storm and people are 
impacted, that's going to have an influence on whether people decide to 
stay or not. 
The fear for many within this storyline is that insurance companies will either stop 
insuring people or costs will be so high that they will result in local economic disasters, 
and that an ultimate risk would be having to retreat. An elected official elaborated on this 
point and discussed it in the context of someone bringing up the idea of planned retreat. 
What we all understand is the reinsurance industries, the Swiss Re and 
other reinsurers are warning us and have been warning us for the last 
couple years that we need to mitigate against the damage that's going to 
come from all this flooding. Yeah, to limit and reduce known hazards and 
known losses. It's billions in known losses. Nobody is doing anything 
about it. They're just raising the dollar value of known losses by allowing 
more and more. One of the scariest comments I heard about two or three, 
maybe three years ago… there was a gentleman from Army Corps of 
Engineers doing a presentation… He said, “At some point soon, you'll 
have to develop an exit plan.” 
Another part of the problem framing in this discourse is that the drive for short-term 
gains in the development industry is creating problems for adapting to sea level rise. As 
one elected official shared,  
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… here we are, just looking the other way and letting them keep building 
these multi-million, billion-dollar…” Developments are reliant on our 
foreign money still coming in, developers making a buck, a lot of 
construction going on, so helps the economy, and it's all short-term gain. 
Narratives around economic risks are structured around the loss of the economic 
core and the loss of the tax base needed to finance adaptation measures going forward. In 
addition, risks are viewed as the possibility that there will not be a federal or state bailout 
for these market driven failures.  
Both current and future loss of property values becomes one of the key ways the 
problem is framed under this storyline. The focus placed on the economic core manifests 
in the way risks are understood and measured. For example, with the Compact, risk maps 
are presented in terms of inundation levels and property values, embedding assumptions 
about risk as being the places where the greatest property loss occurs (Vulnerability 
Assessment 2012). Informant interviews corroborated this with their emphasis on 
needing to protect the economic core to fund future adaptation efforts. In this way, 
maintaining property value, protecting the economic core, and planning for a future 
economy in the region become the focus of adaptation efforts in the region. This takes 
place in diverse ways including, beach re-nourishment programs focused on protecting 
coastal properties and the attention to building codes and urban design.   
 Linked to the problem framing around economic risks, is the emphasis on 
economic gains and emerging economies around adaptation actions. Business 
opportunities were expressed in-terms of both consulting firms that can take advantage of 
the emerging adaptation industry, but also in-terms of the need for ongoing development 
that will secure investments in the region. This second point was expressed in terms of 
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the risk of not building and how sea level rise will create slums in existing low-elevation 
areas. Development is viewed as a necessary adaptation solution for raising base floor 
elevations and protecting economic investments. As one private sector individual 
described the relationship between developers and adaptation planning,  
When Barret Houseman and Napoleon III tore out Paris, they said they 
were doing it to stop the possibility of more revolution and violence. This 
was breeding ground for rebellion and revolt. They tore down Paris, and 
they built a new Paris, but that new Paris made a lot of developers really, 
really wealthy. It's the same thing. It also made Paris a city of the middle 
class, whereas the city was a city of poor before they started their work. 
Similarly, North Beach is an area of poverty. There's always been a reason 
to tear down places the poor live, whether it's put in highway or a 
stoplight, or to stop concentrations of poverty, or whatever. The newest 
reason is sea level rise and climate change. Just like those other reasons, 
there's a validity to it. You're talking about a Barrier Island in Florida. 
Several interviewees that represent this view shared that there are no physical limits to 
adaptation, that the limits to adaptation are economic limits, that the land must be worth 
enough and the concern is if the region waits too long to adapt, the land will no longer be 
worth enough to save. This sentiment is commensurate with problem framings and 
solutions that are engineered and adapt the physical landscape to allow for growth in the 
era of sea level rise. One government employee shared that sea level rise risks will not 
limit future growth, it will just change the way the region grows, 
We are not thinking about abandoning any areas at all. We already live on 
reclaimed land so we will keep reclaiming. It doesn't really matter. It's all 
reclaimed land anyways so it's not an issue. So then, you have to abandon 
this area and say ‘Why? China can make an island in the middle of the 
ocean, we can build some more.’ So the thing is that abandonment is 
going be more related to areas that are already difficult to live, because 
they're too low so they need to be redeveloped. And [those areas are] 
going to be redeveloped with more focus on how we're going dispose of 
the water because it's going to be harder for us to drain… So there are 
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some areas that are going to look very different to what they look now. 
That doesn't mean that there are not going to be houses there. 
Another government employee shared this sentiment and discussed a link between the 
economic framing of sea level rise adaptation with an engineered perspective. In this 
way, economic framings are matched with ideas for re-grading the city to solve the 
problem of sea level rise. As this individual shared,  
One thing that I suggested is you can fix everything with enough money. 
But the land needs to be worth the money… you know there's a cost 
benefit analysis to that… if you ask me what's the best thing that could 
happen from the engineering standpoint to get rid of the problem not 
necessarily about the individual people who are living there but from… If 
some developer will buy everything out fill it two and a half feet and 
rebuild it. You know, and that would make the problem literally go away. 
Many in this discourse echo this individual and bound the problem of sea level 
rise by the financial constraints to solve the problem. In this risk discourse around the 
economic core, risks are expressed via a monetary lens. As one city employee shared 
when discussing future growth and development in the region,  
It's all land value. It's not really the buildings and that's what we talk 
about. Saving the building. I said the buildings are worth very little, it's 
where they sit is what the value is.  
The risk of sea level rise is bound by the ability of the region to be economically 
prosperous as to be able to afford the adaptations needed to support cities in Miami-Dade 
County. Several interviewees used economic reasoning to discuss prioritization for 
adaptation strategies, as one elected official shared,  
There's economic activity to happen and there's places where they need to 
be reinforcing, elevating structures and land to keep that happening. 
There's an area, very high economic activity in the Jackson Hospital area, 
along the Miami river. That area is a big job engine and the area is pretty 
low. They need to be paying attention there.  
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With the problem framed around developers serving as a major roadblock to 
adaptation planning, the logic follows that this stakeholder group needs to be included in 
planning activities. Several people from the development community have been involved 
in sea level rise adaptation planning via participating on committees and proving input in 
assessments. Because of the presence of the business community on these committees 
and their involvement, the conversations that take place in those arenas often surround 
the need to update codes, building materials, and emerging business opportunities around 
adaptation planning. Several interviewees from outside this discourse commented on the 
focus on building codes and new growth for sea level rise adaptation and resiliency 
strategies. These outsiders expressed that these building code changes can be slow 
because of political challenges and detract from activities that could take place in the 
nearer term. As one individual from an environmental organization shared when 
discussing private sector organizations involved in adaptation planning efforts,  
Yeah, they seem to be sort of fixated on building code changes, and asking 
for money to get surveys, or risk assessments, or experts, or things like 
that. That has been slow in coming… Economic impact studies, like GIS 
surveys… Financial, and elevation perspective, and flood maps… And 
building code changes… It's very slow and difficult to get changes to the 
building code. It takes years… And then Miami is a very developer driven 
town economically, and so adding additional burdens onto developers for 
doing things with sea level rise in mind is slow going. Because it's going 
to cost them more money to build their buildings differently, or elevate 
them, or so on and so forth. Because right now most of the costs are 
pushing on people who are buying apartments and things like that, because 
developers sort of engage for three to five years, and then they sell them.  
While those within the economic discourse emphasize the need to focus on building 
design and code challenges, this individual from outside the economic discourse 
discussed an alternative framing. Understanding how slow moving changes to building 
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codes can be, this individual shared that there are alternative solutions that could be done 
in the nearer term, including green infrastructure and emissions reduction.  
Within the economic discourse, several people representing private sector 
interests discussed the new economy emerging out of building adaptation strategies. This 
new emerging economy is part of how those within this discourse frame adaptation 
solutions and focus on infrastructure investments. For example, one private sector 
individual discussed recent changes to Miami-Dade County’s sewer treatment in terms of 
a positive economic driver,   
They were slapped with a consent order, and so now they were forced to 
basically upgrade their infrastructure to accommodate for the growth, and 
also to protect sewage issues into our ecosystem. Therefore, that’s been 
good for business… The economy is the environment, and the 
environment is the economy in South Florida… $20 billion dollars over… 
well, over 20 years, so you do the math. There’s a lot of contracts out on 
the street already, and big global firms are down here hiring small firms. 
My firm benefits from that as well, because they hire me to help them.  
This notion of emerging economies out of the need to engineer and transform the built 
environment was discussed among several others. In relation to the business community 
an elected official discussed how some in the business community discuss the need to 
focus on the new economies around adaptation to sea level rise. This individual shared, 
[The business community] talks about new economies that we should be 
focusing on. One is the ability to bring in engineers and state-of-the-art to 
help with planning, and to help with infrastructure. There is an economy 
waiting to do that. Renewable energy, solar, all of those things. There is a 
new green economy, but we aren't involved in it as a county, at the 
chamber… or any of those levels. We are solely invested in tourism 
development. These developers come in, and they're building in the most 
vulnerable coastal areas, which is still the most valuable property, because 
they know they'll be able to take the money and run within the next five-
year spread.   
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Economic benefits are also discussed in terms of longer-term improvements to the region. 
As some business and homeowners in Miami-Beach have expressed frustration with 
infrastructure projects at public meetings, one adaptation proponent from the business 
sector reframes this issue in the context of economic gains.  
Guess what? We’re going to bust up your street… But it’s all for the 
greater good, and you’re going to have better services, and we're 
improving the system. There are temporary impacts to greater benefits, 
and it’s also helpful for the economy. The [business community] comes in 
and understands that and wants to build… that conversation.  
Economic Discourse Summary: The link between the economic framing of the problem 
with the economic opportunities surrounding new growth and an adaptation economy are 
produced out of and reinforced by an economic rationality. Miami as a development 
driven town with political leaders and officials closely connected to developers lends 
more political weight towards this discourse. The long-term involvement of the 
development and business community participating on sea level rise and climate change 
committees for the different municipalities lends the business community some level of 
administrative authority, shaping the development of plans and assessments. Further, 
insurance programs, flood protection, and beach nourishment activities create a direct 
pathway for economic considerations to have formal positions within the planning arena. 
This storyline is used by local politicians and the business community to reframe the 
problem of economic barriers to sea level rise adaptation as an economic opportunity.  
Infrastructure Discourse: Risks are Technological and can be Managed with 
Infrastructure  
 Regional, county, and city planners and managers primarily frame the problem of 
sea level rise around the physical impacts to infrastructure that result from inundation and 
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associated physical changes to the landscape. Part of this is understood in relation to 
protecting the regional economy and tax base, overlapping with the economic framing of 
risk. This framing is rationalized through procedural rationality, where those within this 
group justify action and problem framing in the context of what they perceive as logical 
and apolitical assessments and prioritizations. A large emphasis around the framing of the 
problem of sea level rise is around the roles and responsibilities of local government, and 
the need to address their own issues and risks before asking others to do the same. This 
places some focus around roles and responsibilities of local governments and not wanting 
to infringe on property rights. As one federal employee suggests, 
I think that local governments in general they are trying to work on things 
they can do… You know the things that involve public infrastructure are 
going to be more feasible to start working on than anything that impacts 
private property… That is something that you see a lot of the emphasis is 
on public infrastructure.  
In addition, government employees shared the desire to get their own assets prepared for 
sea level rise before asking the public to do theirs. The question of public and private 
responsibility is brought up in the context of when landowners should adapt and whether 
to wait for the government to adapt the infrastructure first. As one scientist and county 
resident explained this question of public and private action,  
If they're gonna charge me tax on my parcel of land with my house on it, I 
should have access to my parcel of land. That's my feeling… I mean, I can 
afford to elevate my house, and do those things. I mean it'd be kind of fun, 
but, before I make the investment, I want to be sure that I can get to my 
house. 
And while the procedural logic around adapting infrastructure is wrapped up in 
roles and responsibilities of local governments, there are several outspoken critics of this 
discourse. Critics from the environmental discourse shared that ongoing infrastructure 
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investments in low-elevation areas encourages additional growth in vulnerable regions. 
As one scientist shared,  
And so what we're doing is we're putting all our money into this basket of 
infrastructure protection, and it's going to keep driving our property values 
down and keep more social inequity, higher cost, poor quality of life, and 
then finally, we're going to start get hit with serial Katrina and Sandy style 
events because it won't take that big a storm at some point where when 
that system finally gets swamped, it's going to be bad… We're going to 
build ourselves into a disaster. That's my fear… And once it gets to that 
point, I think what we're going to end up with is… this kind of… 
apocalyptic shoreline where you're going to have abandoned infrastructure 
and cities, squatters living in places that don't have any sewer or water, 
maybe they have hi-jacked electricity or something.  
Logic around adapting infrastructure is to approach it from an incremental 
perspective. In Miami Beach, for example, the city has been installing stormwater 
pumps and raising roads based on a 30-year planning horizon. Several people 
shared that this is in part because raising roads higher than that would kill the 
local economy. While the logic behind planning this way is based on procedural 
and economic elements, there were several outspoken critics that expressed this 
planning was too short-term and parochial. For example, as an environmentalist 
and critic shared about infrastructure adaptation in Miami Beach,  
I kept saying, “Good guys, but what happens when you've raised the 
streets 3 feet and you put the pumps in and you're pumping the water out 
24 hours a day pumping it out? You put sea walls all around Miami Beach 
and the rest of Miami-Dade County looks like that?” There is no causeway 
to drive across because it's under water. Great, and good, you have built a 
1 mile wide, 7-mile-long island, with a wall around it. You can't call it 
Miami Beach anymore because there is no beach here. What quality of life 
is that? Is that where you want to live? Are we slowing down and 
building? Hell no. We're building billions and billions of dollars’ worth of 
stuff all along this. Something's wrong with people. 
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This individual as well as other critics favor planned retreat as a strategy for adaptation 
planning. Interviewees representing the infrastructure arena discuss encounters with 
outspoken critics of adaptation who favor planned retreat. In these scenarios, those that 
subscribe to the infrastructure storyline—especially those working in local government—
argue that planned retreat is not an option. This is in part because people want to continue 
living in the region and it’s the local governments role to provide infrastructure. As one 
government employee shared,  
A planned retreat, which, you know, is a totally valid argument when you 
look at the whole scale of the problem. But then their individual plans for 
their own family are not in accordance with that. And you think, “Okay, I 
understand why, because you like where you live.” And that is also true of 
your neighbors, so it's not really possible to assume that these other people 
should pack up and leave, while you maintain your particular home and 
community. So people, not everywhere, but a lot of people wanna 
maintain their community, and they wanna maintain their house… which 
is what we're, as a government, you know, what the community wants is 
what we're trying to provide.  
Local government employees do discuss some hyper-localized retreat in the general sense 
when speaking on panels but have yet to formally address this issue in policies, plans, 
and official public forum. They emphasize small scale retreat within low-lying parts of 
neighborhoods, not mass planned retreat. Beyond the moral argument around the purpose 
of local governments to provide a certain quality of life and maintain communities, the 
emphasis on hard infrastructure projects is embedded in policies and mandates.  
Emergency management and FEMA become one lens for how the region views 
infrastructure risks from sea level rise. Often, these policies direct investment towards 
what was referred to as “hard” infrastructure projects, meaning infrastructure projects that 
are built to withstand disturbance. As one government employee shared,  
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One of the other collateral things I was involved in was called “Local 
Mitigation Strategy.” Which was part of the emergency management 
office. FEMA is really the driving force on that. The county was very 
aggressive, probably one of the leading counties in the country, on 
developing this Local Mitigation Strategy on how to harden vulnerable 
facilities. They have taken advantage of a lot of grant money through 
FEMA. A lot of programs that they have to help communities, both 
municipal government and county agencies. A lot of other entities get 
funding to protect, harden their resource. Whether it is hurricane impact 
windows, doors, or generators. Raise a facility or build a new facility. 
Kind of drainage, pumping facilities to pump water.  
Some government employees discussed wanting to explore more flexible infrastructure 
projects, for example green infrastructure, which are designed to take on some of the 
impact of disturbance and dissipate that across a larger system for impact. This notion of 
infrastructure flexibility was contested among different people within this discourse, 
particularly in discussions about green infrastructure. Many proponents of more flexible 
infrastructure did not see it as a replacement for hard infrastructure, but to augment and 
alleviate disturbances to hard infrastructure. 
With local governments, the emphasis of the risk is framed around public 
infrastructure and the solutions are centered around developing a detailed understanding 
of risks and engineering solutions to those physical risks. This is supported with logical, 
decision-making and represents a procedural rationality, backed up by scientific 
assessments and economic rationalities around costs and benefits specific to 
infrastructure design and investments. The work of developing criteria and prioritization 
for projects is most often done by consulting firms and government employees and 
mandated by different state and federal policies. As one planner shared,  
The first task that we gave them [the consultant] under that contract was to 
assess climate impacts. They did extensive evaluations. They did storm 
surge modeling. We did rainfall projections. Because part of that program 
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is also to calculate what our future flows will be. If a rainfall is going to be 
more intensive, we may have higher peak flows in the future. They did 
that assessment. We look at wind also. Based on all that, we came up with 
a criteria.  
Prioritizations and solutions become embedded in the infrastructure themselves. 
Several people within this discourse discussed the role of the useful life of infrastructure 
in determining what science to apply, what the costs and benefits are, and how to 
prioritize different strategies. In some cases, people described this process as being 
represented as a formula around weighting different decisions. As one planner shared,  
Basically, we have this formula for allocating those stormwater 
utility dollars to improve flooding. So objectively, this basin was 
the most flood prone area that we had, so it's pretty standard.  
 
Even though the system is currently set up to strive for procedural 
approaches to decision-making and prioritization, some within this discourse 
challenged the efficacy of standardized approaches to prioritize adaptation 
actions. For example, some government planners within this arena shared the 
challenge in coming up with standards for determining “Adaptation Action 
Areas.” “Adaptation Action Areas,” are supported by State land use policies as an 
official designation (Section 163.3177(6)(g)(10), Florida Statutes), which can be 
used to as a land use zone to support adaptation actions. There are different 
approaches to designating Adaptation Action Areas and some planners question 
the ability to come up with calculations to identify these priority areas. For 
example, one individual shared that they used a standard calculation used for 
allocating stormwater utility dollars to determine a pilot area for an Adaptation 
Action Area. This planner describes the tension between an official systematic 
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process for designating Adaptation Action Areas using a standard stormwater 
calculation verses a more flexible approach, 
…when we selected the area… obviously we didn't know that much about 
the area when we chose it… the most flood prone area was just off the 
map, it was this mobile home facility, basically. It's just a little bit off the 
map. It's literally across the street. Anyway, it's just off the map, and it's 
like, as soon as you start to speak to people, and you go up there, and you 
learn more about the area, and you're mapping it et cetera, you're like “Oh 
man, this is just outside the boundary.” Which isn't a problem for us in this 
particular sense, cause we just say “Okay, this is part of it.” Yeah, it's just 
a part of it. It's not a big deal. But if it's officially designated, I don't 
know… It wouldn't be in there. So I don't know. I guess some of the 
benefits of being designated is that you might be able to direct funding 
towards those places.  
This view of systems being too complex to have strict criteria for prioritizing and 
determining adaptation actions was linked with people who shared the need to work on 
hyper-focused projects that explore the complexities and nuance of place. Such a concept 
is emerging in some areas around pilot projects sponsored by different foundations, and 
design charrettes have been performed in this way. However, currently this approach and 
the logic behind this approach exists more on the periphery of this discourse. Most that 
subscribe to the infrastructure discourse emphasize the need to have prescribed 
assessments and approaches to determine prioritization and adaptation solutions.  
Part of the concern around having standardized approaches to prioritize adaptation 
planning based on physical risks of sea level rise surrounds how to address complex 
issues experienced by low-income communities. The response to the concerns of low-
income communities within this discourse is varied. Some planners shared that while 
there are vulnerabilities unique to these communities, the bigger picture of the risks from 
sea level rise do not make those vulnerabilities worse than vulnerabilities to more affluent 
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communities. “Risks do not discriminate between rich and poor” was a common 
argument made to rationalize the inclusion of low-income communities in the 
conversation. As one planner shared,  
Well, I think the big takeaway is the same as it is in lots of other 
communities, I mean, like, this is an existential threat to Miami, and 
people are informed about the severity of the threat, and that, basically, 
regardless of emissions, the amount of sea level rise the community will 
encounter is probably more than the community can absorb. We're not 
talking about inches, we're taking about feet. And such a huge percentage 
of the community is below six feet. So, I think the challenge is that, you 
know, the concerns that you hear in Liberty City and the concerns that you 
hear from big developers, affluent developers… Key Biscayne, an affluent 
community… they're the same. People are like, “This is a serious problem. 
What you said, it sounds very serious, I haven't heard you say what we can 
do about it.” And like, “What are we gonna do about it and why isn't it 
already happening?”  
 
And really I think that they're the same… you know, the content is 
different, like, in Key Biscayne residents brought up that… one woman 
asked this room full of people, like “Who knows Donald Trump? 
Someone pick up the phone.” Obviously, in Liberty City, those kinds of 
comments don't come up. People are talking about New Orleans a lot 
more, and they're talking about storms, and savings getting wiped out, so 
the impacts are the same, but I would say that the tenor, and the real 
fundamental concern, is pretty similar. You know, it's like “What you've 
just told me is that this sounds really serious and irreversible. Like, what 
are we gonna do about it? And why haven't you, like, come up with a 
plan? 
When discussing solutions, some planners shared that infrastructure adaptations will 
benefit rich and poor alike, that there is no distinction. In this way, the focus on the 
elevation and infrastructure is used as a tool to depoliticize the planning process. Some 
interviewees shared that they view infrastructure adaptations as an apolitical, 
technological solution that provides equal opportunity and benefits to those within the 
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regions the infrastructure serves. When discussing equity issues with climate change, one 
city employee suggested that,  
Every neighborhood will have different [socio-economic] levels like we 
mentioned. North Beach is kind of a lower income but at the same time 
some other neighborhoods are mixed. Any project that is developed will 
end up benefiting them, any level of society because they're a part of those 
neighborhoods… but basically when it comes to lower income population 
they'll also benefit… We have homeless all the way to billionaires as you 
heard. As in any city, is it always challenging to provide and tailor things 
to everybody… It was like I mentioned, [the city] really does a lot of 
communication to the public, a lot of outreach and education on the things 
that are being done. Those meetings are public, and anybody can attend 
and learn more. 
At the same time, some planners were more vocal about the different challenges among 
different communities. These planners expressed that possibility of sea level rise 
adaptation planning addressing a plurality of issues related to low-income communities. 
As one planner shared,  
… sea level rise planning really if it's done well… there's a real 
opportunity to address many other stresses and potential shocks hitting our 
community so I think that holistic resilience one is really, it bodes well 
particularly given socio-economic vulnerability so much of our… city. 
70% of the city's population is struggling to make ends meet.  
While views like this may offer the seeds for innovation around integrating social 
considerations outside of economic and biophysical drivers into infrastructure planning 
decisions, current planning remains focused on physical hazards for prioritization. There 
are different framings around how to support low-income communities with adapting to 
sea level rise. In considering sea level rise as a physical problem with high cost solutions, 
some interviewees within this infrastructure discourse were highly vocal about the 
challenges of supporting low-income communities. As one government representative 
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shared when discussing why conversations around adaptation do not focus on how to 
support low-income communities,   
We’re not discussing how to support them, because there is no supporting 
them. It's people mostly just waving their arms up and down saying, “Hey 
this is going to be unfair.” That's are things are, things are unfair. Right 
now, ironically the rich people are in the way of the problems, but rich 
people can relocate themselves to their Swiss chalet or whatever… 
 
Two meters by the end of the century…The slope is like that, so now it 
doesn't stop at two meters. Two meters, okay I got to figure out what to do 
with two meters… It's accelerating. You can't catch up with it. You never 
catch up with it and finally it overtakes you. You're out of money and 
you're out of rock. The sea level isn't quitting. It's still cranking up on 
you… Then what? You're going to worry about gentrification and Liberty 
City at that point? I don't think so… Yeah, by the time the water finally 
gets up to… Makes Liberty City's property valuable… This is going to be 
a very different place.   
 
Infrastructure Discourse Summary: Within the infrastructure storyline, sea level rise 
poses risks to infrastructure. The emphasis is on local governments to address those 
issues. Local governments primarily rely on procedural rationalities and also use 
economic and scientific rationalities to bolster procedural elements in relation to 
infrastructure costs, design and prioritization. The emphasis is on considering threats 
from sea level rise as being physical and economic, and solutions are framed in a similar 
context. Counter arguments around the need to consider retreat are ignored by this 
planning arena, primarily because of the moral and legal obligations local governments 
must maintain communities. At the same time, considerations for how to integrate 
challenges experienced by low-income communities remain mixed with some expressing 
visions for integration and others focused on the challenges and impossibility of 
integrating them into planning due to the perceived prohibitive costs of adaptations on 
private land.  
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Ecological Discourse: Ecological Complexity and Longer-term Processes and Impacts 
 The third discourse storyline that emerged surrounds ecological complexity and 
longer-range impacts from climate change. This discourse is primarily supported by 
environmental organizations and scientists with some government employees who work 
in environmental focused programs. In this discourse, risks to sea level rise are 
understood in relation to the environment and the solutions consider the role of the 
environment in adaptation. This arena is primarily based on scientific rationality. 
Individuals from environmental organizations discussed their close relationships with 
scientists from local and regional universities, and often talked about the biophysical 
impacts from sea level rise in longer-term with higher projections and more severe 
impacts than other groups.  
Environmental sea level rise impacts are often discussed in the context of broader 
climate change impacts to the environment and emphasize inundation of the Everglades, 
salinity issues within Biscayne Bay, coastal erosion and warming impacts on the living 
shoreline (including mangroves, eel grass, and coral bleaching), and water quality 
challenges that are worsened by sea level rise. For example, as one an individual from an 
environmental organization shared,  
All the mangroves will be gone, all the grasslands will be gone. Flats are 
going to die. All the grass flats, all the mangroves are going to die. They 
can't take sea level rise more than nine inches a century. They cannot 
migrate quick enough.  
Several people linked regional vulnerability to the overall health of the ecosystem. 
Many focus on the Everglades, in part because of the longstanding environmental focus 
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on connecting regional systems with Everglades restoration. As one individual from an 
NGO shared,  
I think people are seeing that our vulnerability to a great degree is affected 
by the health of our natural systems. I think that one thing we could do a 
better job of is conveying to people that we have been regulating this 
system, this aquatic system in our backyard going back to the late 1940s 
and providing flood control in a system that receives a lot of water. If we 
can manage this Everglades ecosystem, and also restore it, put more water 
out there and still keep our developed areas relatively dry in what is 
otherwise a flat, low lying landscape, then we might have the capacity to 
do really what people think is the impossible.  
Many that subscribed to this discourse talked about the multiple threats to the 
environment and often discussed these threats in the context of broader climate change 
risks to the ecosystem. Sea surface temperature and ocean acidification were frequently 
added into interviews in the context of risk from sea level rise. One government 
employee focused on ecological protection shared,   
… there's going to be significant impacts to the natural resources. I don't 
think that our resources will maintain the same homeostasis that they 
historically had with potentially accelerated sea level rise. Impacts 
potential to benthic resources, corals which we're seeing right now. Sea 
surface temperature, ocean acidification, coral disease. The coral reefs off 
Miami-Dade County are not in great shape. Also, we are seeing a large-
scale sea grass die-off in certain parts of Biscayne Bay which may be 
attributed to land-based sources of pollution.  
In terms of impacts, baselines and reference points often follow an ecological time scale. 
Several people within this arena focus on whether the ecological systems can keep up 
with the impacts from sea level rise. For example, several shared that one key uncertainty 
is how the mangrove system will be able to keep up via soil accretion rates.  
In addition to these direct impacts, this discourse discusses indirect water quality 
impacts from failed infrastructure surrounding sewerage system and stormwater 
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infrastructure failures. Several interviewees and documents also discuss ecological risks 
from adaptation strategies themselves, including from sea-walls, well drilling, and 
stormwater pumps. One informant shared, “They'll [individual homeowners] start 
hardening yep, along the coastal areas. The problem then is, is you lose your inner tidal 
zone. There is no inner tidal zone, it's just two lines on a wall.” Another environmentalist 
expressed, “You lose your inner tidal and you lose your inner tidal life. It's a temporary 
fix. Also of course when the water tops your sea wall then you're in big trouble. It gives 
you a false sense of security.” 
Many within this discourse framed part of the problem around ecological risks 
being rooted in decisions that support economic benefits to the region. Many were 
outspoken critics of short-term economic gains at the expense of the environment and 
considerations for the impacts of sea level rise. As one interviewee from an 
environmental organization shared,  
We have the port dredging to bring in mega cruises. You're damaging 
coral reef and marine life. It's like, “We need coral reefs. You're killing 
them. What are you doing?” It's brutal. Money is… It's a monster.  
In addition to framing the risks and the problem around climate change and sea 
level rise to ecological systems, many discussed that risks (both to the environment and 
to the economy) can be addressed using ecological systems. Most within this arena link 
the economy to the environment and identify synergies between the environment and sea 
level rise adaptation solutions. These include: living shorelines restoration, sand dune 
restoration, stormwater treatment, green infrastructure, Everglades and Biscayne Bay 
restoration, sending water south to prevent saltwater intrusion, and green space. As such, 
environmental protections and funding are often driven by the need to protect the 
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environment for the economy. This is linked to the connection between the environment 
and the economy, expressed by one individual, “It's like the quality of our water. The 
availability of our water. The health of the ecosystem, which is at the center of our 
economy.” Groups use this framing to make a case for restoration and the role of the 
environment in adapting to sea level rise. As one individual from an environmental 
organization shared,  
I think one of the most compelling things that we can do, and we're 
working toward that, is making a strong economic case for Everglades 
restoration. That includes understanding the economic impacts of the 
existing system, and being able to project what restoration will do, not 
only in terms of avoiding those impacts, but also improving the system on 
some trajectory back to what it may have been. We've done economic 
studies. We know that people pay a lot of money to fish, people pay a lot 
of money to bird watch. 
 
The importance around protecting the environment because it’s tied to the economy was 
shared by some local government officials. As one municipal employee shared,  
… we have a lot of money and political backing for the environment and 
an understanding of how important it is because it’s tied to our economy. 
The same way and that’s why people move here and that what funds all 
our programs. In the end if we don’t have a pleasant environment to enjoy 
and live in, we and all these other items don’t really matter because 
nobody is going to want to live here. Everybody is going to be like oh you 
know this area is doomed okay we might as well just leave because it’s not 
even worth living. We don’t ever want to get to that point.  
 
In extending the role of the environment for protecting the economy, the 
environment also gets brought into discussion around protecting the region from impacts 
of sea level rise. The environment is enrolled in conversations about solutions for 
adapting to sea level rise, solving some of the proximal impacts of sea level rise. For 
example, one individual from an environmental organization shared,  
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Yeah, living shoreline is not going to solve sea level rise. That’s more 
about sort of proximal effects, like flooding and erosion. Sea level rise 
exacerbates those things… It takes not so much mangroves to really stop a 
lot of waves… So that protects from erosion and flooding… And provide 
all kinds of other benefits; habitat for fish that people love to catch, and 
water filtration, wildlife habitat, a million other things.  
 
At the same time, some within this discourse express a strong scientific argument 
around climate change impacts being insurmountable and call for discussions of planned 
retreat and political movements towards greenhouse gas reductions. The challenge of 
addressing these longer-term impacts is the lack of political motivation around emissions 
reduction. As one individual from an environmental organization shared when discussing 
the risk Miami Beach took in discussing and addressing sea level rise,  
… you potentially put your region in the cross hairs for bad press with this 
issue that you don't have a solution to. It's a really expensive, intractable 
problem. I don't think people want to talk about it without knowing what 
to do about it. The sort of logical end to these conversations is sort of 
reducing emissions, and I don't think people want to talk about what that 
means. There's political and economic pressure to not talk about those 
things… It's insanely expensive to do adaptation and it's insanely 
expensive to… or is going to shift our economic structure to do the 
mitigation. Neither thing is particularly palatable. 
Like both the economic and infrastructure storylines around the problem framing, 
people within the ecological discourse discussed barriers to implement adaptation 
strategies posed by private landowners. This was discussed in the context of trying to get 
private landowners onboard with some of the ecological adaptation strategies, for 
example, sand dune restoration. As one person from an environmental organization 
shared,  
Most of the governments want dunes… It’s really private homeowners, 
and the government can’t put a dune in front of a home until they sign 
paperwork, so sometimes they build a big project and they have to put 
gaps in the dune, because there are certain homeowners that don’t want a 
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dune on their property… There’s nothing bad about a dune. They’re 
protective, they’re a good wildlife habitat… From like an, other than not 
being able to see over it, there’s nothing bad about a dune.  
 Several among this group suggested that the adaptation strategies themselves will 
have environmental impacts that are not being considered. For example, one individual 
from an environmental discussed environmental concern for drilling into the aquifer to 
treat wastewater as part of a sea level rise adaptation strategy. They shared,   
I know they're doing this deep well injection process now that makes me 
quite nervous… Yeah, so they're just sticking all the dirty water down a 
hole basically… It's taking hundreds of billions of gallons of water out of 
the water cycle and putting it into a hole, which I think is not sustainable. 
It's also a somewhat untested technology. What's going to happen to that 
water down there? Is it just going to stay down there forever? Is it going to 
migrate, is it going to contaminate the aquifer, is it going to create a 
methane bubble and become anoxic? It's becoming more and more clear 
that, particularly in Miami, where we have porous limestone, things are 
not very well contained underground, and… there are fissures even into 
the boulders now that we don't even know about.  
People within the environmental discourse differed in their opinion of how impactful the 
high profile stormwater pumps and elevated streets in Miami Beach are to the 
environment. Some expressed concern that the pumps concentrate stormwater pollution 
and create more problems in Biscayne Bay that existed prior to the pumping. For 
example one scientist shared,  
Well, it has been effective in short term lowering of the water in the 
streets. The downside of it is that the stuff is pumped into the bay without 
any real treatment. They might strain out a few chunks or something like 
that, but it's… So, North Biscayne Bay sea grasses are dying off, and it 
probably relates to turbidity in the bay, and it started to happen about the 
same time that the pumps were turned on. That's not proof that that's the 
case but… It's an observation, and one of the obvious candidates. FIU 
[Florida International University] did measurements of the nutrient 
loading in the plumes of stuff going into the bay, and the mayor of Miami 
Beach, [Mayor] Levine, was outraged because they were finding there 
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were some problems with the amount of nutrients, and so, instead of 
working with them, basically a politician often attacks the messenger.  
At the same time, some people from this discourse, including from environmental 
organizations, feel that the pumping is no worse than what’s been going on in the past 
and that the real concern is a lack of stormwater infrastructure in general. As one 
individual shared,  
On the scale of massive pollution issues I'm much more worried about the 
sewage infrastructure getting overwhelmed and getting millions or billions 
of gallons of sewage… Yeah, the bigger problem is we don't have good 
stormwater management, we have a shallow water table, we have too 
much water. Every time it rains we end up with infiltration in the sewage 
infrastructure. There's lots of storm water pollution, we don't have enough 
green spaces to let it percolate. I think that problem is only getting worse 
with sea level rise and salt water intrusion issues. It's like the pumps are 
very visible, and sort of high profile, so people are sort of fixated on them, 
but it's a much bigger problem than just for the Miami Beach where they 
have pumps. 
While people working within local governments also share ecological goals, the pressure 
from those that are more central to the ecological discourse is pushing local governments 
towards those considerations. For example, within Miami Beach, government and non-
government employees discussed how the pressure from scientists sampling water quality 
has resulted in additional sampling programs and efforts to design stormwater 
infrastructure to address bacteria and contamination at the water pump stations. Some 
interviewees shared that many of the activities proposed by the environmental 
community are long-standing issues. One consultant expressed,  
The environmentalists in this county were the first adopters of the sea 
level rise and climate change. Environmental goals that were being 
pursued anyway are being strengthened. Restoration of habitat… of the 
Everglades protection. Things that were happening anyway. 
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Most of what was already “happening anyway” center around Everglades restoration 
efforts aligned with sea level rise risks and adaptation. Restoring the natural flow of the 
Everglades and maintaining the brackish characteristic needed to sustain ecological 
processes in Biscayne Bay have long been ecological goals among environmental 
organizations and local and federal governments in the region. Among those within the 
environmental discourse, this goal of sending water south and “growing the bubble” is 
seen as preventing salinization of the Biscayne aquifer, an important water supply. The 
risk of salinization comes both from not enough aquifer recharge and from saltwater 
intrusion from sea level rise. This argument is also linked to other ecosystem needs for 
the Everglades and Biscayne Bay. As one individual shared,  
But anyway, that natural flow that goes through the Everglades, that 
reestablishes freshwater flow there to the extent that it then continues into 
Florida Bay. The fresh water is important to Florida Bay because without 
it, the bay dies. It's that brackish water, the fresh water that collides with 
salt water, that creates these amazing estuaries for fish and natural life. But 
these other fish, it ends up being part of this whole fishing economy, that 
you hear about in the Florida Keys. That hydration needs to then continue 
to Biscayne Bay because there's evidence that the bay might be dying off 
in certain areas. Sea grasses are not there like they used to be. You don't 
want the bottom of the bay to be muddy. You want it to be filled with sea 
grass. 
This issue framing around sea level rise and the Everglades restoration has historical 
context which impact modern conflicts and present challenges for restoration. In Palm 
Beach County, for example, the sugar industry has long been considered by 
environmental organizations as a big polluter and political power against sending the 
water south, which is viewed as necessary for Everglades restoration, and now for sea 
level rise adaptation.  
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Ecological Discourse Summary: Within the ecological discourse, the problem is 
framed in relation to direct and indirect impacts of climate change and sea level 
rise on the environment. These include how inundation rates affect different 
species, ecological impacts of adaptation strategies, and the broader human 
impacts on the environment which places sea level rise among multiple threats. 
The role of private property rights and developers are also framed as part of the 
problem, with ongoing development in the region both producing ecological 
harms and long-term challenges for sea level rise adaptation. The environment is 
linked to the economy in that it supports tourism, quality of life, and the reason 
people are drawn to live in the area. Within this problem framing, there are 
different problem solutions that emerge, many focusing on the role of the 
environment in protecting infrastructure. Risks from climate change are 
considered much longer-term and more severe and calls for mitigation and 
planned retreat emerge from this framing. 
Community Discourse: People also Matter, and Risks are Not the Same  
 The fourth discourse storyline emerged out of cultural rationality and emphasizes 
the need to consider the people who use infrastructure and the importance of including 
the public in adaptation planning. The emphasis is on low-income and historically 
marginalized communities which have a history of being left out of planning decisions in 
the city. As one community organizer expressed, “If you don’t have a seat at the table 
you’re on the menu.” In addition to urban community organizations, people from South 
Miami-Dade County and the agricultural community expressed similar sentiments around 
being left out of planning efforts and had less awareness of sea level rise impacts to their 
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region. The problem of sea level rise risks is framed both in terms of impacts to day to 
day life, the situatedness of historical and contemporary socio-economic factors, 
exclusion from the planning process, displacement from adaptation practices, and health 
and economic risks to the community from flooding and other impacts of sea level rise. 
Emergency preparedness for hurricanes and flooding events is another major concern for 
this group. Heat and other climate stressors factored into the risk understandings, as did 
other social and economic stressors, as interviewees articulated that they cannot be 
separated.  
While some in this arena discussed flooding impacts and potential inundation 
from sea level rise in low-income communities, most focused on how sea level rise and 
climate change present a complex problem that extends beyond physical inundation. 
Within this context, the problem is framed not only around the impacts but also the 
inability of some communities to be able to bounce back. One community organizer 
shared,  
As you know… low income communities, when you're having 
conversations about any kind of stress, like sea level rise or gentrification, 
the issue is not how they'll be affected, but the fact that they can't bounce 
back. They don't have the same ability to adapt to changes or stresses.  
Several interviewees discussed this issue of not being able to bounce back in the context 
of public health challenges that will emerge from sea level rise and climate change. 
During interviews, several people within this group used Zika as an example and the role 
that the disease played in impacting low-income verses affluent communities. As one 
interviewee shared when discussing the variegated effects of Zika:  
Sea level rise will present a whole new generation of public health threats, 
and when you don't have the money to adapt to those threats, you're 
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uniquely affected. Zika is a great example because, when Zika came to 
Miami, many of the affluent or even just middle-class women that I knew 
that were pregnant. Yes. They were like, “Oh, I'll be in Canada. You have 
a blessed life. I'm going to have my babies Zika-free, wait until this all 
dies down, and then come back.” Obviously, that's a privilege that a lot of 
women did not have. Especially, when Zika moved to Miami Beach, 
which is a very high affluent community compared to this area and to 
Little Haiti… So, Zika was just a prime example. But there's going to be 
other threats, and Zika's not completely eradicated yet. Let's not forget, 
mosquito season died down, but it's coming back…  
Evoking the 2016 Zika crisis in relation to impacts from sea level rise and climate 
change is indicative of considerations for public health, socio-economic 
disparities creating different risk exposure, and different abilities to bounce back 
from risks. Similar logic was used to contextualize the issue of urban flooding 
from sea level rise, which is understood in a largely economic context among 
local governments. However, under the community storyline public health and 
different challenges in the community are emphasized. As one community 
organizer from this group shared,   
We can talk about other public health threats, such as flood water 
exposure. You saw some of the pictures of the flooding during the tidal 
events in Shorecrest. They're just now trying to get shuttles that will 
transport residents down these roads. But if you lived there before, and 
there's articles that show, residents in knee, waist high water having to 
wade through… Now, there was a study done showing that, in the pumps 
that funnel the water into Biscayne Bay, there was traces of human fecal 
waste. Those studies haven't been replicated with the actual water that 
people are exposed to, but can you imagine wading through water that is 
clearly contaminated? There are probably floating animals and all kinds of 
things in there. There is the issue of trash and trash then being released 
into this water, that's moving and carrying things with it, so that's an issue.  
Among those in this group, it was widely expressed that the local governments and 
planning arenas are not discussing public health issues and the concerns of low-income 
communities. People shared that because these issues only affect some people, and those 
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people tend to have minimal political power and access to decision-makers, these issues 
are ignored. In discussing why no one is talking about public health issues including heat 
and increased frequency of diseases such as Zika, one person shared that,  
Nobody talks about it… Because it's not affecting everybody. People 
think, well, we have A/C [air conditioning] units. People in low-income 
communities don't always have A/C units. The fact that we lack vegetation 
in most of our low-income communities. It's really, really hot… And I'm 
almost sure Liberty City and Little Havana are [hot]. I know down in 
Coral Gables and different places, they have these huge canopy trees.  
Several shared how the dominant planning circles call Miami Beach and other low-laying 
coastal communities as “frontline” communities and related this terminology to the 
communities they are a part of and represent.  
Yeah. So, why we call it frontlines is because, you know, they call it 
frontline communities that would be affected by climate… So, Miami 
Beach is definitely a frontline community, right? You can't deny that. But 
a place like Little Haiti, where they don't have money to pay a light bill. 
They don't have money to evacuate. They don't have money to buy 
hurricane supplies. So, that puts us in a more vulnerable situation than 
other communities.  
 One of the major concerns from institutions primarily focused around this 
discourse, is that people in the communities they represent and work with are very 
uninformed about sea level rise and the impacts that are coming. When a foundation 
became involved in sea level rise and resiliency planning they worked with local 
community organizations to understand the perspectives from the communities those 
organizations work with. People involved in that organizing shared that those community 
members were largely unaware of sea level rise being an issue. As one individual shared,  
I mean, their concerns were that they had no idea. A lot of these people 
that came, this was new information. They had heard of climate change, 
but they didn't know that sea level rise was as big of a threat. They didn't 
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know that climate change was a threat multiplier. With sea level rise it's 
heat, it's vector-borne diseases. It's food and water vulnerability.  
People in this discourse also shared their concern for representational justice and having 
their voices heard. In different efforts by community organizations and foundations to 
gather and share information, several expressed the view that community members 
wanted more information and more contact with government representatives. Some 
people also talked about the challenge of bridging these connections because of distrust 
on part of the community for local government and non-government organizations from 
past injustices. For example, one person shared,  
The African American community is not necessarily on good terms with 
the Red Cross, with government, because they feel that they are slighted, 
in obvious ways. So, I wouldn't say it's the best relationship, but I feel like 
creating these platforms is the first and best step to, I guess, like placating 
that kind of tension, I would say. I would say it's a little tense. They don't 
hate each other… but it's not the best.   
Equity issues were viewed as not being included in conversations about sea level rise 
risks and adaptation strategies. When discussing what’s not included in formal planning 
efforts one community organizer responded, “Equity. That’s it, in a nutshell… we’ve 
seen the results of cities who don't plan for everybody. You have people sleeping on the 
highway for a week, waiting for assistance. Or living in a stadium.” While those in this 
discourse shared that this is changing slowly and pointed to the Rockefeller Foundation 
100 Resilient Cities initiative, they also shared that progress is slow. Many shared they 
have not seen changes in policies or the way decisions are made based on their 
participation.  
Within this discourse, risks are understood to differentially affect low-income 
communities because they will not have the means to adapt, pay for damages to their 
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homes, and fight displacement from climate gentrification. In addition, development and 
the focus on the economy are also part of the problem framing around risk. However, the 
difference in this framing is that developers are viewed as a threat to their communities 
from gentrification. In the context of development, one individual shared,  
Miami has a development problem that we don't know how to balance. We 
don't know, really, how to redevelop for a community. We redevelop for a 
new community instead of redeveloping with a community. That's why I 
mentioned the hyper-gentrification. It's not regular gentrification where 
there's a few apartment buildings, some people come in, and then it's like 
mixed income. No. It's like, “All of ya'll have to go… It's like, “Here's the 
new crowd in this neighborhood” …  
Many people frame the challenge of gentrification as an economic problem with 
the city prioritizing economic interests over community interests. As one person 
shared,  
Well, it's economics because we want to bring more money into the city. 
So these developers come with these mega projects, and we're like, “Yes!” 
What we don't think about is the fact that, as soon as that development is 
even approved, the property values in that neighborhood skyrocket.  
Another part of the problem framing is that existing adaptation planning efforts 
focus on the economy, development, and things that both displace people and fail 
to address needs of low-income communities. For example, one individual 
discussed how conversations focusing on development ignore low income 
communities:  
Planning and zoning is… I mean, they're a huge department. They cover a 
lot. One conversation, for the greater part of three hours, revolved around 
changes that can be applied to new developments. Now, there are not a 
whole lot of people in Miami that can afford the new developments that 
are being built, but you know who definitely can't afford them? People 
under a certain income. So, to me, it was another example of them 
addressing something that's not very important [to low income 
communities].  
 
183 
 
While this individual and many within this arena recognize the point of exploring 
building codes and economic components to address sea level rise, they argue that the 
policy and planning work around sea level rise cannot be purely economic. As one person 
elaborated on this:  
A lot of the ways that you spur an argument, or you start the conversation 
and inspire action, is economic. You're going, “Look, you're going to lose 
your city, so whether or not you agree with me, this threat is coming. Do 
you want to be ready for it or not?” That doesn't mean that the 
conversation should stay economic though… Once you've started the 
conversation, and you've gotten the resources, then there's your 
opportunity to redirect it back too… Infrastructure matters. People also 
matter. We can have these conversations concurrently.  
The economic context reads like three risks: a risk of communities being ignored, not 
having the resources to bounce back, and the risk of displacement from climate 
gentrification. Several situate this high elevation development pressure in a historic 
context. As one community organizer shared,  
We had to have special passes to get over the causeway to go to the beach 
during segregation… So, when we had the conversation, all of those 
things came up. It was just so crazy how they pushed us to this one area 
because they didn't want us by the beach. And now the beach is flooding. 
Now they want to push us out and they want to come to the center of the 
city.  
Community organizers share that people are experiencing climate gentrification as 
developers are buying land in low-income high elevation neighborhoods such as Liberty 
City and Little Haiti. This framing is based on personal experience. While referring to the 
woman who coined the term “climate gentrification,” one community organizer shared,  
And she coined the term and every resident when you first hear the term. 
You're like, that's exactly what I've been hearing. Like, immediately you 
put two and two together. She didn't have any science behind it. But she 
just knew that we're starting to see this trend of developers from the beach 
coming into Liberty City. Buying up property. Buying up lots.  
 
184 
 
In addition to personal observation within their communities, several organizers also 
referenced how they see newspapers quoting developers about this issue. In this way, the 
problem framing of risks from sea level rise includes private greed. One community 
organizer shared,  
When you have certain developers. Peter Erlich, who was quoted saying 
that he's buying up Little Haiti because it's gonna be beach-front property. 
That furthers the evidence for us, right. And this guy despises Haitians. 
Real racist man. I don't like him at all.  
Several outside this arena, while pointing to issues of gentrification experienced in these 
communities argue that it’s not possible to prove that it is due to sea level rise. People 
within this group respond to such criticisms with examples of things they have heard 
developers say and that whether or not it can be “proved” is irrelevant because they see it 
happening. As one community organizer shared,  
Well people will say we can't prove that's why they're doing it because 
they never said that's why they're doing it. They actually might not—it 
might not be a factor, or it could be… because they're very short-term 
thinkers, developers. Because they get a short-term buyout. So they could 
just be gentrifying it. But it doesn't matter to me because it's happening, so 
it doesn't matter what their intention is. 
In response, community organizations point to the work of a geographer at Florida 
International University who has mapped out elevations and recent purchases by land 
developers across gentrifying communities (discussed in chapter 5, see Figure 5.5). When 
discussing this map and critics of the climate gentrification argument, one person shared,  
This map here. Everybody shuts up now, because we have proof to show 
that it's trending. Maybe it's not happening as fast or as in-depth as we 
think it is. But it's happening. Right? It's real.  
For solutions and sea level rise adaptations, those within this discourse focused on 
the need for hyper-localized approaches, efforts for distributional justice, and community 
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organizing and education. This is like some of the views shared within the infrastructure 
discourse who shared the need to conduct localized planning to address social issues not 
captured by large-scale planning. To overcome issues of climate gentrification, for 
example, community organizing and education around issues of displacement are being 
used. People are also drawing attention to these community issues to get government 
spending on adaptation to support these communities. Many community organizers are 
focused on distributional justice and making sure communities get what they need in 
terms of adaptation to sea level rise and climate change. This was often independent of 
references to infrastructure investments and prioritizations. As one individual from a 
community organization shared,  
And I don't know all the science and everything, but I'm more than sure, 
like, if you don't get rid of the water first, the water's not going to go 
anywhere. So, throughout all of that, I just really focused on making sure 
low-income communities get what they need.  
 
During interviews about sea level rise, the problem was often discussed in relation 
to other climate stressors, for example heat waves. The problem around heat is partially 
framed in terms of distributional differences and inequities. This was discussed in 
relation to spending on sand dune restoration, resilience development, and infrastructure 
adaptations. As one community organizer shared when discussing how some of the 
resources could be redirected,  
You should be pouring those millions of dollars into these houses so that 
these kids are not passing out from heat exhaustion in their own house. 
Instead, you're building a multimillion dollar skyscraper when there's ten 
other ones around you. So it's frustrating. It's very, very frustrating.  
 
Surrounding community development and education, much of the focus is on preparing 
for storms and extreme events. As one person from a community organization shared,  
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My work usually focuses on educating low-income communities and 
preparing us for storms and things like that… Hurricane preparedness and 
any other things I do there. Because the way things are going, we gotta 
expect more than just a hurricane, if we're not careful… also, I'm going to 
try to do a big push on heat. 
 
 While much of the storyline around people center around urban areas, there are 
similar storylines emerging in the southern, more rural part of the county. The agriculture 
community and community leaders in South Miami-Dade County expressed concern with 
being left out of planning conversations about many issues, including climate change and 
sea level rise. Though the agriculture community in South Miami-Dade County is new to 
this topic and currently lacks a cohesive problem framing around the issue, several from 
South Miami-Dade County shared that they do not have information on the impacts of 
sea level rise to their communities. These interviewees focused on how their unique 
experiences and needs are regularly ignored from planning processes. For example, 
several people shared that formalized climate change planning ignores issues relevant to 
the agriculture community. Some from the agricultural community took this further and 
shared that policies fail to support and at times cause greater challenges to agriculture 
communities. For example, land use policies that allow for development on agriculture 
land are resulting in increased development pressure and further loss of agriculture land. 
At the same time, several managers and government employees expressed that there is 
little that can be done to address sea level rise issues in the agriculture community 
because of inundation and salt water intrusion. While there are differences around 
storylines and problem framings between urban communities and agricultural 
communities, the general cultural rationality claims underscore both. Both express unique 
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social challenges surrounding the way risks are experienced and being left out of 
planning processes.  
Community discourse summary: Community based organizations and foundations within 
the community discourse frame risks of sea level rise around impacts to daily life, 
including housing affordability, health concerns, transportation, and more. Risks framed 
under the community discourse emphasize the social risks in how low-income and 
historically marginalized communities are uniquely at risk because they do not have the 
ability to bounce back. The storyline is based on cultural rationality claims as much of the 
reasoning behind it comes from peoples’ daily lived experiences. The problem is also 
framed around issues of justice and being left out of decision-making related to climate 
change planning. Individuals within this discourse expressed their concern that many 
people from low-income and historically marginalized communities are unaware of sea 
level rise. Efforts to address these risks take place through building social capacity. This 
includes education and community organizing efforts.  
Seeds for a Communicative Approach 
 The four discourse storylines offer an assessment of the primary modes by which 
institutions and individuals acting within those institutions frame the problem of sea level 
rise and adaptation planning. At the same time, however, institutions are not static and 
some individuals acting within the system do work towards integrating some of these 
disparate and at times opposing views. During the interviews, some individuals discussed 
different integrative approaches and expressed frustration with the challenge of trying to 
span certain discourse boundaries. Though not well enough established to be its own 
discourse, these boundary spanning activities offer places where there may be a more 
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communicative turn in adaptation governance. This has occurred primarily through 
resiliency planning, community organizing and education, and efforts of the Compact.   
 Rockefeller’s 100 Resilient Cities initiative has brought groups together who had 
previously been left out of climate change and created an official platform for the City of 
Miami, Miami-Dade County, and the City of Miami Beach to work together on resilience 
issues. While issues of equity had previously been ignored, the 100 Resilient Cities 
advisory committee was required include community organizations representing those 
issues. The 100 Resilient Cities framework also requires that local governments work to 
understand issues pertaining to the community to determine what planning assessments 
and efforts are needed. Most of the public participation was done via public polling and 
committee discussions. While these mechanisms have limitations in integrating the public 
into decision-making, nonetheless the 100 Resilient Cities initiative represents a 
government supported, broad public engagement effort around issues of resilience, 
including sea level rise. Some planners within local government as well as community 
organizers expressed that they are hopeful about the outcomes of this planning being able 
to integrate more perspectives into issues of climate change and sea level rise. At the 
same time, however, some were skeptical and shared that resilience planning is too broad 
and would distract the region from needed sea level rise adaptation planning. Several 
skeptics shared their frustration with local governments now claiming that everything 
they do is resilient planning, often referencing the Mayor of Miami-Dade County who 
made such proclamations.  
 Some environmental and community organizations work with regional 
universities and scientists to engage stakeholders, including the public, in discussions 
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about climate change. For example, the CLEO Institute, a Miami based nonprofit 
organization dedicated to climate change education, engagement and advocacy, was 
discussed by people across all four discourses. Several interviewees shared that the 
“listening sessions” hosted by the CLEO Institute bring people with diverse interests into 
the same space. These listening sessions take place at the neighborhood scale and invite 
members from the community to share their concerns and experiences with climate 
change. Local government staff, primarily from resilience offices, attend these as do 
scientists and other stakeholders. People who may have otherwise not become involved 
in climate change and sea level rise learn about the issues and share their experiences in 
these listening sessions. Some of those individuals have become community organizers 
and participate on panels and committees. For example, based on their participation at 
listening sessions and other educational activities, several community organizations 
successfully made a case for having someone on the City’s Sea Level Rise Committee 
representing their interests. Many interviewees noted that the presence of someone 
representing socio-economically marginalized communities on the City of Miami’s Sea 
Level Rise Committee has broadened the dialogue towards more issues.  
 The Compact has been the longest collaborative effort in the region but has 
primarily focused on collaboration among local governments and to some extent 
environmental organizations. The Compact supports design charrettes which take place at 
very local scales. These charrettes may serve to model some of the hyper-local scale 
planning approaches that a few people from the infrastructure, community, and 
ecological discourses suggested are needed. Many interviewees from institutions that 
exist primarily outside this effort shared that the Compact is primarily for local 
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government. However, recently this organization has been broadening its scope, in 
response to some of these criticisms and the acknowledgement of including more 
stakeholders. In the updated Regional Climate Action Plan 2.0 they added issues of 
public health, public outreach and engagement, and social equity, which many pointed to 
as a reflection of the change in who is involved. However, some still expressed their 
frustration with the Compact for being disconnected to issues that matter to different 
stakeholders. Several people from the agriculture community shared that the Compact 
emphasizes things (such as urban agriculture) that have little to do with the issues facing 
the agriculture industry.  
 While these efforts offer opportunities for boundary spanning, those individuals 
working in these efforts also express frustration with the current governance system 
limiting knowledge integration. For example, some within the environmental community 
vocalized that they would like to see local governments more actively pursuing green 
infrastructure for stormwater, integrating both ecological and infrastructure goals. Several 
also expressed frustrations that they do not have access to how local governments, 
including Miami-Dade County and the City of Miami, conduct their stormwater 
management planning. Those wishing to be able to comment or contribute different 
approaches and ideas to managing stormwater—primarily from the environmental 
discourse—expressed their frustration with not having access to this information or being 
able to provide input. At the same time, however, some from the community discourse 
shared that they think the experts should make decisions around how to design 
stormwater systems, and that it may not be appropriate for the community to provide 
input on engineering decisions. 
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6.5 Discussion 
Efforts to plan, design, and implement radical changes to the urban form—such as 
sea level rise adaptations—are often confronted by obdurate social, economic, and 
political systems embedded in physical structures (Hommels 2005). To overcome 
obduracy in the city, institutions make knowledge claims in support of new infrastructure 
and connect with other groups to garner political backing (Hommels 2005). Cities are 
contested spaces with different economic, social, and political interests vying for space 
and resources (Heynen et al. 2006). While urban transformations require an efficacious 
political process to take hold, the way these planning efforts are carried out— and the 
knowledge that goes into making these decisions— shapes social, political, economic, 
and biophysical aspects of the city and the overall outcomes of adaptation efforts. Within 
urban transformations, such as adapting to sea level rise, the process by which dominant 
ideas take hold is ‘‘practically accomplished and politically constructed… inherently, if 
not exclusively’’ by discursive means (McGuirk, 2012, p. 260). Discourse storylines 
about risk are not only used in the political planning process promoting climate 
adaptation, but become embedded in physical designs, plans, implementation efforts, 
strategies, and technologies (Hilgartner 1992). The discourse storylines that emerge in sea 
level rise adaptation planning in Miami-Dade County characterize the current governance 
system around this issue (summarized on Table 6.3). Once integrated into new 
technologies they transform those institutions and groups encountering the new proposed 
and implemented solution (Hilgartner 1992). 
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Table 6.3 Summary of four emerging discourses within sea level rise adaptation governance in Miami-
Dade County, Florida 
 Problem Framing and 
Focus of Risk 
Interpretation  Boundary of 
Problem Framing 
Adaptation 
Strategy 
Economic 
Discourse 
 
Economic 
rationality 
 
Actors:  
Business 
interests, 
politicians 
Negative impacts to the 
economy by via 
property value, 
business, insurance, 
reducing investment, 
and blight devaluing 
property. Business and 
private property 
interests viewed as 
roadblock to adaptation, 
so framing the problem 
around economy.  
Made legible 
through formal 
industry reports (e.g. 
banking, insurance), 
government 
assessments, 
advisory panels, 
local meetings and 
events. Emphasis is 
sea level rise 
inundation and 
property values.   
Dev. short-term 
profit thinking, 
but re-frames this 
and consider 
resilient 
development to 
maintain 30-year 
mortgages and 
lower insurance 
costs (near-term). 
Primarily along 
the coast.  
Update building 
standards, urban 
design/planning
, new economy 
around 
adaptation, 
focus 
infrastructure 
adaptations to 
affluent areas to 
use future tax to 
pay for 
adaptations. 
Infrastructure 
Discourse 
 
Procedural 
rationality 
(primary); 
Econ. and Sci 
(secondary) 
 
Actors: Gov, 
private firms 
Sea level rise will 
impact already 
overstretched and aging 
infrastructure. This 
includes: stormwater 
management, canals, 
wastewater treatment, 
drinking water, 
transportation routes, 
evacuation corridors, 
government buildings 
and important sites. 
Government 
assessments, 
advisory panels, 
meetings, and 
events. Emphasis on 
physical impacts to 
infrastructure, 
maintaining levels 
of service set out in 
policies and laws, 
and political support 
and funding. 
Municipal 
boundaries around 
decision-making 
authority; 
temporal 
dimensions of sea 
level rise are 
primarily 
understood in the 
relation to how 
long infrastructure 
is designed to last.  
Calculate 
localized and 
specific impacts 
and design new 
systems that can 
withstand those 
impacts. 
Integrate sea 
level rise 
projections into 
infrastructure 
planning.  
Ecological 
Discourse 
 
Scientific 
rationality  
 
Actors: Env. 
orgs, 
scientists, 
Fed agencies  
Impacts of sea level rise 
and climate change to 
ecosystems, risks from 
infrastructure failures 
because of climate 
change, and ecological 
risks from adaptation 
strategies themselves. 
Concern with impacts 
from ocean heat and 
acidification.  
Assessments, 
scientific monitoring 
and reports, as well 
as community 
organizing around 
climate change 
mitigation.  
Geographically, 
the problem spans 
the entire region 
and far into the 
future. The 
primary emphasis 
is bound by places 
experiencing 
water quality and 
habitat loss. 
GHG emissions 
reduction, use 
the environment 
and ecological 
restoration to 
adapt to sea 
level rise, to 
protect 
infrastructure, 
water supply, 
flood risk.  
Community 
Discourse 
 
Community 
rationality  
 
Actors: 
Comm. Orgs, 
foundations 
 
People using 
infrastructure also 
matter. Risks of 
exclusion from 
planning. Distributional 
justice concerns of not 
getting resources and 
displacement. Concerns 
over extreme events 
and socio-economic 
vulnerability, not being 
able to bounce back. 
Not all the risks are 
biophysical, there 
are also social and 
economic risks 
related to climate 
gentrification. Also, 
risks to public health 
understood from 
heat impacts, sea 
level rise, and new 
diseases (e.g. Zika).  
Bound in the 
context of what is 
occurring in local 
communities and 
often temporally 
restricted to 
challenges 
communities are 
experiencing now.  
Community 
organizing and 
education to be 
included in 
planning 
activities, 
inform people 
of the issues, 
and create 
platforms for 
elevating 
voices.  
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By examining discourse storylines, it is possible to identify places where groups 
are in alignment and where tensions may emerge in a diffuse governance arena. Across 
all discourses, problem framing is tightly linked to proposed solutions. For example, 
ecological problem framings are linked with the use of ecosystem processes to mitigate 
impacts from sea level rise. Likewise, impacts to the community are matched with the 
need to educate people and create opportunities to integrate diverse voices into adaptation 
decisions. Similar patterns follow the economic and infrastructure framings. Further, the 
role of private property is brought up in all four discourses though intersects with 
problem framings and storylines in different ways. For each, private property is seen as 
an impediment to adaptation solutions and/or as a source of risk. In the ecological 
discourse, for example, private property is viewed as a barrier to implementing ecological 
adaptations such as sand dunes and mangroves. Those in the community discourse view 
the focus on risks to private property as something that excludes their interests from the 
planning process. For the economic discourse, private property is used to frame the 
problem of sea level rise, with risk shaped by property values and threats to private 
property. This has similarities with the infrastructure discourse which complicates the 
issue of private property surrounding service delivery.  
The two most closely aligned discourses are the economic and the infrastructure 
discourses. Within the economic discourse, part of the problem is framed around existing 
and ongoing high-value development within low-lying areas that are viewed as being 
vulnerable to sea level rise. Because local governments (the primary group involved in 
the Infrastructure Investments discourse), are concerned with maintaining their tax base, 
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this gives individuals within the economic discourse practical authority in the governance 
arena. There is evidence for this in that several members from the business community 
are represented on sea level rise and climate change task forces and advising groups. Of 
course, not all interests are aligned and those within the infrastructure discourse are 
responsible for addressing non-economic factors to maintain quality of life, ecological 
processes, and other goals. At the same time, people from the business community and 
others shared how businesses push back against local governments for regulations that 
create barriers to economic growth. From the infrastructure discourse, the emphasis on 
risks to infrastructure and the link between infrastructure and tax-dollars creates a further 
justification to engage with the business community. In addition, both the business and 
the infrastructure groups view risks from sea level rise from a highly biophysical and 
engineered perspective, framed in the context of risks to property value and insurance 
rates. This framing places the focus of sea level rise solutions on engineered, technical 
solutions while avoiding challenges around land use and social and environmental 
impacts from those solutions—including new, resilient urban development. Local 
governments primarily emphasize infrastructure to stabilize the risks of sea level rise and 
ensure ongoing investments and insurance stabilization in the region. This emphasis 
placed on infrastructure creates a knowledge arena that favors engineered, technical 
knowledge and solutions and serves as a barrier to other interests, primarily ecological 
and community based.  
Within the ecological discourse, there is some alignment with the economic and 
infrastructure discourses in that many evoke the role of the environment in protecting the 
economy and built environment. Some ecologically based activities, for example beach 
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re-nourishment, demonstrate this link. While beach re-nourishment comes out of 
infrastructure protection, many from the ecological discourse pointed to it as a “win-win” 
solution, that it is good for the environment, infrastructure, and economy. At the same 
time, economic and infrastructure impacts to the environment are viewed in tension. 
Longer term and more complex impacts of climate change and sea level rise are 
connected to calls for retreat and greenhouse gas emissions reduction.  
There is also some overlap between the ecological discourse and the community 
discourse. Both discourses frame part of the problem around the emphasis placed on 
economic growth in the region at the expense of their interests. There has been some 
alignment around calls for greenhouse gas emissions reduction and community 
organizing around improvements to the local environment. At the same time, these 
discourses are largely distinct with the environmental discourse focused primarily on 
“traditional” ecological concerns such as Everglades and Biscayne Bay restoration 
activities and the community discourse emphasizing hyper local and contextual 
experiences.  
The four discourse storylines around sea level rise adaptation governance that 
emerged out of Miami-Dade County, Florida share commonality with other studies and 
work on discourses around the environment. In terms of the tensions among the different 
groups, this case study demonstrates how those are linked to different forms of rationality 
and power dynamics (Hajer 1995; Fischer 2000; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Dryzek 
2013; Taylor et al. 2014). Although conflicts between competing discourses will 
happen—different sides of a conflict interpret the issues at hand in different ways and the 
way an issue is dealt with depends partly on the balance of competing discourses (Dryzek 
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2013). Within Miami-Dade County, the economic and infrastructure discourses are 
primarily aligned with the most decision-making authority and power around adaptation 
strategies. The infrastructure and economic discourses embody power which can advance 
economic and growth interests while suppressing others (Foucault 1980). This is not 
surprising given the privileged position of business in city planning because of tax 
revenue (Lindblom 1978) and urban growth machine politics (Logan and Molotch 1976).  
In considering the economic discourse, problem framings are born out of the 
inevitability of financial impacts and the political inertia created by the business 
community. This problem framing shapes much of the emphasis around planning 
activities that support economic growth, reframing the issue around creating economic 
opportunity. While climate adaptation studies have pointed to the way in which risks 
from climate change are often understood in economic terms (Adger et al. 2005), it is 
more complex than that. In Miami-Dade County, these risks to the economic core relate 
to a view that they are also an opportunity to reshape the economy around an adaptation 
and resilient development economy. Echoing calls for ecological modernization, in which 
the economy is reshaped to support the environment (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006), 
business leaders and politicians that evoke the economic discourse storyline in Miami-
Dade County emphasize opportunity in the context of economic risks. Like critics of 
ecological modernization theories, critics of this framing in Miami-Dade County point 
out the contradiction: that the same economic rationality used to justify adaptation 
planning is also creating the economic problem (Dryzek 2013). Critics of this logic point 
to the ways in which ongoing development in the region—no matter if striving for 
resilience from sea level rise—will continue to grow economic risks.  
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Local governments that primarily emphasize the infrastructure discourse latch 
onto the economic framing to overcome political inertia and advance future growth in the 
region. Within both discourses, large-scale retreat is not considered a viable option, and 
local governments emphasize infrastructure to adapt the physical landscape to protect and 
encourage economic investment. The combination of the emphasis on infrastructure and 
the economy offers problem and solution framing to support ongoing growth in the 
region. While this tactic is focused on maintaining community function in the region, the 
primary underlying objective seems to be either in protecting assets from physical 
impacts or from changes and risks of the insurance industry. The emphasis on having 
formal assessments to base planning choices on are situated in procedural, economic and 
certain scientific rationalities, leaving out and conflicting with community-based 
interests. At the same time, the science used for infrastructure decisions often ignores 
ecological science and debates in longer-term and more climate change complex impacts 
on the environment. The divergence of these discourses is not perhaps surprising. In other 
regions, pro-growth discourses have been shown to run in opposition of adaptation 
planning and greenhouse gas emissions reduction. For example, Taylor et al. (2014) 
examine the tensions between urban growth and climate adaptation discourses in 
Queensland, Australia with pro-growth largely in conflict with GHG emissions reduction 
and adaptation. The shift away from greenhouse gas emissions reduction and towards the 
economy around adaptation is connecting what may otherwise be divergent discourses in 
Miami-Dade County. However, the emerging discourses around the economy and 
infrastructure shut out some discussions of retreat and greenhouse gas emissions—and 
science used to inform those arguments—in favor of a pro-growth future.  
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The tendency for economic and procedural rationalities to be tied to formal and 
contextual forms of power and authority within institutional arrangements governing the 
urban environment is being re-produced in the context of sea level rise adaptation 
planning. While such linkages have a long history in planning theory and practice, the 
threat of sea level rise is primarily viewed as a highly expensive and engineering 
challenge, places more emphasis on those rationalities. What this case study suggests, is 
that although there are calls for integrative approaches that consider social and ecological 
risk factors within the governance arena, these occur on the margins. Community groups 
expressed feelings of being left out of planning processes and not having their interests 
represented or discussed. Part of this is because of the view that sea level rise threats are 
largely economic and physical, it seems to those that subscribe to these dominant 
discourses believe that there is little need for attention to other interests. Interests within 
the ecological and people-centric discourses are often infringed upon and go 
unconsidered by the dominant narratives around problem and solution framing.  
While the divergent storylines and interests create numerous planning challenges, 
this case study also points to actors and activities that strive for more integration. These 
places of integration represent seeds for where more communicative rationality efforts 
can start to lead the way and help address many of the challenges discussed above. A 
collaborative process can be communicatively rational “To the extent that all the affected 
interests jointly engage in face-to-face dialogue, bringing their various perspectives to the 
table to deliberate on the problems they face together… all participants must also be fully 
informed and able to express their views and be listened to, whether they are powerful or 
not. Techniques must be used to mutually assure the legitimacy, comprehensibility, 
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sincerity, and accuracy of what they say. Nothing can be left off the table. They have to 
seek consensus.” (Innes and Booher 2010, p. 6). Based on ideas from Habermas (1984) 
and Dewey (1927) and brought into the planning field by Healey (1997) and Forester 
(1999), collaborative processes designed to generate collaborative rationality can produce 
effective options for how actors can move forward together, and allow for collective 
learning that will help make communities more adaptive and resilient (Innes and Booher 
2010). In the Miami-Dade County case study, the 100 Resilient Cities initiative, 
community outreach and involvement practices by local organizations, and the Compact 
have certain elements that offer possible direction for collaborative planning. For 
example, each of these initiatives is bringing diverse interests and people into the 
planning process and opening the conversation around sea level rise to other perspectives 
and problem framings. While some of the divergent interests have yet to be formally 
addressed in planning processes, the connections being made are bringing stakeholders 
that had been left out of sea level rise into the planning process.  
Design charrettes and activities looking at neighborhood scale have begun to 
build these connections. The Compact has played a large role in supporting these efforts 
which bring together universities, governments, scientists, and stakeholders for short, 
design charrettes to look at a small area. This type of work could be expanded and 
formalized by local governments. Broader public engagement efforts are needed around 
resilient community design activities. Because existing efforts have tended to be on 
shorter planning timelines, they have been limited in public engagement.  
Within Miami-Dade County, building off the existing collaborative approaches 
could move the region into a more communicative approach. One mechanism would be 
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to adjust the role of the Resiliency Officers, supporting the 100 Resilient Cities Planning 
Effort, from one that is primarily internally focused as cross bureau relationship 
managers to a position that incorporates communicative planning. Resilience Officers 
could work integrate communicative planning process into all dimensions of 
infrastructure and planning choices by creating education and outreach materials, 
establishing community advisory committees, and creating an equity and justice division 
to provide oversight. There is currently a lack of community dialogue being integrated 
into infrastructure adaptation planning decisions. Establishing the role of Resilience 
Officers as one that expands public engagement around cross-bureau planning activities 
could help address this issue.  
These cross-sector efforts show early signs of groups working together to find 
more holistic and joint problem framings around the risks of sea level rise. Another 
potential mechanism to integrate a more communicative approach could be to use joint 
fact finding to frame the problem of sea level rise (Susskind et al 1999; Innes and Booher 
2010). The approach connects diverse stakeholders to the process of identifying risks and 
creating and using different forms of knowledge to frame problems and solutions (Innes 
and Booher 2010). In Miami, this could occur with community derived baselines of 
acceptable risks that currently exist outside of mainstream activities and instead be 
integrated into existing assessment processes. This practice can be a powerful tool where 
even if the outcome was not what the group predicted, they may still be happy with the 
decision that was made. For example, Inness and Booher (2010) point to a case in which 
stakeholders brought together by the CALFED Bay-Delta Program agreed to close off 
one channel to allow more flow into the delta in fear of drought conditions. All the 
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participants agreed, including the Los Angeles Metropolitan Water District, which was 
significantly harmed by the decision. These participants testified that though the result 
was unsatisfactory, and there was a mistake in judgement (the drought did not occur) that 
the decision was right. Collaborative approaches can help uncover issues of dubious 
findings, opens-up assumptions, identifies biases, and dismisses unsupported claims and 
ultimately, the “truth” is whatever the group agrees upon (Innes and Booher 2010). More 
participatory activities around different infrastructure projects could produce similar 
results in Miami. This would require a restructuring of the way infrastructure is assessed 
and planned for from one that is predominately expert driven towards a process that is 
more open and engaged with the broader community. Efforts by the City of Miami Beach 
to provide public information surrounding adaptation planning are a good start, but more 
mechanisms for public engagement and integrating diverse perspectives would help the 
city and the region overcome some of the current conflicts and challenges.    
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter used an institutional discourse approach to examine sea level rise 
adaptation governance in Miami-Dade County. Within Miami-Dade County, there are 
several governmental and non-governmental institutions involved with sea level rise 
adaptation planning, and these activities take place across a variety of adaptation 
strategies. The four emerging discourses—around the economy, infrastructure, 
environment, and community—mirror other findings around discourses related to 
environmental changes and risks. The economic and infrastructure discourses are at the 
core of adaptation governance while discourses around the environment and communities 
exist on the periphery. Though the case study shows that the region has yet to achieve 
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integrative approaches across divergent discourses, these institutions and the governance 
arrangements are not static. The case study also demonstrates that some activities and 
individuals are actively working to address these issues. It is in those activities where 
communicative approaches may expand and integrate broader aspects of the system.  
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Chapter 7 Miami-Dade Case Study Conclusions, Theoretical and Planning 
Contributions, and Recommendations 
Some people are very gloom and doom, but that's also sort of by necessity, 
because we don't really know what to do about it. There isn't one easy 
silver bullet that's going to fix it like, “If we just paid for this thing it 
would fix everything.” The geology here is very difficult, we have so 
much infrastructure along the water, and we have a state that won't talk 
about climate change. We have cities and counties that are relatively 
recently talking about this as an issue, and we don't have great plans.  
-Environmental Organizer in Miami-Dade County, Fl 
7.1 Summary of Findings from Miami-Dade County, Florida  
In Miami-Dade County risk construction around sea level rise generally follows a 
hazards assessment approach. Local governments, scientists, and other institutions 
seeking knowledge about the risks from sea level rise emphasize reducing uncertainty 
around rates and projections and how that will interact with the local landscape and 
hydrogeologic conditions. The process of determining what risks to select is a negotiated 
and contested political process underscored by climate change denialism, scientific 
reticence around ice melt acceleration, and political uncertainty as to how people would 
react to higher projections. The need for a narrow range of sea level rise projections 
comes from local governments requiring specific numbers to design and implement 
adaptation planning activities. Part of the desire for local governments to strategically 
identify solutions is in response to the scientific uncertainties and tendency of some 
people to be very “doom and gloom” as described in the quote from an environmental 
organizer at the beginning of this chapter. Local governments strive to create hope and 
present a future for people in Miami. To do so, they promote risk knowledge that can 
allow them to present a secure future for people in the region. At the same time, 
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knowledge suppression practices may also present minimized risks to the landscape to 
continue allowing economic growth in the region.  
Considering sea level rise adaptation governance, there are several governmental 
and non-governmental institutions involved with sea level rise adaptation planning, and 
these activities take place across a variety of adaptation strategies. These diverse groups 
frame the risks of sea level rise around four emerging discourses—focused on the 
economy, infrastructure, environment, and community. Economic and infrastructure 
discourses are at the core of adaptation governance while discourses around the 
environment and community exist on the periphery. This privileged framing connects 
with risk construction and knowledge practices around risk.  
In linking the findings from Chapters 5 and 6, narrative discourse storylines that 
frame risks from sea level rise in the context of the current and future economy and 
infrastructure closes-down knowledge production practices and serves to limit diverse 
knowledge integration around risks. The self-fulfilling process that frames risks from sea 
level rise as a threat to the future of Miami’s economy places much of the emphasis on 
knowledge practices and identifying solutions to minimize risks to the economy. While 
the case study shows that the region has yet to achieve integrative approaches across 
divergent discourses, it also demonstrates some activities that are currently trying to 
address the lack of integration. It is in those activities where communicative approaches 
may expand and integrate broader aspects of the system. 
7.2 Situating Case Study Findings in Risk and Planning Theory and Practice 
 Within environmental planning, theorists examine the way in which institutions 
understand risk and how diverse understandings can lead to conflicts, barriers to 
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implementation, and uneven benefits and harms (Beck 1992; Fischer 2000; Bocking 
2004). This work has been applied in several different planning contexts. When applied 
to environmental toxicants, for example, local communities, environmental organizations, 
and other affected parties are often less willing to accept government and industry 
standards for “safe” levels of exposure, advocating instead for stricter regulations and 
“cleaner” environments (Fischer 2000). Standards around allowable levels of 
contaminants in the environment that favor economic interests over community interests 
can result in community pushback in the form of protests and lawsuits at best, and public 
health crises at worst. Risk literature on hazards shows how risks are disproportionately 
distributed across the landscape, often with low-income and historically marginalized 
communities exposed to more hazards (Wisner et al. 2014). What these and other studies 
point to is that although there are multiple ways to understand and come to “know” risks, 
the planning arena often prioritizes risks that are understood through a top-down 
government driven process that favors some knowledge over other knowledge. Part of 
this is based on the role of uncertainty, and the drive for governments to present certainty 
and confidence in their ability to manage risks (Innes and Booher 2010). The desire to 
represent risks as measured and manageable is wrapped up in the need to establish trust 
and confidence among the public (Beck 1992). At the same time, however, such top top-
down knowledge practices are often disconnected with other ways of understanding risk, 
and the desire for certainty in a complex and uncertain world can backfire. This can occur 
through community pushback, distrust, and with the reproduction of social inequities 
through risk management. Because of these challenges, risk theorists regularly call for 
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integrative approaches to incorporate social and cultural components into the production 
of risk knowledge, prioritization, and planning (Wisner et al. 2014). 
From knowledge systems literature, we know that either intentionally or 
unintentionally ignoring different forms of knowledge—especially around risks—can 
result in barriers to risk knowledge integration and disproportionate planning outcomes 
that favor some communities over others (Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 2018). The Miami-
Dade County case study on sea level rise adaptation planning points to similar processes 
around risk. At the same time, however, institutions governing risk are not static and even 
if limited, risk knowledge is leaning towards more integration going forward.  
 Applying risk construction and knowledge integration to the context of climate 
change adaptation planning expands theories and practice around risk in key ways. While 
the risk literature often focuses on a hyper local scale, risks from climate change are 
understood at a global scale and are dependent on models compiled from local scale data 
sets (Edwards 2001). There is also a temporal mismatch on how risks from climate 
change are understood, in that risks that are understood as possibly occurring in the future 
are measured, prioritized and planned for now. These future risks also shape present day 
discourses around how the problem is framed, understood, and different solutions for 
addressing those risks. Projecting climate into the future and at global scales has several 
uncertainties that are debated, politicized, and lead to additional scientific research to 
reduce those uncertainties (Edwards 2001).  
Although the global and temporal distinctions surrounding climate change risks 
create new risk construction challenges, there are several components of climate change 
adaptation planning that are like other risk construction and planning contexts. Primarily, 
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global and temporal constructions of climate risks are interpreted and adopted at regional 
and local scales (Adger et al. 2005). Such localized processes mirror other risk practices 
in which global, scientific knowledge (i.e. around contaminants, technologies, hazards) 
are debated and brought to bear in local settings. Like these other risks, knowledge about 
the biophysical hazards of sea level rise are constructed and then converted into risks by 
governments and non-governmental institutions in the way that those hazards are 
understood to intersect with social, ecological, and technological systems (Adger et al. 
2005). The centrality of both decision-making authority and knowledge production 
practices around risks echo Muñoz-Erickson’s (2014) findings on knowledge practices 
around land use in San Juan Puerto Rico. Like Muñoz-Erickson’s (2014) findings, in 
Miami-Dade County, institutions that dominate knowledge about risks from sea level rise 
also make most of the decisions. This suggests that a lot of what we know about risks 
from sea level rise are filtered by values of actors controlling adaptation resources 
(Muñoz -Erickson 2014). At the same time, from the experience of Miami-Dade County 
identifying, prioritizing, and planning for risks from sea level rise, we see that risk 
knowledge is also contested. It is through the different contestations that we see how 
future and current uncertainties around sea level rise risks create a planning arena in 
which risks are open to social construction (Beck 1992). The local governments’ 
perception for a need to identify tangible risks and to mitigate these risks creates problem 
closure around risk construction rooted in biophysical and economic framings (Hajer 
1995). The question then becomes how to situate these findings in the context of risk and 
planning theory and practice, how this links back to the problem of planning for sea level 
rise adaptation, and what actions can be taken to address these issues.  
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The case study on knowledge practices and sea level rise adaptation governance 
in Miami-Dade County contributes to the theoretical and planning literature around risk 
knowledge production and governance in three important ways: 1) Risk knowledge about 
sea level rise is constructed and prioritized in a primarily top-down approach; 2) This 
construction of knowledge for action is created in political, social, and economic contexts 
and shaped by the idea of taking action and what is possible to manage; and 3) The way 
in which risk knowledge is constructed, favoring certain political and economic values 
over other values on the landscape, creates a planning arena in which the “facts” are 
already stacked against groups representing other interests.  
First, risk knowledge constructed and prioritized in a primarily top-down 
approach produces knowledge that is situated in plans connected to drive action. Risk is a 
concept that is fundamentally connected to uncertainty. If societies knew the exact 
outcomes of a situation or decision, there would be no risk because they would have 
perfect information of how to act to mitigate that risk. Climate change risks are 
understood in different ways and shaped by different knowledge practices and epistemic 
choices that can drastically change their significance, level of uncertainty, and magnitude 
of the outcome. While the exact rates and impacts of sea level rise can never be known, 
institutions create knowledge around what they think those impacts might be, and this 
knowledge is shaped by institutional positionality as well as interactions with outside 
pressure and knowledge acting on those institutions. This process in Miami-Dade County 
continues to unfold as a system of complex relationships and forms of knowledge and is 
bound by codified institutional arrangements and power structures.   
 
209 
 
Risk knowledge that falls outside of what can systematically be planned for is 
ignored in dominant problem framings, planning documents, and formal public forum. In 
the early 2000s, knowledge of impacts from climate change began to reach the 
mainstream media and concerns over sea level rise placed Florida—a very low-lying 
state—at the center of these narratives. Former Vice President Al Gore and others were 
discussing the vulnerability of South Florida and cities within Miami-Dade County early 
in this process. Locally, geologists, other scientists, and environmental groups mobilized 
around climate change and sea level rise impacts. At the same time, king tides, rain 
events, and the threat of storm surges put pressure on local governments to address 
flooding issues. Local governments in Miami-Dade County began to pay attention to 
issues of sea level rise and wanted to “get ahead of the issue” to change the global 
narrative of doom and gloom. In the mid and late aughts, local governments began 
assembling committees, task forces, and adopting ordinances for how to understand and 
address these issues. This organization was partially in response to the global narratives 
of the insurmountable risks that cities within Miami-Dade County would suffer including 
destruction and economic loss if they took no action to adapt.    
Based on this risk of economic loss via changes to the insurance and reinsurance 
industries, flooding, and loss of investments, local governments have been the primary 
focus for actions deemed necessary to change the global narrative around destruction, 
towards a narrative of continued growth. To do so, knowledge about risks were shaped in 
a way commensurate with the ability to act and systematically identify risks and plan to 
mitigate those risks. To control the narrative around action, risk knowledge about sea 
level rise has been and continues to be constructed and prioritized in a primarily top-
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down, technocratic approach. This produces knowledge that is situated in plans 
connected to drive action. Because much of the knowledge about sea level rise risks 
comes from technocratic planning activities by local governments, that knowledge is 
primarily constructed in relation to priorities and actions of local government. The 
emphasis on infrastructure, building codes, and insurance are rooted in a system that 
prioritizes the primary roles and responsibilities of local government.  
By understanding risks via what institutions governing risk care about, we also 
see that the risk knowledge is shaped by the constraints around what can be done to 
mitigate those risks. Within Miami-Dade County, we see this in that most of planning 
activities that are designed for no more than 30 years—or 2 feet of sea level rise—into 
the future. The idea that planning for any more than that would “kill the economy,” as 
several planners shared. Knowledge suppression practices around the hydrogeologic 
connections between groundwater, surface water, and broader impacts from climate 
change take place to minimize risks on the landscape. This is in part because 
acknowledging these impacts would render future land use planning as currently 
envisioned impossible, since more of the region would be deemed undevelopable. Risk 
knowledge that falls outside of what can systematically be planned for is also ignored in 
dominant problem framings, planning documents, and formal public forum.  
While this case study also points to places of intervention, where individuals 
acting within the system are seeking more integrative approaches, the present trajectory 
around knowledge production practices around risk suggest that these attempts will 
continue to fall short. This is because most of these strategies to integrate diverse 
perspectives take place following the knowledge production process, and this risk 
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knowledge already embeds values that may not align and may run counter to other 
interests on the landscape. The way in which risk knowledge is constructed, favoring 
certain political and economic values over other values on the landscape, creates a 
planning arena in which the “facts” are already stacked against groups representing other 
interests. Drawing on recent knowledge systems work by Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 
(2018), collaborative planning work of Innes and Booher (2010), and others, for regions 
to integrate diverse constructions of risk, they must pay attention to the design of their 
knowledge system and integrate more stakeholders into the planning process. 
7.3 Strategies to Address Risk Ambiguity Challenges in Climate Change Adaptation 
Planning 
 While it is often thought that planning is about linking knowledge and action 
(Friedmann 1987; Innes and Booher 2010), we now extend this to question the nature of 
that knowledge and its purpose for action (Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 2018). The quality 
of knowledge reflects the process of how knowledge was made (Miller and Muñoz-
Erickson 2018) and who participated in the production of that knowledge (Innes and 
Booher 2010). Unfortunately, institutions often lack a clear understanding of how their 
knowledge is constructed and based on the organization’s own values, routines, 
assumptions and other factors which can be both explicit and hidden (Miller and Muñoz-
Erickson 2018). The different ways in which institutions construct risk knowledge can 
create ambiguity emerging out of different problem framings and ways to understand the 
problem. Overall, reflexivity, or self-confrontation and self-reflection, provides an 
opportunity to change this practice. The call for reflexivity in the biophysical and social 
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sciences urges scientists to examine how the knowledge they produce, and the methods 
used to produce it, are influenced by political, historical, cultural and social processes 
(Harding 1987; Boström et al. 2017). Interest in reflexivity emerged from concern about 
how “truth claims” serve particular political and private interests. More recently, scholars 
have extended the call for reflexivity to environmental governance (Dryzek and Pickering 
2017), to examine the politics of knowledge, public discourse, and institutions to improve 
policy outcomes. Others have begun to develop models for institutionalized reflexivity 
where environmental institutions develop mechanisms for examining their own political 
commitments, constraints and assumptions, opening these issues to public debate 
(Boström et al. 2017).  
I echo the call for reflexivity to the practice of identifying and planning for risks 
from impacts and climate change. While some of the knowledge practices within Miami-
Dade County point to the overshadowing of diverse representations of risk in framing the 
problem and identifying solutions, there are also actors working towards knowledge 
integration. In this vein, I use the findings from Miami-Dade County—both the 
challenges and the opportunities—to offer recommendations to create more integrated 
ways for regions to assess and manage risks from climate change, overcoming challenges 
related to risk ambiguity.  
Train experts in areas outside of their disciplinary boundaries 
Part of the challenge around risk knowledge integration in Miami-Dade County 
are the epistemological conditions surrounding expertise. Within sea level rise adaptation 
planning, it is often engineering expertise that is relied upon for decision-making. This 
expert knowledge has epistemic rules that influence the construction of risk knowledge. 
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In Miami-Dade County, for example, engineers and experts producing most of the 
knowledge about risks are not necessarily trained to account for social and ecological 
system components. Several shared that the risks are primarily physical and saw 
engineering analysis and solutions as being equal across socio-economic conditions. This 
problem is not unique to sea level rise risks, but other work points to epistemic challenges 
around how risks are measured, and experts having certain rules of their field (Miller and 
Muñoz-Erickson 2018). Because this problem is ubiquitous across different types of 
risks, scholars have begun to identify ways to shift the epistemic rules guiding expert 
disciplines. For example, Jack Ahern (2011) presents an argument to change engineers 
thinking from “fail safe” to “safe to fail” to incorporate ecological processes and dynamic 
natures into engineered systems. Engineers often place the emphasis on over designing 
systems so that they will not fail, similar to the findings in Chapter 6 around policies that 
emphasize “hard” infrastructure. While fail safe designs are important in many contexts, 
natural systems are dynamic and impacts from climate change introduce additional 
uncertainty into the system. In response, the call to transition thinking to “safe to fail” 
introduces more flexibility into engineering epistemic views (Ahern 2011), similar to the 
calls for flexible infrastructure in Chapter 6. This is only one example, experts that 
represent the dominant knowledge framings around risk can be trained outside of their 
disciplinary boundaries to reframe the epistemic conditions which guide those knowledge 
practices. This can occur with climate scientists working with philosophers, engineers 
intersecting with social scientists, and other forms of disciplinary integration.  
Create multi-faceted risk assessments 
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Most of the formal risk assessments used in Miami-Dade County emphasize 
economic and infrastructure risks, including property value, stormwater infrastructure, 
and transportation infrastructure. There is a critical need to expand this to integrate social 
and ecological risks into core municipal government planning assessments. A goal for 
regions undergoing adaptations to climate change should be to create multi-faceted risk 
assessments. While these currently exist on the fringe in Miami-Dade County, local 
governments have most of the decision-making authority over how to prioritize actions 
and they rely on risk assessments that ignore social and ecological components. Recent 
advances in hazards literature incorporates social dimensions of hazards (e.g. Solecki et 
a. 2011; Wisener et al. 2014), which can include different socio-economic characteristics 
such as income level, number of minorities, different health indicators, and other 
characteristics that relate to social vulnerability (Solecki et al. 2011; Wisener et al. 2014).  
Integrate an equity lens into planning 
Local governments could conduct assessments that relate to those who are the 
most socio-economically vulnerable and address some of the concerns and questions 
raised by community organizations. For example, rather than only examining the impacts 
on changes to the insurance industry, local governments could conduct assessments of 
how those who do not carry flood insurance will be affected. Another concern that could 
be assessed includes climate displacement due to inhospitable living conditions and 
adaptation policies. In addition to conducting a formal assessment of this issue, local 
government could track where people are being displaced to and the risks that surround 
their new location. Researchers are integrating these kinds of approaches, called co-
production of science and actionable science (Vogel et al. 2016; Kjellström et al. 2016; 
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Beier et al. 2017). While this has largely focused on better establishing relationships 
between scientists and managers, this field is expanding to incorporate broader 
stakeholders in the production of science that can be directly used in decision-making 
(Innes and Booher 2010; Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 2018). There are many ways local 
government could use these approaches to create integrated risk assessments or 
assessments for interests currently on the fringe. For example, during the CLEO 
Institute’s listening sessions, communities highlight issues of pressing concern. Local 
governments and researchers could build assessments framed by these concerns, putting 
resources to answering and solving problems that matter to the community. The climate 
gentrification map that came out of a Florida International University professor attending 
a listening session is a good example of knowledge co-production. Local governments 
better connected to decision-making and resources could work with the existing 
community organizing efforts and relationships to allocate funding for assessments that 
seek to understand risk from diverse perspectives, including assessments framed by the 
community. This can also be paired with more participation in risk evaluation and setting 
baselines for management.    
Broaden adaptation measures with plausible scenarios approach and incremental 
planning 
Risk theorists argue for increased participation in decision-making that surround 
knowledge production and governance of risk (Beck 1992; Fischer 2000), applied to 
climate change adaptation planning this means broader participation in risk evaluation 
and setting baselines. Within Miami-Dade County, most of the decisions surrounding 
how to measure, assess, and prioritize risks take place in a closed off arena of experts and 
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decision makers. This process has served to limit broad representation and integration of 
risks. In addition to ecological and social risks existing largely on the periphery, planned 
retreat is primarily ignored. This is in part due to current accepted baselines and risk 
framings demonstrating the possibility of continued growth. However, many scientists 
and even some planners argue that these baselines are a minimum and that actual sea 
level rise rates and impacts will be far greater.  
Incorporating broader participation into decisions surrounding baselines and risk 
evaluation would enable civic dialogue and engagement around risk (Beck 1992; Fischer 
2000). There is very little information regarding public perspective on rates of sea level 
rise, because the regionally adopted government projections are assumed to be the “real” 
rates from which peoples’ perspectives are measured against. These “real” rates could 
either be wrong, or as many scientists suggest in the case study, should be taken as a 
minimum. This suggests that broader adaptation measures should be taken to capture 
more plausible futures, or futures that wider stakeholder groups view as plausible, 
including the upper boundaries of the risk.  
Presenting upper boundaries of the risk for planning can have its own challenges 
because addressing large scale change is difficult in any planning context. One approach 
to include the upper boundary of the risks would be through looking at incremental 
changes overtime using plausible scenarios that look at several planning horizons. 
Broader participation in decisions surrounding what different incremental planning 
horizons to include along with the upper boundaries of the risk would help the region 
identify incremental planning solutions to address issues at different stages. A plausible 
futures scenarios approach with different temporal increments of potential change can 
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engage communities to consider ways to address the issue of uncertainty around different 
climate futures at different planning horizons (both short term and long term) in the 
future. This would entail planners to open-up the climate projections they have currently 
selected when they engage with diverse stakeholders. Rather than assume the regionally 
adopted sea level rise projections, stakeholders could engage in planning activities to 
examine impacts from a range of possible climate scenarios to determine different 
adaptation responses.  
Identify visions for post environmental disaster 
Current knowledge practices that close off debates around baselines and 
projections allow local governments to present a vision for the future of Miami that 
allows continued resilience, growth and prosperity. While not mal intended, this framing 
potentially minimizes the current risks and given more knowledge on the topic and more 
ability to influence decisions, civic epistemologies may or may not change this 
perception (Miller 2008). The intentions of local governments to present an optimistic 
future are important, but optimism and retreat do not run counter to each other as local 
governments project. Though decisions about community and individual retreat are 
highly political and deeply personal, there are examples of voluntary retreat programs 
following Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey. In Miami-Dade County, 
discussions of retreat are shut out of local government, though interviewees from federal 
government agencies brought up the need for the region to begin this conversation. There 
are multiple ways to look at retreat. Retreat can symbolize the death of community or the 
death of place or, it can allow for risk avoidance (financial, personal, and human life). 
This is an area where post disaster recovery planning can be beneficial (Berke and 
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Campanella 2006). Public engagement practices that address community values, politics, 
and what visions people have for their communities post environmental disaster offer a 
way to build conversation around regional goals for a longer-term vision of the 
community (Berke and Campanella 2006). Within Miami-Dade County, this could allow 
for opening-up the conversation around planned retreat rather than economic disaster 
forcing retreat.  
Reframing the issue to broaden scope and create more public involvement 
In Miami-Dade County, current modes of public involvement in adaptation 
planning center on climate change and sea level rise focused advisory panels, which the 
City of Miami Beach and the City of Miami both currently have, and Miami-Dade 
County had in the past. Within this planning context, the focus is primarily on sea level 
rise, with less engagement in broader climate change issues including heat waves, 
changes to hurricane patterns, other climate stressors, and mitigation. Several individuals 
from the ecological and community discourses expressed these limitations and shared 
that they want to see the planning issues broaden to include more aspects of climate 
change. This would expand the planning conversation around different risks—not just sea 
level rise risks—and also to different solutions, including more mitigation and solutions 
that address these additional risks. Mitigation was framed by many in the environmental 
discourse as a necessary part of adaptation to slow-down and limit the problem of sea 
level rise.  
In addition, a re-framing around resilience currently underway via the 100 
Resilient Cities initiative is one approach to broadening the scope to create a more 
inclusive dialogue. The planning efforts that are framed as sea level rise adaptation 
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planning are primarily expert driven and limit public involvement. Perhaps a re-framing 
of sea level rise adaptation planning to the context of reducing harm to communities 
could help broaden scope (e.g. to include crime, safety, hurricanes, heat, etc.) and 
increase participation. Additionally, while the Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact (Compact) provides easy online access to planning assessments and 
documents, several planning activities remain out of public view. For example, while the 
county provides access to generalized risk assessments, publicly accessible information 
around stormwater infrastructure and decisions regarding how stormwater projects are 
prioritized is lacking. Interviewees from outside of government expressed frustration with 
not having information regarding stormwater planning in Miami-Dade County. Similar 
frustration occurred among City of Miami Beach residents as adaptation projects were 
implemented. When newly installed stormwater pumps failed and flooded a local 
business, residents and business owners began to demand more transparency around 
planning. This resulted in the City of Miami Beach hosting open houses about project 
development. This activity helps address issues of transparency but at the same time is 
primarily a one-way flow of information. Reframing these infrastructure adaptation 
planning activities around reducing harm to communities could open up this planning 
process from expert-driven towards broader inclusion.  
Increase transparency and actively solicit input from groups 
Other approaches to increase transparency and public involvement would be to 
require community engagement strategies be developed for each plan, have community 
advisory panels for different infrastructure planning divisions, and have an environmental 
justice and service equity division. The Seattle Public Utilities in Seattle, Washington, for 
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example, uses these tools to both create more transparency in their infrastructure planning 
activities and increase public involvement in decision-making. Within Miami-Dade 
County, local governments could provide information that emphasizes how infrastructure 
and flood management decisions are assessed and create direct pathways for 
involvement. The budgetary oversight committee being established for the Miami 
Forever Bond is a good place to start. It is also possible to imagine a service equity 
oversight committee reviewing codes for project selection criteria and propose criteria 
around environmental justice and equity. Within Miami-Dade County, the Resilience 
Officers primarily focus on building connections across sectors of government to work 
towards creative resiliency planning. Their role could be expanded to also promote 
transparency and public engagement in all infrastructure planning decisions. In this way, 
they could help serve as a boundary organization or integrate existing boundary 
organizations between infrastructure, environmental and social justice communities. They 
could be engaged in organizing and institutionalizing oversight committees across 
multiple layers of municipal planning and representing multiple interests. A formalized 
climate justice committee could review planning related to climate change adaptation, 
including changes to zoning that may lead to displacement. This would move position of 
the planner from internally facing to outward facing and a turn towards a more 
communicative approach to resilience planning.  
Reflexivity in climate adaptation planning 
While much of the risk knowledge and governance practices come out of an 
expert and decision-maker space focused on infrastructure and the economy, there are 
elements of the current planning process that bend towards more integration. This is 
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evident in the Resilient Cities initiative, activities of the Compact, and community 
organizations seeking to incorporate broader groups through education and organizing. 
Expanding these communicative processes to more aspects of sea level rise adaptation 
planning can serve as a point of reflection for planners embedded in the process. For 
example, a communicative process around stormwater adaptation planning could expand 
knowledge practices from just favoring scientific-technical knowledge, to one that 
recognizes multiple types of knowledge and the values embedded within them. Climate 
adaptation planners can build more reflexivity in the planning process by examining 
knowledge biases in current decision-making frameworks, identifying how diverse public 
views are integrated into planning decisions, and assessing modes of participation and 
ensuring that everyone has a seat at the table for all adaptation planning activities. These 
reflexive practices must extend beyond the communicative approaches and towards 
activities governing decisions around infrastructure, a predominantly expert and decision-
maker space. Opening-up these predominantly technocratic planning spaces towards a 
reflexive and communicative approach can foster trust and create shared meaning and 
problem framing around risks from sea level rise.  
7.4 Conclusion 
On October 22, 2018, WLRN Public Radio and Television in Miami hosted a sea 
level rise adaptation expert panel to share their perspectives and where they view the 
region headed. The four panel members each represented the following categories, 
closely aligned with the discourses identified in this dissertation: an environmentalist, a 
community activist, a local developer, and a government planner. As if it were 
choreographed, each spoke of the problem in relation to what they prioritize and value on 
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the landscape. The environmentalist emphasized the need for carbon reduction and 
possible planned retreat, while the community organizer discussed the impacts to low-
income communities and the responsibility of others to support those who cannot afford 
to adapt. The developer discussed innovative building solutions and the need to secure 
investments in economic hot spots and high tax base areas. Finally, the planner 
recognized the importance of all these issues but emphasized adapting infrastructure to 
secure investment. This was explained as a necessary first step to stabilize the situation 
and attract external investments to be able to afford the necessary adaptations that would 
be needed. While this planner kept coming back to acknowledging the variety of ways 
people are impacted, this planner is also confronted by the risk of major physical impacts 
on municipal infrastructure, and the obligation to provide services to citizens. Such short-
term planning, addressing the immediate needs for infrastructure and investment, cannot 
preclude the region from finding more integrated solutions. Although the current 
planning trajectory around risk appears to leave people out, the region can build off the 
existing communicative strategies to create a more integrated planning future for the 
region.  
While this chapter offers a conclusion and recommendations for the Miami-Dade 
County case study, the following Chapter 8 offers an integrated approach to how this 
might be applied to sea level rise knowledge practices from global to local scales. More 
work on knowledge and governance practices around climate change adaptation planning 
is needed to understand how those practices help or hinder diverse knowledge 
integration.  
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8.1 Introduction  
Over the past century, changes in mean sea level and increased tidal fluctuations 
have been recorded around the world and modeled projections show the potential for sea 
level rise to significantly impact cities’ social, ecological, and technological systems 
(IPCC 2012) here termed SETs (Grabowski et al. 2017). In two particularly vulnerable 
regions—the South Pacific and South Florida USA—sea level rise is expected to be 
around 80 inches by 2100 (Compact 2015; Sweet et al. 2017); this rise is expected to 
contribute significantly to extreme weather-related risks (IPCC 2012). In response, 
coastal governments work to manage threats posed to urban life (e.g. raising roads and 
expanding stormwater drainage in Florida and discussing plans for retreat and relocation 
in Kiribati). These sea level rise adaptation strategies vary in their underlying value 
systems, spatial scales, and forms of institutional collaboration. While part of a seemingly 
innocuous technical planning processes, sea level rise transitions are inherently political 
in their processes, indicators, and outcomes, often reinforcing long-standing unequal 
development and power relations (Kaika 2017), because the types of knowledge and 
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expertise used in decision-making inherently ignore some risks and favor others (Gross 
2010).  
Scholarship on community and urban resilience continues to rapidly evolve, 
encompassing prescriptive and descriptive analyses (e.g. Cutter et al. 2008), as well as 
process-based approaches that frame resilience as an emergent property of risk-
negotiating social, environmental, and infrastructural systems (Adger et al. 2005). Here 
we expand this work by asking how different socio-political arenas describe and frame 
the risks of sea level rise at different temporal, spatial, and administrative scales. We use 
knowledge systems analysis to expose linkages between global and local knowledges and 
transformations of irreducibly complex social, ecological, and technical systems (SETs) 
of the city (McPhearson et al. 2016) and beyond. Drawing upon field work with urban 
and regional managers and engaged communities, we propose the concept of ‘scalar 
politics of risk,’ i.e. the ways in which scales explicitly frame and channel interactions 
between knowledge systems that define and manage risks. Here we provide a theoretical 
grounding for this approach, explicate five distinct arenas of ‘scalar politics,’ and 
illustrate the utility of this conceptual framework (Figure 1) by examining results from 
interviews with practitioners and communities engaged in sea level rise adaptation in 
Miami, USA and the Pacific Islands. By exploring the scalar politics of risk, we present a 
framework for exploring sea level rise (and other) governance that can make more 
explicit the knowledge systems and politics at play within multi-scalar governing bodies.  
Theoretical Grounding of the Scalar Politics of Risk 
The notion that systemic forms of knowledge are developed and often 
problematically deployed by governments and municipalities to manage territories, 
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populations, economic activities, and infrastructures have long been studied by scholars 
of science and technology studies (Scott 1998; Graham and Marvin 2001, Pritchard 
2011), including those explicitly examining city level adaptations to climate change 
(Miller 2004; Muñoz-Erickson 2014). We draw on these works, as well as fundamental 
concepts of coproduction of knowledge and social order (Foucault 1980; Jasanoff 2004), 
knowledge systems analysis (Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 2018), and the social and 
scientific production of risk (Beck 1992) to examine sea level rise.  
First, of particular importance to understanding sea level rise adaptation is the 
literature examining the totalizing potential of seemingly apolitical scientific knowledge 
production (Porter 1996), which can erase the social and political contingencies of its 
production, or the ‘power knowledge relationship’ (Foucault 1980). Powerful actors often 
frame specific knowledges as inherently apolitical, obscuring the actual political and 
subjective elements of knowledge creation (Hajer 1995; Jasanoff 2004; Agrawal 2005). 
Jasanoff (2004) describes this power/knowledge relationship as coproduction. She 
explains, “Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of society. It 
both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, 
discourses, instruments, and institutions” (Jasanoff 2004, p. 3). Thus, looking through a 
coproductive lens clarifies the ways in which particular understandings of the world are 
privileged in questions of what is being studied, why it is being studied, and how it is 
being studied (Porter 1996; Scott 1998; Jasanoff 2004). These considerations are not only 
theoretical, but also inherently practical as local climate adaptations form the basis of the 
urban experience of sea level rise, and misalignment between framings at different levels 
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of decision-making about adaptation can lead to less equitable and less effective 
outcomes.  
Second, to help expose the underlying coproduction of sea level rise adaptation, 
we utilize knowledge systems analysis. Organizations often focus on examining policy 
outcomes rather than the values, assumptions, and routines that go into their policy 
decision-making processes in the first place. Knowledge systems analysis, instead, 
examines how knowledge is conceived and constructed for decision-making, rejecting the 
concept of the “logic of discovery” that assumes knowledge is found, pre-formed and 
ready for use (Miller and Muñoz-Erickson 2018). Knowledge systems analysis builds on 
the concept that different disciplinary practices designate rules, standards, and norms for 
producing legitimate and useful knowledge (Foucault 1980; Gieryn 1999; Wynne 2003), 
as well as defining what constitutes the ‘public’ for whom such knowledge is relevant 
(Rogers and Hall 2003; Rancière 2015). This is key to holistically understanding sea level 
rise adaptation and its consequences. 
Lastly, we specifically seek to examine how risks are conceived and constructed 
by different knowledge systems, both shaping and being shaped by the social and 
material world (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Miller and Edwards 2001; Jasanoff 2004). In 
following this coproduction of risk, we examine the processes by which dominant 
discourses, expertise, and institutions render risk calculable and knowable. And while 
risks are most often understood from a material point of view (i.e. risk is the probability 
of a consequence), a constructivist point of view unpacks this process and asks: whose 
experience counts, who bears the consequences, and who determines the probabilities 
(Beck 1992; Lupton 1999), making institutional structure the ultimate cause of risk 
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perception (Rayner 1992). These theoretical foundations—power/knowledge, knowledge 
systems analysis, and risk construction—ground our work in multi-scalar sea level rise.  
8.2 Scalar politics of risk in sea level rise adaptation planning 
While humans have certainly dealt with rapid climate change throughout their 
evolutionary history (Calvin 2002), anthropogenic climate change presents two novel 
considerations. First, human decisions surrounding SETs and resource consumption has 
directly produced climate change and its corollary, rapid sea level rise, both of which are 
clearly visible in the geologic record (Zalasiewicz et al. 2017). Secondly, and more 
importantly for our purposes here, climate change has for the first time in the human 
story been understood as a truly global phenomenon rather than a local or regional event, 
as well as a phenomenon requiring coordinated global responses (Edwards 2001; 
Demeritt 2001; Miller 2004). However, insufficient attention has been paid to the various 
intermediate scales between the construction of global knowledge systems and local 
experiences of climate change. To fill this gap, we argue for understanding feedbacks 
between five scalar arenas within which knowledge is co-produced and turned into 
actions (Muñoz Erickson 2014). Between each arena—which correspond to distinct 
spatial and temporal scales (Figure 8.1)—knowledge must be translated (Latour 2012) 
into forms relevant for decision-making within each political arena. Below, we define the 
scope of each arena (summarized in Table 8.1), briefly describe existing work that has 
uncovered each arena, and identify key tensions within each.  
 
228 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Distribution of the five scalar arenas across spatial, biophysical, and administrative time.
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Table 8.1 Summary of definitions, processes, and key tensions within the five arenas of scalar politics of 
risk. 
 
Definition: Processes: Key Tensions: 
Scalar Work 1: Construction of global climate from local and planetary observations 
Local data collection, data 
aggregation, scenario 
building, and local and 
global discourses. 
Global bodies (IPCC, etc.) shape 
climate knowledge requirements and 
discourses. Local data collection 
procedures are shaped by global 
requirements and shape global data. As 
local data is aggregated and taken up 
into scenario building processes, 
discourses and ways of knowing 
compete for authority. 
Issues of temporal and spatial 
scale, resolution, and 
sensitivity; limitations of 
translation from predictions to 
reality; displacement of local 
voices and needs. 
Scalar Work 2: Regional downscaling of climate impacts 
The creation of SLR 
knowledge relevant to 
localized governance 
strategies from global 
climate measurements and 
regional biophysical 
processes. 
Institutional and social players at the 
global and regional level set SLR 
adaptation priorities and lend authority 
to particular ways of knowing. Based 
on prioritization practices, historic and 
scenario-based modeled outputs are 
often used to project future 
infrastructure and local policy needs.  
Top-down agenda-setting—
regional adaptation policies 
structured by global knowledge 
decisions. Downscaling data 
challenges—globally-produced 
models lack specificity for local 
decisions. Politics of temporal 
choice—political contestation 
over planning horizons for 
adaptations and infrastructures. 
Scalar Work 3: The creation of risks and vulnerabilities out of biophysical impacts 
Risks are produced by 
SLR’s interaction with 
SETs, and the practices by 
which those are analyzed 
and prioritized. 
Institutional processes prioritize the 
ecological, economic, technological, 
and social dimensions of risk according 
to existing expertise and structures. 
Risk discourse shaped by what is 
known and valued. 
Political economy of 
expertise—authorization and 
prioritization of particular ways 
of knowing by groups with 
power. Social constructions of 
risk—the spatial and social re-
apportioning of SLR impacts 
through discourse and 
knowledge practices may not 
address local issues. 
Scalar Work 4: SETs transformation via adaptation actions on-the-ground 
On-the-ground adaptation 
actions transform the 
social, ecological, and 
Political power exerted via technical 
proposals for adaptation. Different 
solutions are legitimized and/or 
delegitimized through technical 
Expert vs. lived experience—
the ‘inevitability’ of adaptation 
can prioritize engineering 
expertise above grassroots 
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technological systems 
(SETs) of a local place. 
decision-making procedures around 
infrastructure. Local prioritization, 
authorization, and enactment of 
adaptations transform material reality 
on the ground, leaving legacy impacts. 
input. Adaptation vs. legacy—
climate changes demand shifts 
in SETs and financial systems, 
yet legacy impacts can be 
resistant to change. 
Scalar Work 5: Evaluation and certification of best practices for addressing risks 
Ways in which local 
initiatives to manage risk 
are monitored, as well as 
how they interact with 
local-global strategies for 
managing risk. 
Evaluation procedures may or may not 
exist, based on the institutional value 
placed on assessment. Institutions that 
do put evaluation procedures in place 
set up procedures to determine the local 
effectiveness of interventions based on 
constructions of risk and prioritization 
of expertise. Infrastructures are then 
evaluated for how they fit with global 
certification procedures as strategies for 
effectively managing risk. 
Legitimization of risk 
management—expertise 
embedded in existing 
institutional practices is 
prioritized in determining 
which risks to evaluate and 
what knowledge to use to 
evaluate them. Temporal issues: 
outputs/outcomes of one-off or 
pilot projects deemed 
acceptable, while long-term 
impacts are not assessed. Scalar 
challenges: global and local 
constructions of risk may be 
considered separately, if at all. 
 
231 
 
Scalar Work 1: Construction of global climate from local and planetary observations 
Global sea level rise projections rely on complex coupled social, technological 
and environmental models to project climate and oceanographic conditions in the near 
and distant future. These modelled projections rely on ongoing practices of local (e.g. 
tidal gauges, buoys), remote (e.g. satellite measurements of mean sea level), and 
historical (e.g. stratigraphic records) data (Miller 2004). Practices of aggregating different 
forms of data (e.g. biophysical and socio-economic) are then used to construct possible 
future scenarios (Edwards 2001) and local and global discourses interdependent with 
these modelling processes are deployed (Jasanoff and Long-Martello 2004). Global 
projections are thus extremely sensitive to both scientific uncertainties (Hansen 2007) 
and the socio-economic and technological scenarios guiding emissions projections. They 
are also of limited relevance for local decision makers due to a mismatch in scales of data 
aggregation and analysis; this contributes to distrust against scientific, political, and 
humanitarian actors when models fail to match local experiences (Mahony 2014), or take 
into account uneven vulnerabilities (Nicholls and Mimura 1998) and longer standing 
practices of community resilience (Spencer et al. 2016), resulting in further victimization 
of local people rather than empowerment (Miller 2004; McNamara and Gibson 2009). In 
this arena, global institutions such as the IPCC represent a unified body of knowledge 
(Hulme 2013) yet rely on inherently contentious processes of legitimizing and 
constructing knowledge which can often mask the conditional elements of projections of 
future conditions (Hulme 2010). In response, a large body of work has sought to ‘down-
scale’ global climate projections to more relevant regional scales however, down-scaled 
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results still contain the inherent uncertainties of global projections processes outlined 
above. 
Scalar Work 2: Regional downscaling of climate impacts 
Regional downscaling includes the creation of localized sea level rise rates and 
projections from global projections (e.g. mean sea level rise, tidal variance, extreme 
weather patterns) and regional biophysical processes (e.g. tectonic uplift, sediment 
accretion, tidal geometries). These biophysical processes are assessed using similar data 
collection and aggregation protocols, yet come with their own sets of assumptions, 
uncertainties, and social decisions about what constitutes the region (Fawn 2009) and 
what processes are considered relevant by different social actors involved in their 
creation. Adjudication of knowledge relevance cannot be separated from the constellation 
of social and political actors involved, all of whom have their own demands for regional 
sea level rise projections, while also being constrained by gatekeeping organizations 
(Lejano et al. 2013). The selection of metrics and scales (time, space, and administrative) 
to address sea level rise knowledge and governance, especially as regional downscaling is 
often performed by global actors (Miller 2004), produce tension between global 
institutions and the needs of regional decision makers. Additionally, such decisions can 
be shaped by political and financial pressures, rather than by best available science 
(Edwards et al. 2007). These dynamics can both disrupt or solidify institutional 
arrangements by identifying which problems are likely to emerge and implementing 
presumably—though not guaranteed—effective responses (Wildavsky 1988; Barnett 
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2001), which ultimately depend on the ability to make regional impacts legible as matters 
of social concern or risk. 
Scalar Work 3: The creation of risks and vulnerabilities out of biophysical impacts 
Risks are produced by translating impacts into operational and functional damage 
to regional and local SETs (Adger et al. 2009), such as damages to the built environment, 
as well as potential loss of life. Risks are what make impacts meaningful for decision 
makers who possess their own institutional priorities and knowledge systems (Short and 
Clark 1992; Wisner et al. 2014) and are subject to the influence of powerful interests 
(Kelman 2014; McCubbin et al. 2015;). Risk translation as a scientific practice relies on 
higher precision models of localized impacts of anticipated events, yet in order to be 
robust, requires recognizing diverse risk and vulnerability knowledge for adequate 
system characterization (Dovers et al. 1996; Barnett 2001). Given that risks are both 
regional (e.g. regional infrastructure failure), and local (e.g. a neighborhood being 
washed away), we must avoid unproblematically valorizing the ‘local trap’ (Jasanoff and 
Long-Martello 2004), which equates locality with spatial smallness, social homogeneity, 
and norm similarity (Agrawal and Gibson 1999). By focusing on weaknesses and 
shortcomings, risk production can produce a loss of confidence in decision-making 
(Campbell 1997), as well as bounding the effectiveness of different management and 
adaptation strategies (McCubbin et al. 2015). 
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Scalar Work 4: SETs transformation via adaptation actions on-the-ground 
On-the-ground adaptation actions require specific transformations of given SETs. 
In this arena, scalar politics move from socio-political processes of planning and into the 
seemingly apolitical technical practices of engineering and design. However, this process 
is indeed political as proposed and enacted material actions on the ground distribute risks, 
benefits, and costs differentially through the “hidden” work of project finance and design 
(Heynen et al. 2006), along with the internalization of assumptions from the previous 3 
scalar arenas. sea level rise and climate change make SETs transformation inevitable; the 
key question then becomes how the lived experience of these transformations, including 
grassroots and unstructured responses, relate to formal processes of planning and 
designing adaptation measures, including adjudicating between competing technical 
proposals. Additionally, the path dependency of existing infrastructures and knowledge 
systems impede SETs transformations through pre-existing practices of prioritizing 
capital distribution and material inertia on the ground (Palm 2006). Flows of capital 
embedded in infrastructure systems shape local spaces, with the sunk costs of previous 
infrastructure choices impacting any future adaptation proposals (Palm 2006). Taken 
together, these considerations highlight both the complexity of translating risks into 
material adaptation proposals, making the evaluation of their effectiveness a key 
consideration for their contextual desirability, as well as global generalizability.  
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Scalar Work 5: Evaluation and certification of best practices for addressing risks 
Evaluation and certification of best practices for addressing risks involves the 
ways in which SETs transformations managing risk are monitored and evaluated, as well 
as how they scale up to act as best practices and generalizable strategies within the other 
four scalar arenas. As rapid sea level rise becomes a driving concern of regional and city 
level adaptation programs, there is a need to construct robust monitoring and evaluation 
programs that are shaped by contextual process and distributional concerns to assess the 
effectiveness of interventions and compare to global municipal peers (Holling and Meffe 
1996). To do so, the original contexts of risk constructions and competing knowledge 
claims (e.g. marginalization of local voices, creation of pathological path dependencies) 
must not be ignored as institutions seek to attain measurable outcomes. Temporal and 
spatial challenges to representative assessment can impact the ability of locals to 
adequately assess their own interventions, not least because of global social and 
environmental concerns that make sea level rise rates uncertain. Mechanisms of 
evaluation encounter limited control comparisons for one-off or local projects, procedural 
justice assessments (e.g. how equitable is the process), as well as risk shifting (e.g. sea 
walls transferring risk to adjacent communities). At the same time, larger scale impacts 
are often ignored (e.g. the impacts of large scale construction projects on rates of climate 
change). 
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8.3 Applying Scalar Politics of Risk  
We apply the scalar work framework to case studies of sea level rise adaptation 
planning in the Pacific Islands (Table 8.2) and Miami-Dade County, Florida USA (Table 
8.3), two regions that are undergoing adaptation planning and implementation. Case 
studies were developed based on empirical work done by two of the authors of this paper. 
Each case used interviews, document analysis, and literature reviews to examine 
conceptions of sea level rise risk. In each case, we identify key dynamics affecting the 
circulation of knowledge in framing vulnerabilities and solutions to climate change in 
each identified arena. The different scales that each case study represents allows us to 
explore how vulnerability is framed and by whom, to make explicit the scalar elements of 
risk construction and governance, and to understand how different communities are 
perceiving risk across scales. This illuminates the ways in which risk construction in 
urban environments is produced by, and productive of, global trends in climate change 
governance.  
Pacific Island Nations 
PI- Scalar Work 1  
The Pacific Islands are often the focus of literature surrounding regions hit by sea 
level rise, and frequently portrayed as victims (Denton 2017). Lower levels of scientific 
and technical capacity require many Pacific Island countries to rely on IPCC projections 
of sea level rise--staffed by predominantly Northern, white, male scientists (Barnett and 
Campbell 2010) who value scientific expertise--or use global data collection networks’ 
requirements as guiding forces. With the stringent requirements made by global data 
gathering networks, this means that PIs are mostly limited to gathering the data that is 
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required globally without paying attention to local needs and conditions. As these 
capacity challenges play out in global discourses, there is rarely inclusion of beliefs or 
practices promoted by locals to combat these issues (Barnett and Campbell 2010). The 
Pacific Islands are the most commonly discussed and analyzed region within global 
climate change, which can be damaging when the same group of people are consistently 
framed as victims or as a vulnerable population. This focus on the Pacific Islands key-
holes its people in the position of victims in the global sea level rise narrative, while other 
groups who are also facing very real dangers in terms of sea level rise are ignored.  
PI- Scalar Work 2  
As data is downscaled, the global framing of the Pacific Islands as victims creates 
politics over knowledge and expertise. For instance, in a recent study of Tuvalu’s 
landmass, researchers found that, as adaptive ecosystems, the islands of Tuvalu had 
actually grown over the last four decades (Kench et al. 2018). These findings produced a 
wide range of reactions among recipients: hope among islanders, vindication among 
climate deniers, or anger and frustration among Pacific Island climate negotiators, 
depending on the recipient’s position (Friedman 2018). Additionally, in 2016 the 
Guardian released a story entitled, “Five Pacific islands lost to rising seas as climate 
change hits” (Anon. 2016). Immediately after, the publication released a correction 
requested by the study’s authors, “Headlines 'exaggerated' climate link to sinking of 
Pacific Islands” (Mathiesen 2016). Debates like this one are rarely simple, power and 
authority produced by and productive of climate change knowledge means that 
contestation is at the heart of the decision-making.  
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Such contestation can put additional pressure on already constrained scientific and 
technical capacity of PIs. For instance, large-scale funders are prioritizing even more 
rigorous data collection processes to address these measurement issues rather than 
investing more heavily into adaptation strategies. This can be seen in recent efforts to use 
LiDAR to measure the landmass of islands in addition to the simple sea level rise buoy 
measurement used up to this point (UNCC 2018). The new procedures require costly 
technology and training to use properly, even as adaptation measures become more 
informed.  
PI- Scalar Work 3  
Risks are continuously shifting due to the adaptive nature of the islands, 
ecologically but also socially, and politically. Traditional ways of knowing trend toward 
an adaptive knowledge of nature that puts power to overcome climate risks in the hands 
of capable, adaptive communities (Denton 2018). Alternatively, global strategies tend to 
view nature as an object in need of control, therefore requiring scientific and technical 
capacity to overcome challenges. In response to the global strategies view of risk, one-off 
pilot projects are used to mitigate for rapid shifting social, ecological, and political 
changes. These strategies come about due to the global discourses of urgency and 
inevitability of biophysical climate risks that delegitimize alternative approaches. As 
Barnett and Campbell argue, “These regular statements have the effect of rendering 
climate change as an environmental fact against which actors can do little but suffer. 
They deny the agency of people at risk: to define the problem in their own terms; to apply 
their own systems of knowledge; to implement the solutions that are appropriate to their 
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needs and values and which accommodate uncertainty; and to make knowledge claims of 
equal value to those of science” (2010, p. 2).  
PI- Scalar Work 4  
The construction of Pacific Islanders as victims in need of scientific and technical 
capacity to overcome climate challenges and control an unwieldy nature has fostered 
inconsistent and, at times, counterproductive infrastructure interventions. International 
investments in infrastructure in the region require extensive pre-grant assessments that 
can be prohibitively costly in terms of time and resources (Denton 2018). This fosters the 
emphasis on one-off and pilot projects that can have counterproductive outcomes. For 
example, seawalls are regularly used in the Pacific as a tangible adaptation to sea level 
rise that also appeals to global desires to control nature. Imbedded in these choices is also 
a colonial history and international aid that shapes the flows of finance in the region 
(Atteridge and Canales 2017). While alternative approaches like mangroves are used as 
well, considerations of beach development, the visibility of an intervention and the ability 
to “fly the flag” of the donating country, etc. are considered in determining this choice. In 
fact, local communities many times choose this option due to lower upkeep and the 
perceived lack of alternatives. 
PI- Scalar Work 5  
Although the region emphasizes scientific and technical capacity, it may seem 
ironic that evaluation and certification play such small roles in climate governance. The 
use of one-off and pilot projects means that projects can only be evaluated for achieving 
outputs or adhering to processes, but not for other desired impacts including alleviating 
risks and vulnerabilities. Projects that do run long-term have resource constraints that can 
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make it challenging to evaluate broader impacts. Additionally, global constructions of 
risk can be privileged over local-level evaluation, hiding the nuances of attitudes between 
islands. One example of this is in the differing ways in which ‘climate refugee’ status is 
considered. Some countries such as Kiribati have purchased land on Fiji for climate-
based migration, others like the Marshall Islands denounce migration seeing it as giving-
up on making polluters pay. 
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Table 8.2: Pacific Island case study scalar work processes and key tensions.  
Pacific Islands 
SLR presents a pervasive risk to islands everywhere. In the Pacific Islands, detangling the specific risks 
presented by SLR from development pressure, ocean acidification, & climatic changes resulting in 
extreme weather events can be challenging. This leads to multiple contestations over authoritative 
knowledge, power in decision-making, & risk constructions, which move between & across scales. 
 Processes: Key Tensions: 
Scalar Work 1: 
Construction of 
global climate 
from local & 
planetary 
observations 
Lower levels of scientific & technical 
capacity create reliance on IPCC SLR 
projects. Efforts within the PIs are 
mostly limited to gathering the data that 
is required globally without paying 
attention to local needs & conditions.  
Global victimization of the region. 
Contestation between local & global 
data/adaptation needs. 
Scalar Work 2: 
Regional 
downscaling of 
climate impacts 
Reliance on international community 
pits scientific assessments against local 
experiences of SLR resulting in debates 
over knowledge within climate change 
diplomacy & governance.  
Regional contestation over 
measurements. Scientific/technical 
capacity constraints exacerbated by 
global requirements. Adaptive capacity 
possibilities & realities largely ignored. 
Scalar Work 3: 
The creation of 
risks & 
vulnerabilities 
out of 
biophysical 
impacts 
The construction of risks is 
commensurate with different views of 
nature. Pacific Islanders often view 
nature as an adaptive ecosystem which 
puts power to overcome climate risks in 
the hands of capable, adaptive 
communities, while understanding 
nature as an object in need of control 
creates other problems & solutions. 
Risks constructed without consideration 
of multiple types of capacity or ways of 
knowing. Views of nature delimit the 
nature of risk & opportunities for 
addressing vulnerabilities. 
Scalar Work 4: 
SETs 
transformation as 
adaptation 
International investments in 
infrastructure in the region require 
extensive pre-grant assessments that can 
be prohibitively costly in terms of time 
& resources. This fosters the emphasis 
on one-off & pilot projects that can have 
counterproductive outcomes. 
Outside funding requires extensive up-
front investment in status evaluation, 
limiting access to quality projects. Pilot 
projects produce inconsistent &, at 
times, counterproductive infrastructure 
interventions. Colonial flows of finance 
can shift decision-making, leaving 
long-term legacy impacts. 
Scalar Work 5: 
Evaluation & 
certification of 
best practices for 
addressing risks 
The use of one-off & pilot projects 
means that projects can only be 
evaluated for achieving outputs or 
adhering to processes, but not for if the 
measures had the desired impacts--
alleviating risks & vulnerabilities 
One-off & pilot projects are limited to 
process evaluation instead of impact 
evaluation, leaving little opportunity for 
improvement. Evaluation of risk 
abatement can be out of touch with 
local valuations & constructions of risk. 
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Miami-Dade County, Florida, USA 
MDC- Scalar Work 1  
Low-lying coastal regions of the United States such as South Florida are 
portrayed as ground zero for sea level rise by the media, scientists, and environmental 
activists. In the global narrative, sea level rise impacts in Miami-Dade County are 
primarily focused on tourism and affluent residents, which can overshadow discussions 
of vulnerable and marginalized communities within the region. The region has high-
levels of technical and scientific capacity, with support from federal agencies to gather 
and integrate localized datasets into global sea level rise models.   
MDC- Scalar Work 2  
Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (Compact) formed in 2009 
as a four-county partnership between Miami-Dade, Broward, Monroe, Palm Beach 
Counties, and cities align regional sea level rise projections and lobby for funding. 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, disagreements amongst scientists and policymakers centered 
around which sea level rise models and rates to adopt (e.g. IPCC, NOAA, and USACE), 
with some scientists arguing that because some sea level rise projections fail to account 
for ice melt acceleration and localized processes they underestimate sea level rise. While 
some local governments were reluctant to adopt sea level rise projections, external forces 
with locally relevant projections (including NOAA and the USACE), as well as the 
collaborative Compact effort, helped to drive the adoption of higher projections that 
extend further into the future. The Compact adopted projections from NOAA, the 
USACE, and the IPCC, which are now the primary projections referenced in Miami-Dade 
County.  
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MDC- Scalar Work 3  
Miami-Dade County development is supported by systems of canals and other 
stormwater infrastructure. Upon initial settlement, large-scale infrastructure projects were 
built to drain portions of the Everglades and allow for development. As such, risks from 
sea level rise are primarily understood in terms of physical, economic, and infrastructure 
domains. For example, a process called “bathtub modeling” is used to superimpose where 
water will rise with sea level rise stemming from the coast, adding water levels to high-
tides and using elevation gradients to determine what areas will be inundated. This form 
of modeling has several limitations as it assumes that land geomorphology, tidal surface 
variability and other conditions remain constant (e.g. groundwater surface water 
interactions), and it does not consider additional hydrodynamic effects during storm 
surges (SFRCCC 2012). Because of these limitations, the use of bathtub modeling 
emphasizes risks to coastal regions and de-emphasizes inland risks. And while the 
primary focus for assessments is on infrastructure, vulnerability assessments often 
highlight property values. Several interviewees shared that this is in part to get attention 
and garner action for adaptation strategies. At the same time, however, the emphasis 
placed on economic risks may lead to the ongoing focus of adaptation strategies that 
support the economy over others. Currently, it appears that sea level rise risk knowledge 
that supports an economically viable future is favored over knowledge that may threaten 
that future. For example, calls for fine resolution LiDAR to better understand elevation 
gradients support engineered solutions and building at higher elevations, and support 
dominant narratives that the region will not stop growing, that growth will happen in a 
different way. While community organizations emphasize concerns over high-elevation 
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climate gentrification, emergency preparedness, displacement, insurance, and health 
impacts, few government assessments covering these issues have been completed, though 
recent planning efforts may begin to address these issues.  
MDC- Scalar Work 4  
Engineered solutions dominate SETs transformation and, as technical design 
tasks, are being viewed as an apolitical decision points with limited to no interaction with 
people prior to decisions around where to adapt and how to adapt have been made. 
Planning decisions around infrastructure are made in an expert space and rooted in a path 
dependency around existing infrastructure. Infrastructure decisions around stormwater 
management, wastewater treatment, and water provision surround cost benefit analysis 
and risk management decision-making practices that focus on level of service and shaped 
by policies including the NFIP and Clean Water Act stormwater permitting. Issues of 
public versus private investments and responsibilities are emerging. In the City of Miami 
Beach, for example, roads are being raised with new stormwater drainage and landowners 
are expected to tie their driveways into the new system. Longer-term, people have begun 
to speculate and question whether it would be up to individual landowners to raise their 
homes, and historic designations and zoning disagreements have been emerging around 
the drive for new development and ground raising over older buildings that are 
susceptible to flooding. Planners also express concern over how to plan for lower income 
communities where the adaptation costs for private property may be prohibitively 
expensive. While additional efforts are taking place including community organizing 
efforts via education and organizing to access decision-making arenas; environmental 
organizations designing and implementing green infrastructure and living shoreline 
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projects; and informal discussions of localized and regional planned retreat, these are 
primarily on the planning periphery. 
MDC- Scalar Work 5  
Several projects and programs have built in monitoring and evaluation. For 
example, the Compact, which develops regional goals and planning practices, holds an 
annual meeting with policy-makers, managers, scientists, and other practitioners to share 
information. In addition, the Compact has a process for reviewing sea level rise 
projections as new models and information are available. The recent Regional Climate 
Action Plan published by the Compact reflects broader inclusion than the first plan, 
expanding to groups and topics including social equity. And while at the regional level 
the tendency has moved towards evaluation and broader inclusion, individual projects 
have had varying levels of evaluation. Several projects initiated by the Compact and 
different foundations are evaluated as case studies communicated to cities around the 
world. The City of Miami Beach recently received high praise from an independent panel 
of experts brought in to evaluate their sea level rise adaptation strategies. Projects within 
the region have been used as case studies, design charrettes, and project feasibility 
assessments and this knowledge has circulated the region primarily via the Compact. This 
knowledge often focuses on the technocratic aspects and infrastructure designs and less 
about the process and public/community involvement. 
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Table 8.3: Miami-Dade County, Florida case study scalar work processes and key tensions.  
Miami-Dade County, Florida, USA 
Climate projections suggest that Miami-Dade County will experience increased flooding from SLR, 
higher severity of extreme weather events. Municipalities have undertaken activities to mitigate 
anticipated impacts from SLR. The City of Miami Beach, for example, is implementing an aggressive 
& expensive plan to combat SLR by moving water off city streets & away from businesses & houses. 
 Processes: Key Tensions: 
Scalar Work 1: 
Construction of 
global climate 
from local & 
planetary 
observations 
High technical & scientific capacity & 
support from federal agencies allows for 
local datasets & technologies to be 
integrated into SLR models.  
Ground zero for SLR but portrayed as 
affluent & able to handle the adaptation 
challenges. The focus on economic & 
infrastructure risks overshadows 
marginalized communities within the 
city & surrounding areas. 
Scalar Work 2: 
Regional 
downscaling of 
climate impacts 
The Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact (Compact) (a 4-county 
& multi-city partnership) was formed in 
2009 to adopt a unified regional SLR 
projection, lobby for funding, & 
coordinate planning activities.  
Process contested & shaped by 
reticence around ice melt, climate 
change denialism, & political 
uncertainty. Pattern of gov. wanting to 
adopt smaller projections, but support 
for larger projections came from local 
downscaling of models via NOAA, 
USACE, and collaborative efforts. 
Scalar Work 3: 
The creation of 
risks & 
vulnerabilities 
out of 
biophysical 
impacts 
Development is supported by systems of 
canals & other stormwater infrastructure. 
Upon initial settlement, large-scale 
infrastructure projects were built to drain 
portions of the Everglades & allow for 
development. As such, risks from SLR 
are understood in terms of physical, 
economic, & infrastructure domains. 
Knowledge systems that support the 
dominant political economy, linking 
power with knowledge, is more 
prevalent & sometimes runs counter to 
knowledge that addresses social risks. 
Scalar Work 4: 
SETs 
transformation 
via adaptation 
actions on-the-
ground 
Planning decisions around infrastructure 
are made in an expert space & rooted in 
a path dependency around existing 
infrastructure, cost benefit analysis, & 
risk management decision-making. 
Public private tensions around 
responsibility for funding adaptation. 
Path dependency around engineered 
solutions. Engineered solutions are 
expensive & may be unattainable for 
many individuals & communities.  
Scalar Work 5: 
Evaluation & 
certification of 
best practices for 
addressing risks 
Evaluation & certification of best 
practices occurs primarily via the 
Compact & foundations funding design 
charrettes. Evaluation of stormwater 
projects in Miami-Beach has recently 
taken place with panel of experts.  
Knowledge gathered to evaluate 
focuses on the technocratic aspects & 
infrastructure designs & less about the 
process & public/community 
involvement. 
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8.4 Discussion 
 As Foucault argues, “Power never ceases in its interrogation, its inquisition, its 
registration of truth; it institutionalizes, professionalizes, and rewards its pursuit” (1980, 
p. 93). In both PIs and Miami, technical and scientific approaches are largely privileged 
over local constructions of risk, as technological solutions are presented by global actors 
as working across scales without having to address many, if not all, cross-scale socio-
political tensions. While PIs are largely making decisions in transnational space about sea 
level rise knowledge and adaptation, Miami’s work at the urban scale mirrors many of 
the politics at play. Global constructions of a vulnerable and victimized Pacific Islands 
have prioritized scientific and technical approaches to risk abatement, while largely 
ignoring the knowledges, discourses, and capacities used by the Islanders, themselves. 
Alternatively, perceptions of affluence surrounding residents of the Miami area has left 
vulnerable and marginalized communities within the region largely ignored, instead 
measurable elevation and property value considerations are emphasized. The globalized, 
objective approaches to sea level rise in these areas obscure rights and knowledges from 
non-expert and local communities in attempts to scale up knowledges, practices, and 
discourses in sea level rise adaptation. As local populations are written off as victims in a 
global, technical space, they are left out of the sea level rise projections and models.  
It is in these spaces that scalar politics of risk play out as knowledge systems 
interact and compete across scales, from global to local and back again. These tensions 
are cascading—global constructions of the climate victimize both Pacific Islanders and 
Miami-Dade County residents (Scalar Work 1), which then causes regional approaches to 
emphasize scientific measurement over local understanding (Scalar Work 2), which then 
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constructs risks as technical concerns (Scalar Work 3) that transform SETs and leave 
legacy infrastructures (Scalar Work 4), which then pose challenges for quality evaluation 
(Scalar Work 5). These things also work in reverse, however, as legacy infrastructures 
(Scalar Work 4) impact global sea level rise measurements (Scalar Work 1) and 
opportunities for policy change (Scalar Work 2). Additionally, regional policy changes 
(Scalar Work 2) can transform the processes by which data is collected for global models 
(Scalar Work 1) and what risk abatements are evaluated (Scalar Work 5). Without 
addressing each scale within the system, hidden struggles over knowledge, discourses, 
and practices can remain just that—hidden.  
8.5 Conclusion 
We have used knowledge systems analysis to question the construction of science, 
and the framing of science as apolitical and objective, specifically in respect to multi-
scalar understandings of the risk of sea level rise. We look at five primary arenas in 
which a scalar politics of risk emerge: 1) the construction of the global climate; 2) the 
regional downscaling of climate impacts; 3) the local definition of risks; 4) the 
transformation of on-the-ground social-ecological-technical systems and infrastructures; 
and, 5) the evaluation of intervention efficacy.  
The processes by which power flows through these knowledge systems can leave 
local populations, saddled with victim discourses, with little recourse. Adaptive 
capacities, non-expert/non-scientific knowledge systems, and everyday practices can be 
hidden by ‘objective’ investigations in to sea level rise. A thorough investigation of scalar 
politics thus works to take apart the “regimes of truth” that conceal the histories of how 
those ways of knowing came to be (Foucault, 1980). These principles and practices do 
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not only apply to Miami and Pacific Islands but can work across knowledge systems at 
all scales. We encourage future work to continue to investigate these scalar politics of 
risk in this and other arenas.  
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Appendix A: Timeline of events related to sea level rise adaptation planning in 
Miami-Dade County 
1992 Hurricane Andrew, Category 5. 
1992 Responding to Andrew, Miami-Dade County improved stormwater management 
program. 
1995 Florida updated building codes, primarily for wind. 
1998 Miami-Dade County created first FEMA Local Mitigation Strategy. 
2006: Miami-Dade County Water Conservation Program Established. 
2006 The Board of County Commissioners established the Miami-Dade County Climate 
Change Advisory Task Force, through the adoption of Ordinance 06-113. 
2007: The South Florida Water Management District passed a regulation that put a cap in 
the Biscayne Aquifer (Miami-Dade County’s main source of drinking water).  Led the 
county to implement aggressive water conservation program and plans to drill into the 
Floridan aquifer (which is deeper and less susceptible to saltwater intrusion).  
2008 February: Miami-Dade County entered into Joint Funding Agreement 
08E0FL20817 with the USGS to develop an integrated surface/groundwater numerical 
flow model, with one of the objectives of the project being to evaluate if sea level rise 
will cause salt water intrusion into coastal wellfields 
2008 April: Miami-Dade County Climate Change Advisory Task Force delivered Second 
Report and Initial Recommendations to county commissioners. 
2008: State Law governing water treatment outflows (forces Miami-Dade County to 
upgrade systems at cost of $3.3 billion). 
2009 Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact formalized. 
2009: The South Florida Water Management District’s Interdepartmental Climate 
Change Group published a report entitled, “Climate Change and Water Management in 
South Florida.” This report provides an overview of the impacts of sea level rise, 
temperature, evapotranspiration, rainfall, floods, drought, tropical storms, and hurricanes 
to South Florida. This report states that flood protection in Southeast Florida may be 
impacted by sea level rise. The report identifies several existing South Florida Water 
Management District coastal structures in Miami-Dade County that could be potentially 
impacted. The South Florida Water Management District initiates a new pilot project to 
determine the current level of flood protection in the C-4 basin, to consider future 
changes that may impact flood protection, and to develop adaptation strategies to address 
such impacts with funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
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2010: Miami-Dade County Climate Change Advisory Task Force delivered 
Recommendations to county commissioners. 
2010: Miami-Dade County GreenPrint Published, includes some of the recommendations 
from the Miami-Dade County Climate Change Advisory Task Force, but not the 
projections from the Science and Technology Committee. 
2012: Miami-Dade County started negotiating second consent decree with EPA because 
of needed updates to water treatment facilities to come into compliance with regulations.  
2012: City of Miami Beach approved stormwater master plan, the plan discussed sea 
level rise but no actions to address it.  
2012 October: Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact Publishes first set of 
projections. 
2012: Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact publishes first Southeast 
Florida Regional Climate Action Plan. 
2013 July: Miami-Dade County Sea Level Rise Task Force Created through Miami-Dade 
County Resolution R-599-13, adopted on July 2, 2013. It was amended to add a seventh 
member through Resolution R-744-13, adopted on Sept. 17, 2013. 
2013: Miami-Dade County and EPA finalized water treatment consent decree, total cost 
of prescribed projects/upgrades $1.6 billion. 
2013: Mayor Philip Levine elected to City of Miami Beach on a campaign to drain the 
streets.  
2013 October: Board of County Commissioners approved amendments in Miami-Dade 
County’s Comprehensive Development Master Plan to incorporate language addressing 
climate change and sea level rise in over thirty objectives and policies of the plan. 
2014 April: Formal partnership between the South Florida Water Management District 
and the Ministry of Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment of the Netherlands 
established.   
2014 September: USGS integrated surface/groundwater numerical flow model published. 
This enhanced modelling is considered by scientists and planners to be extremely 
important to planning because of its improvement to “bathtub” sea level rise inundation 
maps.  
2014: The streets in Miami Beach were dry during the King Tides. The city had plugged 
holes in the pipes and put in critical pumps during Mayor Levine’s first year in office.  
2014 January: City of Miami Beach Mayor’s Blue-Ribbon Panel on Flood Mitigation 
meets for first time. 
 
272 
 
2014: Resolution R-451-14 and Ordinance 14-79 were adopted in 2014, requiring that 
planning, design and construction of Miami-Dade County infrastructure consider 
potential sea level rise impacts. 
2014 July: Miami-Dade County Sea level Rise Task Force submits recommendations to 
County Commissioners. The main recommendation is to implement the recommendations 
that the first Advisory Task Force produced in 2008 and 2010. 
2015: South Florida Water Management District initiated a two-year grant project that is 
funded by NOAA’s Sectoral Applications Research Program. It was awarded to the 
South Florida Water Management District and their partner, Deltares10, for their project 
entitled, “Flood and Drought Risk Management Under Climate Change: Methods for 
Strategy Evaluation and Cost Optimization.”  
2015: The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact Publishes second set of 
updated projections. These include NOAA and IPCC projections, not just USACE 
projections that the 2012 version had. Also, the 2015 projections extend to 2100 whereas 
the 2012 version only went to 2060. 
2015: City of Miami establishes Sea Level Rise Committee via Resolution: R-15-0072.  
2015: January 21, 2015, the Board of County Commissioners (Board) passed seven (7) 
resolutions, each supporting the implementation of one of the seven recommendations 
included in the “Miami-Dade Sea Level Rise Task Force Report and Recommendations.” 
Resolution R-48-15, which requires a quarterly status report and a final report within 364 
days, directs the Mayor or Mayor’s designee to work in conjunction with the Office of 
Intergovernmental Affairs (OIA), the South Florida Water Management District, the 
USGS, and other member Counties of the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change 
Compact to conduct a comprehensive study and develop adaptation strategies to address 
potential flood damage reduction and salt water intrusion associated with sea level rise. 
2016: Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, and the City of Miami Beach selected as 
for the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Initiative.   
2017: The 100 Resilient Cities Initiative for Greater Miami and the Beaches publishes 
their initial assessment of community, economic, and environmental “Stressors and 
Shocks.” 
2017: City of Miami joins the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact. 
2017 April: Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact begins updating 
Southeast Florida Regional Climate Action Plan 2.0 
2017: Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact publishes the second 
Southeast Florida Regional Climate Action Plan.  
                                                          
10 Deltares is an independent research institute which focuses on applied research in the field of water, 
subsurface, and infrastructure. Deltares is based in Delft and Utrecht in the Netherlands, with a USA branch 
(Deltares USA) based in Silver Springs, Maryland. 
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Appendix B: Key Documents  
Document Name Year  Author 
MD County Stormwater Master 
Plan C-7 Basin Phase II Executive 
Summary and Final Report 
2006 Miami-Dade County 
Miami-Dade Climate Change 
Advisory Task Force Second 
Report and Initial 
Recommendation 
2008 Miami-Dade County 
Presentation on SLR to first 
climate change committee 
2008 Dr. Hal Wanless, University of Miami 
Planning for Hazards and Climate 
Change Impacts: One County's 
Approach 
2009 NOAA 
An Update on USACE Sea Level 
Change Guidance and Preliminary 
Applications for Everglades 
Restoration Projects  
2010 US Army Corps of Engineers 
Miami-Dade County GreenPrint 
Our Design for a Sustainable 
Future 
2010 Miami-Dade County 
Climate Change Advisory Task 
Force Status of Recommendations 
2010 Miami-Dade County 
Analysis of the Vulnerability of 
Southeast Florida to Sea Level 
Rise 
2012 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
A Region Responds to a Changing 
Climate: Southeast Florida 
Regional Climate Change 
Compact Counties: Regional 
Climate Action Plan 
2012 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
Implementation Guide: Southeast 
Florida Regional Climate Action 
Plan 
2012 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
Regional Impacts of Climate 
Change and Issues for Stormwater 
Management 
2012 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact; South Florida Water 
Management District 
US EPA Region 4 Adaptation 
Implementation Plan 
2013 Environmental Protection Agency 
Nature Conservancy Coastal 
Resilience Visualization Tool 
2013 The Nature Conservancy 
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Adaptation Action Area Pilot 
Project Report 
2013 South Florida Regional Planning Council 
SFWMD Lower East Coast Water 
Supply Plan Update 
2013 South Florida Water Management District 
USACE Incorporating Sea Level 
Change in Civil Works Programs 
2013 USACE 
Miami-Dade Sea Level Rise Task 
Force Report and 
Recommendations 
2014 Miami-Dade County Sea Level Rise Task 
Force 
2014 Municipal Implementation 
Survey Report 
2014 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
US DOT Climate Adaptation Plan 
Ensuring Transportation 
Infrastructure and System 
Resilience 
2014 US Department of Transportation 
Workshop on Robust Decision 
Making Under Deep Uncertainty 
2014 South Florida Water Management District 
Nature-Based Coastal Defenses in 
Southeast Florida 
2014 The Nature Conservancy 
Regional Climate Action Plan 
Health Impact Assessment  
2014 Florida Institute for Health Innovation; 
Broward County; Southeast Florida 
Regional Climate Change Compact 
Policy and Advocacy 
Implementation Report 
2014 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
Integrating Climate Change and 
Water Supply Planning in 
Southeast Florida 
2014 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
20-Year Water Supply Facilities 
Work Plan  
2014 Miami-Dade County 
Miami 2040 Long Range 
Transportation Plan 
2014 Miami-Dade County 
USACE Procedures to evaluate sea 
level change: impacts, responses, 
and adaptation 
2014 USACE 
Sea Level Change and Long-
Range Water Resources Planning 
for Florida 
2014 USACE 
Unified Sea Level Rise Projection 
Southeast Florida 
2015 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact  
Guidelines to Local Governments 
for Temporary Coastal Armoring 
Seaward of the Coastal 
Construction Control Line 
2015 Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection 
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Miami-Dade County 
Comprehensive Development 
Master Plan 
2015 Miami-Dade County 
Village of Pine Crest 
Comprehensive Development 
Master Plan 
2015 Village of Pinecrest 
Miami Comprehensive 
Neighborhood Plan 
2015 City of Miami 
Miami Beach Stormwater 
Management Master Plan 
2015 City of Miami Beach 
Village of Pine Crest Stormwater 
Master Plan Report 
2015 Village of Pinecrest 
Pinecrest Survey for Landowners 
about Flooding 
2015 City of Pinecrest 
Pinecrest Stormwater Plan 2015 City of Pinecrest 
Effective Sea Level Rise 
Communication Strategies for 
Local Governments 
2016 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact and The Miami 
Foundation 
Integrating the Unified Sea Level 
Rise Projection into Local Plans 
2016 Institute for Sustainable Communities 
Local Mitigation Strategy Miami-
Dade County Whole Community 
Hazard Mitigation 
2016 Miami-Dade County 
Memorandum Miami Dade 
County: Final Status reports in 
response to multiple resolutions 
pertaining to recommendations by 
the sea level task force 
2016 Miami-Dade County 
Assessment of Available Tools to 
Create a More Resilient 
Transportation System 
2016 Miami-Dade County 
Climate Adaptation: The State of 
Practice in U.S. Communities 
2016 The Kresge Foundation 
Report on Flooding and Salt water 
intrusion 
2016 Miami-Dade County  
Mobilizing Miami for Sea Level 
Rise 
2016 The Miami Foundation and the Knight 
Foundation, written by firm, Sightful 
Sea Level Rise and U.S. Coasts: 
Science and Policy Considerations 
(by Congressional Research 
Service) 
2016 Congressional Research Service 
Reducing Climate Risk and 
Creating Economic Opportunity 
(Regional Climate Action Plan 
Implementation Support Guidance 
Series) 
2016 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
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Southeast Florida Climate 
Indicators 
2016 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
Integrating the Southeast Sea 
Level Rise Projections into 
Community Planning 
2016 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
South Florida Climate Change 
Vulnerability and Adaptation 
Assessment Pilot Project 
2016 U.S. Department of Transportation 
Adaptation Action Areas: 
Feasibility Assessment 
2016 Miami-Dade County 
Miami Frontlines Coalition Letter 2016 Community organizations and leaders 
FreddieMac Life's a Beach: 
Economic and Housing Insight 
2016 FreddieMac 
Health and Sea Level Rise: 
Impacts on South Florida 
2016 Florida Institute for Health Innovation 
Climate Change Advisory Task 
Force 
2016 Miami-Dade County 
Strategic Implementation of the 
Environmentally Endangered 
Lands Program 
2016 Miami-Dade County 
Hydrologic Conditions in Urban 
Miami-Dade County, Florida, and 
the Effect of Groundwater 
Pumpage and Increased Sea Level 
on Canal Leakage and Regional 
Groundwater Flow 
2016 USGS 
FEMA Letter to Mayor Cindy 
Lerner about CRS rating in Village 
of Pinecrest 
2016 FEMA 
USACE Guidance for 
incorporating climate change 
impacts to inland hydrology in 
civil works studies, designs, and 
projects 
2016 USACE 
Arch Creek Briefing Book 2016 Miami-Dade County  
Arch Creek Final Report 2016 Urban Land Institute 
Pinecrest Climate Action Plan 2016 City of Pinecrest 
What Climate Change Means for 
Florida 
2016 Environmental Protection Agency 
Climate Change Leadership 
Training 
2017 Catalyst Miami 
Rising to the Challenge, Together: 
A review and critical assessment 
of the state of the US climate 
adaptation field 
2017 The Kresge Foundation 
Miami-Dade County: selected 
policies and legislation related to 
sea level rise and climate change 
2017 Miami-Dade County 
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100 Resilient Cities Preliminary 
Assessment 
2017 Miami-Dade County, City of Miami, City 
of Miami Beach 
Miami-Dade Comprehensive 
Planning Survey 
2017 Miami-Dade County 
Compact survey for feedback on 
the Regional Climate Action Plan 
2.0 
2017 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
USACE Guidance for detection of 
nonstationarities in annual 
maximum discharges 
2017 USACE 
Joint Statement on Collaboration 
for Regional Economic Resilience 
in Southeast Florida  
2017 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
Regional Climate Action Plan 2.0 2018 Southeast Florida Regional Climate 
Change Compact 
   
   
   
 
  
 
278 
 
Appendix C: Interview Guide 
 
Interview guide for planning professional, manager, and government employees 
Tell me a bit about your background and how you got to your current position. 
 
When did you first get involved in sea level rise planning? 
[Alternatively: Can you tell me about your current role in sea level rise adaptation 
planning?] 
 
What are some of the projects and policies you are aware of going on in the county? 
 
What are your thoughts on how the region is doing regarding sea level rise adaptation 
planning? 
[Alternatively: What are the biggest issues regarding sea level rise adaptation planning?]  
 
What parts of the county do you see getting investment and resources for sea level rise 
adaptation? 
 
Are there areas getting more resources and investments towards adaptation planning than 
other areas?  
Follow-up questions: 
• What is it about these areas that you think makes them receive more resources and 
investments? 
• What do you see as driving adaptation planning?  
• Where is the funding coming from? 
 
What types of strategies do you see getting the most investment and resources for sea 
level rise adaptation? 
Follow-up questions: 
• What is it about these strategies that you think makes them receive more 
resources and investments? 
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Can you tell me about some of the policy changes that have taken place since sea level 
rise adaptation planning became a priority for the region? 
 
What was your main objective with [name of document/effort/adaptation/etc] 
 
What do you think are the most important things that can be done to prepare the region 
for sea level rise? 
Follow-up questions:  
• What is it about these strategies that make them so important?  
• How is the region addressing these strategies?  
• What do you think it will take to implement these strategies? 
• How would you prioritize these strategies? 
 
Where in the county is most vulnerable to sea level rise?  
Follow-up question:  
• What about these places makes you think they are vulnerable? 
 
Can you tell me about your relationship with other organizations in the area who are also 
working on sea level rise adaptation planning?  
Follow-up questions:  
• Who do you see are most involved in adaptation planning efforts?   
• Who do you work with? 
• How do you work with them? 
• Who are your most vocal opponents/Critics? 
 
What, in your opinion, would be a successful sea level rise adaptation project?  
[Alternatively: How do you measure project success?]  
 
What lessons have you learned from this process that you could share with other areas? 
 
What is your hope for this region in 50 years from now?  
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Interview guide for community, environmental, or other organization  
Tell me a bit about your background and how you got to your current position. 
 
What are your interests in sea level rise planning?   
 
What are your thoughts on how the region is doing regarding sea level rise adaptation 
planning? 
[Alternatively: What are the biggest issues regarding sea level rise adaptation planning?] 
 
What are the biggest issues regarding some of the proposed adaptation strategies or 
policies affecting your organization?  
 
What was your main objective with [name of document/effort/adaptation/etc] 
 
What parts of the county do you see getting the most attention for sea level rise 
adaptation? 
Follow-up questions: 
• What is it about these areas that you think give them the most attention? 
• What do you see as driving adaptation planning?  
 
What parts of the county do you see getting the least attention for sea level rise 
adaptation? 
Follow-up questions: 
• What is it about these areas that you think give them the least attention? 
 
What types of strategies do you see getting the most attention for sea level rise 
adaptation? 
Follow-up questions: 
• What is it about these strategies that you think give them the most attention? 
 
What was your main objective with [name of document/effort/adaptation/etc] 
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What do you think are the most important things that can be done to adapt to sea level 
rise? 
Follow-up questions:  
• What is it about these strategies that make them so important?  
• How is the region addressing these strategies?  
• What do you think it will take to implement these strategies? 
• How would you prioritize these strategies? 
 
Where in the county is most vulnerable to sea level rise?  
Follow-up question:  
• What about these places makes you think they are vulnerable? 
 
Can you tell me about your relationship with other organizations in the area who are 
working on sea level rise adaptation planning?  
Follow-up questions:  
• Who do you see are most involved in adaptation planning efforts?   
• Who do you work with? 
• How do you work with them? 
• Who are your most vocal opponents/Critics? 
 
What, in your opinion, would be a successful sea level rise adaptation project?  
[Alternatively: How do you measure project success?]  
 
What lessons have you learned from this process that you could share with other areas? 
 
What is your hope for this region in 50 years from now?  
 
Ask questions directly related to their views on how risk is framed in adaptation 
planning.  
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Appendix D: Codebook used in Atlas.ti 
 
100 Focus of Risk 
101 Economic/Tourism 
102 Ecological 
103 Infrastructure/Canals/Buildings 
104 Wellness and health 
105 Political 
106 Identity, sense of place 
107 Historical 
108 Hazard 
109 Water supply 
110 Agriculture 
111 Communities of Special Concern 
112 Private Property 
113 Affordable Housing 
114 Future Generations 
115 Legal/Liability 
 
200 Interpret Information About Risk (Risk Measurement) 
201 Models 
202 Assessments/plans 
203 Personal Experience 
204 Historical Information  
205 Community input 
206 Cost benefit analysis/Valuation 
207 Prioritize Projects  
208 Best Available Science 
209 Vulnerable Places in the County  
210 Media 
211 Maps 
212 Materiality/Understanding of Physical Property of risk 
213 Harmonization  
214 Scientific Study 
215 Scenarios 
 
300 Risk Boundary 
301 Baseline  
302 Projection Range (temporal) 
303 Uncertainty 
304 Boundary (geographical) 
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305 Constraints/Limitations 
306 Monitoring/evaluation 
 
400 Planning Process 
401 Comprehensive Land Use Planning 
402 Stormwater Planning 
403 Water and Sewer Planning 
404 Vulnerability Assessment 
405 Adaptation Action Area 
406 Hazard Mitigation Planning 
407 Post Disaster Recovery 
408 Adaptive Management/Planning 
409 Sustainability/Resiliency Planning 
410 Task Force/Committee 
411 Adaptation Planning  
412 Incremental Planning 
413 Proactive 
414 Reactive 
415 Economic development 
416 Regional Plan 
417 Holistic 
 
500 Governance 
501 Laws/Policies/Regulations 
502 Funding 
503 Transparency 
504 Accountability 
505 Inclusiveness 
506 Fairness 
507 Collaboration/Integration  
508 Capability 
509 Adaptability 
510 Legitimacy/Authority 
 
600 Knowledge Networks 
601 Partnerships 
602 Trust 
603 Miami-Dade County 
604 City 
605 Southeast Florida Regional Climate Compact 
606 SFWMD 
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607 Resilient Cities Network 
608 Insurance/Reinsurance/FEMA/NFIP/CRS 
 
700 Solutions 
701 Public Perception/Educate 
702 Communication 
703 Business 
704 Infrastructure 
705 Policy changes 
706 Design changes 
707 Natural Systems 
708 Flood Control 
709 Retreat 
710 Community Organizing 
711 GHG Mitigation 
712 Technology Innovation 
 
800 Other  
801 Barriers 
802 Lack of Action 
803 Politics 
804 Vision 
805 Adaptation project details 
806 Climate Change Denial  
807 Leadership 
 
900 Other Documents 
901 Potential Interviewees 
902 Historical Information 
903 Personal Background 
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Appendix E: Events Attended During Field Research 
Name of Event 
Date 
Attended Brief Description 
Stand Up Rise Up Film 
Screening of Revolution 3/22/2017 
Event put together by CLEO and other 
environmental organizations to show film 
about degraded coral reef habitat in South 
Florida. Panel following screen filming 
had several stakeholders involved in sea 
level rise adaptation planning.  
City of Miami Sea Level 
Rise Committee Meeting 3/27/2017 
Monthly committee meeting at City Hall 
for sea level rise Committee.  
Miami-Dade County FEMA 
Risk MAP Technical 
Update Meeting #2 3/28/2017 
Meeting hosted by Taylor Engineering, no 
FEMA Staff present. A technical meeting 
to go over FEMA Risk Mapping updates. 
Several county and city employees 
(including floodplain administrators) 
present for updates. 
North Beach Neighborhood 
Association Meeting 4/3/2017 
Meeting about proposed zoning changes 
to North Beach neighborhood in the City 
of Miami Beach. Focus was on comparing 
proposed changes with the recently 
developed North Beach Plan. Sea level 
rise was key component, up-zoning 
discussion based on need for resilient 
buildings, counter to community goals of 
historic and maintaining quality of life. 
City of Miami Beach 
Project Open House 4/4/2017 
Organized by City of Miami Beach to 
share information with residents that will 
be affected by stormwater upgrades 
(including road raising) 
Salon Juste 4/5/2017 
Climate justice panel organized by 
community activists and lawyers. 
CLEO Institute Climate 101 5/4/2017 Introductory training on climate change.  
City of Miami General 
Obligations Bond Public 
Comment: City Hall 5/8/2017 
Information meeting about proposed 
General Obligation Bond which featured 
stormwater management and sea level rise 
adaptation planning.  
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City of Miami General 
Obligations Bond Public 
Comment: Hadley Park 5/15/2017 
Information meeting about proposed 
General Obligation Bond which featured 
stormwater management and sea level rise 
adaptation planning.  
City of Miami General 
Obligations Bond Public 
Comment: Little Havana  5/16/2017 
Information meeting about proposed 
General Obligation Bond which featured 
stormwater management and sea level rise 
adaptation planning.  
City of Miami General 
Obligations Bond Public 
Comment: Juan Pablo 
Duarte 5/17/2017 
Information meeting about proposed 
General Obligation Bond which featured 
stormwater management and sea level rise 
adaptation planning.  
New Florida Majority 
Presentation by Chris 
Gongoria and Film 
Screening from Dwight 
Bullard: The Birth of a 
Nation 5/18/2017 
Community event organized by New 
Florida Majority, an organization involved 
in resiliency and community organizing 
around climate justice and hurricane 
preparation/response 
City of Miami Sea Level 
Rise Committee Meeting 5/22/2017 
Monthly committee meeting at City Hall 
for sea level rise Committee.  
Gen CLEO Meetup 5/23/2017 
Event designed for youth engagement in 
climate change work in Miami.  
 
 
